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The temptations of phenomenology Wittgenstein, the synthetic a priori and the ‘analytic a posteriori’

The temptations of phenomenology Wittgenstein, the synthetic a priori and the ‘analytic a posteriori’
The temptations of phenomenology Wittgenstein, the synthetic a priori and the ‘analytic a posteriori’
Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phenomenology’ to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held ‘grammatical’ phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to be tautological. I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein’s adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call ‘analytic a posteriori’ truths through something like the Husserlian method of ‘bracketing’. By the end of 1929, I claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan ‘phenomenology is grammar’, where ‘grammar’ is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the understanding that consists in seeing connections’. Key words: Wittgenstein, phenomenology, grammar, synthetic a priori, seeing connections.
0960-8788
Monk, Raymond
d24bad79-5358-45bb-bc07-8cbc58987bc9
Monk, Raymond
d24bad79-5358-45bb-bc07-8cbc58987bc9

Monk, Raymond (2012) The temptations of phenomenology Wittgenstein, the synthetic a priori and the ‘analytic a posteriori’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phenomenology’ to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held ‘grammatical’ phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to be tautological. I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein’s adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call ‘analytic a posteriori’ truths through something like the Husserlian method of ‘bracketing’. By the end of 1929, I claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan ‘phenomenology is grammar’, where ‘grammar’ is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the understanding that consists in seeing connections’. Key words: Wittgenstein, phenomenology, grammar, synthetic a priori, seeing connections.

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Submitted date: 30 March 2012
Accepted/In Press date: October 2012
Organisations: Philosophy

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Local EPrints ID: 336614
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/336614
ISSN: 0960-8788
PURE UUID: fdba10b2-1ec6-46e8-8e8d-5d8ca7b032c9

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Date deposited: 02 Apr 2012 08:53
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 10:45

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