The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Survival of political leadership

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army's potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent's potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough.

Full text not available from this repository.

Citation

Nurmikko, Sanna (2008) Survival of political leadership , Colchester, GB University of Essex 38pp.

More information

Published date: May 2008
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 339245
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339245
PURE UUID: 04830198-a77a-4008-bfbe-7a0bc4b1a5a5

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 28 May 2012 15:06
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 05:53

Export record

Contributors

Author: Sanna Nurmikko

University divisions


Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×