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Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains

Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types.
2167-8375
4.1-4.21
Naroditskiy, Victor
8881263c-ee85-49f2-b658-99c31b490e1d
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Naroditskiy, Victor
8881263c-ee85-49f2-b658-99c31b490e1d
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Naroditskiy, Victor, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2013) Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 1 (1), 4.1-4.21. (doi:10.1145/2399187.2399191).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types.

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Accepted/In Press date: 28 March 2012
Published date: 22 February 2013
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 336512
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/336512
ISSN: 2167-8375
PURE UUID: 7d4218e9-9d76-412d-9681-b81c0fb39e6f

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Date deposited: 28 Mar 2012 13:27
Last modified: 30 Jul 2019 18:57

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Contributors

Author: Victor Naroditskiy
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

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