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The political economy of declining industries: senescent industry collapse revisited

The political economy of declining industries: senescent industry collapse revisited
The political economy of declining industries: senescent industry collapse revisited
Many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection, once it is instituted, to persist over time. This paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment. With endogenous protection, the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs: the more an industry lobbies, the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts, and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future. When the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable, declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust. However, the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection, such as that predicted by Cassing and Hillman (1986, American Economic Review 76, 516–523), in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection. Finally, the paper examines the well-documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process.
lobbying, adjustment, trade policy
0022-1996
221-237
Brainard, S. Lael
b46bdfa1-9377-4772-8529-f51a70e876da
Verdier, Thierry
87c483ea-f473-408f-9776-d0381cab6454
Brainard, S. Lael
b46bdfa1-9377-4772-8529-f51a70e876da
Verdier, Thierry
87c483ea-f473-408f-9776-d0381cab6454

Brainard, S. Lael and Verdier, Thierry (1997) The political economy of declining industries: senescent industry collapse revisited. Journal of International Economics, 42 (1-2), 221-237. (doi:10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01432-8).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection, once it is instituted, to persist over time. This paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment. With endogenous protection, the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs: the more an industry lobbies, the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts, and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future. When the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable, declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust. However, the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection, such as that predicted by Cassing and Hillman (1986, American Economic Review 76, 516–523), in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection. Finally, the paper examines the well-documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process.

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More information

Published date: February 1997
Keywords: lobbying, adjustment, trade policy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33463
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33463
ISSN: 0022-1996
PURE UUID: b4e5f1ee-a323-4f76-8339-e38b04ac1cea

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Date deposited: 14 Dec 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:44

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Contributors

Author: S. Lael Brainard
Author: Thierry Verdier

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