Expressive constitutionalism

Brennan, Geoffery and Hamlin, Alan (2002) Expressive constitutionalism Constitutional Political Economy, 13, (4), pp. 299-311. (doi:10.1023/A:1020857219135).


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We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested motivations in the in-period context to relatively general-interest decision making in the constitutional context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to relate to essentially political settings where decision making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions that are insulated from popular voting.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1023/A:1020857219135
Keywords: constitution, expressive behaviour, collective choice

ePrint ID: 33387
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:16
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