Electoral competition with local externalities

Ianni, Antonella (2012) Electoral competition with local externalities , Southampton, GB University of Southampton 20pp.


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We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We then analyze the implication that these ndings have in terms of space-time allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a winner-take-all election.

Item Type: Monograph (Project Report)
Organisations: Economics
ePrint ID: 339156
Date :
Date Event
22 May 2012Published
Date Deposited: 24 May 2012 13:38
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 17:06
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339156

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