The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions, and Central Bank Independence


Herrendorf, Berthold and Neumann, Manfred J.M. (2003) The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions, and Central Bank Independence The Economic Journal, 113, (484), pp. 43-64. (doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00088).

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Description/Abstract

Using the citizen–candidate model we study the government’s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. We derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post–election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias.
Our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00088
ISSNs: 0013-0133 (print)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
ePrint ID: 33446
Date :
Date Event
2003Published
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:15
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33446

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