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Cost raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly

Mason, R. (1999) Cost raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly , Southampton, UK University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9908).

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

Abstract

This paper provides a characterisation of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise their common cost. The dynamic analysis has two advantages over existing static models. First, it avoids conceptual weaknesses, allowing conjectures to be derived endogenously rather than imposed. Secondly, it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organisation (quantity and price adjustment, and learning-by-doing).

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Published date: January 1999

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33143
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33143
PURE UUID: 4bbb7e5b-960e-4fd4-baf8-3ebba16db776

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Date deposited: 20 Dec 2007
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:53

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Contributors

Author: R. Mason

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