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Optimal federal capital income taxation

Kotsogiannis, C. and Makris, M. (1998) Optimal federal capital income taxation , Southampton, GB University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9820).

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)


Intergovernmental grants are not available to all federations. In this paper, optimal federal tax policies in a multileveled government framework are studied, when the federal authority has no access to intergovernmental grants, and the state governments implement the residence principle. A vertical fiscal externality exists. The federal government, using the available tax instruments, has a dual role; it corrects the inefficiences that arise from the non-cooperative behaviour of the state governments and also redistributes income. It is shown that there may exist a conflict in the redistributional considerations of the federal government and the achievement of production efficiency between the federation and the rest of the world.

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Published date: January 1998


Local EPrints ID: 33172
PURE UUID: 6b22a11e-fde0-4847-8594-0699b92d8d0c

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Date deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:53

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Author: C. Kotsogiannis
Author: M. Makris

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