Optimal federal capital income taxation


Kotsogiannis, C. and Makris, M. (1998) Optimal federal capital income taxation , Southampton, GB University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9820).

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Description/Abstract

Intergovernmental grants are not available to all federations. In this paper, optimal federal tax policies in a multileveled government framework are studied, when the federal authority has no access to intergovernmental grants, and the state governments implement the residence principle. A vertical fiscal externality exists. The federal government, using the available tax instruments, has a dual role; it corrects the inefficiences that arise from the non-cooperative behaviour of the state governments and also redistributes income. It is shown that there may exist a conflict in the redistributional considerations of the federal government and the achievement of production efficiency between the federation and the rest of the world.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
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ePrint ID: 33172
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January 1998Published
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:17
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33172

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