Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism
Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism
Concerted support from business organisations for increased state welfare provision is unexpected in liberal capitalism, but in Britain this occurred prior to recent major reforms of pensions. Using Mares' micro-theory of employer behaviour and studies of public/private mixes, this article shows that three umbrella organisations of employers and insurers supported higher state pensions because incremental state regulation of non-state provision over many decades and threats about even greater compulsion in the private sector had significantly reduced company control while increasing their costs. As a result, a higher state pension appeared more attractive to all business actors than further regulation of the private sphere. On this basis, we suggest that state regulation should be incorporated more firmly into theories of institutional development and interest formation in liberal regimes.
liberal capitalism, regulation, business organisations, pensions, britain
387-403
Meyer, Traute
ee469bf0-ab32-43ac-9f25-1261c24123fe
Bridgen, Paul
6a2060f6-cbab-47d4-a831-ff82350055c9
July 2012
Meyer, Traute
ee469bf0-ab32-43ac-9f25-1261c24123fe
Bridgen, Paul
6a2060f6-cbab-47d4-a831-ff82350055c9
Meyer, Traute and Bridgen, Paul
(2012)
Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism.
Policy & Politics, 40 (3), .
(doi:10.1332/030557312X645748).
Abstract
Concerted support from business organisations for increased state welfare provision is unexpected in liberal capitalism, but in Britain this occurred prior to recent major reforms of pensions. Using Mares' micro-theory of employer behaviour and studies of public/private mixes, this article shows that three umbrella organisations of employers and insurers supported higher state pensions because incremental state regulation of non-state provision over many decades and threats about even greater compulsion in the private sector had significantly reduced company control while increasing their costs. As a result, a higher state pension appeared more attractive to all business actors than further regulation of the private sphere. On this basis, we suggest that state regulation should be incorporated more firmly into theories of institutional development and interest formation in liberal regimes.
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Published date: July 2012
Keywords:
liberal capitalism, regulation, business organisations, pensions, britain
Organisations:
Sociology, Social Policy & Criminology
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Local EPrints ID: 337930
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/337930
ISSN: 0305-5736
PURE UUID: 6e463dac-6f3e-4212-9134-e5b8433a0a0b
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Date deposited: 04 May 2012 10:16
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:06
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