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Delinquent networks

Ballester, Coralio, Calvo-Armengol, Antonio and Zenou, Yves (2010) Delinquent networks Journal of European Economic Association, 8, (1), pp. 34-61. (doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x).

Record type: Article


Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.

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Published date: January 2010
Organisations: Social Sciences


Local EPrints ID: 339641
ISSN: 1542-4766
PURE UUID: a412008c-f2b7-4f82-ad31-d740ca55a062

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Date deposited: 29 May 2012 08:39
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 05:53

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Author: Coralio Ballester
Author: Antonio Calvo-Armengol
Author: Yves Zenou

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