Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types.
4.1-4.21
Naroditskiy, Victor
8881263c-ee85-49f2-b658-99c31b490e1d
Polukarov, Maria
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Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
22 February 2013
Naroditskiy, Victor
8881263c-ee85-49f2-b658-99c31b490e1d
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Naroditskiy, Victor, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R.
(2013)
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 1 (1), .
(doi:10.1145/2399187.2399191).
Abstract
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types.
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Accepted/In Press date: 28 March 2012
Published date: 22 February 2013
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 336512
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/336512
ISSN: 2167-8375
PURE UUID: 7d4218e9-9d76-412d-9681-b81c0fb39e6f
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Date deposited: 28 Mar 2012 13:27
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 10:43
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Author:
Victor Naroditskiy
Author:
Maria Polukarov
Author:
Nicholas R. Jennings
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