Portfolio analysis in European merger control: an economic analysis

Vergé, Thibaud (2002) Portfolio analysis in European merger control: an economic analysis CMPO Working Paper, (02/046)


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The year 1997 saw the emergence of a new game theory in European merger control called the 'portfolio power theory'. The European Commission argues that the holder of a comprehensive portfolio of brands may obtain a stronger position vis-à-vis its customers, and can therefore more easily impose restrictions, such as full-line forcing. The objective of this paper is to analyse this argument from a theoretical point of view. We show that tie-in sales allow the incumbent to deter entry and to eliminate the retailer's rent when the downstream sector is monopolised. When the producers compete directly for consumers, the second brand provides a new predation tool. This allows the incumbent to deter entry more easily, but it can also limit price distortion. In both cases, the welfare impact is not clear-cut.

Item Type: Article
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ePrint ID: 33364
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Date Event
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:16
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33364

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