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Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.

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Citation

Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered , Southampton, UK University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9708).

More information

Published date: January 1997

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33182
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33182
PURE UUID: 5fca0b30-fa12-4e6b-8c62-e124b67333c3

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Date deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:53

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Contributors

Author: J. Cremer
Author: F. Khalil
Author: J.-C. Rochet

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