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Repeating voting with complete information

Kwiek, Maksymilian (2012) Repeating voting with complete information , Southampton, GB University of Southampton 27pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1110).

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)


A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is not constrained efficient because it does not reflect the strengths of voters' opinion. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency

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Published date: 2012
Organisations: Economics


Local EPrints ID: 339086
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: 30d0f0e2-ad4d-4207-b6d0-3c527ef71345

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Date deposited: 23 May 2012 14:11
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 05:54

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