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The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Record type: Article

Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.

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Citation

Mason, Robin and Swanson, Timothy (2002) The costs of uncoordinated regulation European Economic Review, 46, (1), pp. 143-167. (doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00087-3).

More information

Published date: 2002
Keywords: environmental regulation, strategic entry deterrence, regulatory failure

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33433
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33433
ISSN: 0014-2921
PURE UUID: e8efcc4e-fc3d-43db-92bf-4944c8bd51f7

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:52

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Contributors

Author: Robin Mason
Author: Timothy Swanson

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