Contracts and productive information gathering
Contracts and productive information gathering
We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost, (g) , to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of (g), incite the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study tradeoffs that are involved
University of Southampton
Cremer, J.
ce1026e1-a48b-4ecc-94e1-a9c1fee4ba04
Khalil, F.
13dda263-0988-48f8-8b4c-c1e9974ce905
Rochet, J-C.
dd0dd128-f3e6-44da-80bc-b1cde76cd616
January 1997
Cremer, J.
ce1026e1-a48b-4ecc-94e1-a9c1fee4ba04
Khalil, F.
13dda263-0988-48f8-8b4c-c1e9974ce905
Rochet, J-C.
dd0dd128-f3e6-44da-80bc-b1cde76cd616
Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J-C.
(1997)
Contracts and productive information gathering
(Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9707)
Southampton, UK.
University of Southampton
Record type:
Monograph
(Discussion Paper)
Abstract
We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost, (g) , to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of (g), incite the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study tradeoffs that are involved
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Published date: January 1997
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 33181
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33181
PURE UUID: 75329bac-a1cf-4624-a5f1-36a7e4475132
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Date deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last modified: 11 Dec 2021 15:19
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Contributors
Author:
J. Cremer
Author:
F. Khalil
Author:
J-C. Rochet
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