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International Political Spillovers: The Case of Labour Market Regulation

International Political Spillovers: The Case of Labour Market Regulation
International Political Spillovers: The Case of Labour Market Regulation
This paper explores how the political support for Labor Market Regulation (LMR) is affected by economic and political integration in a two-country overlapping generations model where countries behave strategically. We model LMR as wage regulation and analyze three institutional settings: Autarchy, Economic Union and Political Union.
We show that, if the economy is dynamically efficient, the support for labor regulation is lower in the Economic Union - characterized by capital mobility - than in Autarchy. This decreases the welfare of the owners of the less mobile factor (labor) even in a setting where today workers are next period capitalists. A Political Union restores, under symmetry, the autarchic outcomes and welfare levels. The asymmetric case is also analyzed.
under-employment, factor mobility, political integration, olg model, dynamic efficiency, factor shares, political economy, economic integration, globalization
1-29
Pica, Giovanni
b040ac62-6055-4724-a6bf-eab1efc22915
Pica, Giovanni
b040ac62-6055-4724-a6bf-eab1efc22915

Pica, Giovanni (2003) International Political Spillovers: The Case of Labour Market Regulation. European University Institute Florence. European Forum. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Working Papers, (12), 1-29. (doi:10.2139/ssrn.497863).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper explores how the political support for Labor Market Regulation (LMR) is affected by economic and political integration in a two-country overlapping generations model where countries behave strategically. We model LMR as wage regulation and analyze three institutional settings: Autarchy, Economic Union and Political Union.
We show that, if the economy is dynamically efficient, the support for labor regulation is lower in the Economic Union - characterized by capital mobility - than in Autarchy. This decreases the welfare of the owners of the less mobile factor (labor) even in a setting where today workers are next period capitalists. A Political Union restores, under symmetry, the autarchic outcomes and welfare levels. The asymmetric case is also analyzed.

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Published date: 2003
Keywords: under-employment, factor mobility, political integration, olg model, dynamic efficiency, factor shares, political economy, economic integration, globalization

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Local EPrints ID: 33416
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33416
PURE UUID: 703957f1-9912-4c59-9518-e86ed1b25d76

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Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:44

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Author: Giovanni Pica

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