Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered , Southampton, UK University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9708).


Full text not available from this repository.


In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
ePrint ID: 33182
Date :
Date Event
January 1997Published
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:17
Further Information:Google Scholar

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item