Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly
Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly
This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.
317-336
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
2002
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
Mason, Robin
(2002)
Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 50 (3), .
(doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179).
Abstract
This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.
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Published date: 2002
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Local EPrints ID: 33432
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33432
ISSN: 0022-1821
PURE UUID: a786dfb3-7426-42c4-abd6-1c5f875a9aab
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Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:44
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Author:
Robin Mason
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