Repeating voting with complete information

Kwiek, Maksymilian (2012) Repeating voting with complete information , Southampton, GB University of Southampton 27pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1110).


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A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is not constrained efficient because it does not reflect the strengths of voters' opinion. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
ISSNs: 0966-4246 (print)
Related URLs:
Organisations: Economics
ePrint ID: 339086
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Date Deposited: 23 May 2012 14:11
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 17:06
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