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Inflation targeting as a way of pre-commitment

Record type: Article

This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announced inflation target to an instrument-independent central bank, but retains the discretion to revise the inflation target after wages have been set. We argue that since this arrangement is transparent, it solves Canzonen's private information problem, ensures perfect monitoring of the government, and makes reputauonal forces more effective Cases are characterized in which, for this reason, inflation targeting mitigates the inflationary bias of monetary policy.

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Citation

Herrendorf, Berthold (1998) Inflation targeting as a way of pre-commitment Oxford Economic Papers, 50, (3), pp. 431-448.

More information

Published date: July 1998

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33450
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33450
ISSN: 0030-7653
PURE UUID: e093980a-4887-4fd1-bfbf-6bba73571d4b

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Date deposited: 14 Dec 2007
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:52

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Contributors

Author: Berthold Herrendorf

University divisions


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