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Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly

Record type: Article

This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.

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Citation

Mason, Robin (2002) Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, (3), pp. 317-336. (doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179).

More information

Published date: 2002

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33432
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33432
ISSN: 0022-1821
PURE UUID: a786dfb3-7426-42c4-abd6-1c5f875a9aab

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Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:52

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Contributors

Author: Robin Mason

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