Delinquent networks


Ballester, Coralio, Calvo-Armengol, Antonio and Zenou, Yves (2010) Delinquent networks Journal of European Economic Association, 8, (1), pp. 34-61. (doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x).

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Description/Abstract

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x
ISSNs: 1542-4766 (print)
Subjects:

Organisations: Social Sciences
ePrint ID: 339641
Date :
Date Event
January 2010Published
Date Deposited: 29 May 2012 08:39
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 17:04
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339641

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