The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Mason, Robin and Swanson, Timothy (2002) The costs of uncoordinated regulation European Economic Review, 46, (1), pp. 143-167. (doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00087-3).


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Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00087-3
ISSNs: 0014-2921 (print)
Keywords: environmental regulation, strategic entry deterrence, regulatory failure
ePrint ID: 33433
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:15
Further Information:Google Scholar

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