Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly

Mason, Robin (2002) Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, (3), pp. 317-336. (doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179).


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This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179
ISSNs: 0022-1821 (print)
ePrint ID: 33432
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:15
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