Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism

Meyer, Traute and Bridgen, Paul (2012) Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism Policy & Politics, 40, (3), pp. 387-403. (doi:10.1332/030557312X645748).


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Concerted support from business organisations for increased state welfare provision is unexpected in liberal capitalism, but in Britain this occurred prior to recent major reforms of pensions. Using Mares' micro-theory of employer behaviour and studies of public/private mixes, this article shows that three umbrella organisations of employers and insurers supported higher state pensions because incremental state regulation of non-state provision over many decades and threats about even greater compulsion in the private sector had significantly reduced company control while increasing their costs. As a result, a higher state pension appeared more attractive to all business actors than further regulation of the private sphere. On this basis, we suggest that state regulation should be incorporated more firmly into theories of institutional development and interest formation in liberal regimes.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1332/030557312X645748
ISSNs: 0305-5736 (print)
Keywords: liberal capitalism, regulation, business organisations, pensions, britain

Organisations: Sociology, Social Policy & Criminology
ePrint ID: 337930
Date :
Date Event
July 2012Published
Date Deposited: 04 May 2012 10:16
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 17:12
Further Information:Google Scholar

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