A game theoretic analysis of international environmental pollution
A game theoretic analysis of international environmental pollution
This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is the recognition that countries assess the costs and benefits of acting cooperatively in a game theoretic way. Two hypotheses emerge: (i) cooperation is easier to sustain than standard Prisoners' Dilemma models suggest; and (ii) significant cooperation is unlikely to be achieved, especially when the gains from doing so are largest. Discussion is confined (with little loss of generality) to the case study of acid rain. Comparison of the theoretical predictions with the Second Sulphur Protocol indicate qualitative support for the second hypothesis: the protocol, it seems, achieves little more than a codification of non-cooperative behaviour.
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Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
1996
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
Mason, Robin
(1996)
A game theoretic analysis of international environmental pollution.
Risk, Decision and Policy, 1 (1), .
Abstract
This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is the recognition that countries assess the costs and benefits of acting cooperatively in a game theoretic way. Two hypotheses emerge: (i) cooperation is easier to sustain than standard Prisoners' Dilemma models suggest; and (ii) significant cooperation is unlikely to be achieved, especially when the gains from doing so are largest. Discussion is confined (with little loss of generality) to the case study of acid rain. Comparison of the theoretical predictions with the Second Sulphur Protocol indicate qualitative support for the second hypothesis: the protocol, it seems, achieves little more than a codification of non-cooperative behaviour.
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Published date: 1996
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Local EPrints ID: 33437
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33437
ISSN: 1357-5309
PURE UUID: 7e4072f8-0995-4126-aa0c-29d15f083ed3
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Date deposited: 09 Jan 2008
Last modified: 22 Jul 2022 20:41
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Author:
Robin Mason
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