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A game theoretic analysis of international environmental pollution

Mason, Robin (1996) A game theoretic analysis of international environmental pollution Risk, Decision and Policy, 1, (1), pp. 33-56.

Record type: Article


This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is the recognition that countries assess the costs and benefits of acting cooperatively in a game theoretic way. Two hypotheses emerge: (i) cooperation is easier to sustain than standard Prisoners' Dilemma models suggest; and (ii) significant cooperation is unlikely to be achieved, especially when the gains from doing so are largest. Discussion is confined (with little loss of generality) to the case study of acid rain. Comparison of the theoretical predictions with the Second Sulphur Protocol indicate qualitative support for the second hypothesis: the protocol, it seems, achieves little more than a codification of non-cooperative behaviour.

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Published date: 1996


Local EPrints ID: 33437
ISSN: 1357-5309
PURE UUID: 7e4072f8-0995-4126-aa0c-29d15f083ed3

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Date deposited: 09 Jan 2008
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:52

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Author: Robin Mason

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