Multi-unit auctions with a stochastic number of asymmetric bidders

Vetsikas, Ioannis A., Stein, Sebastian and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2012) Multi-unit auctions with a stochastic number of asymmetric bidders At 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2012), France. 27 - 31 Aug 2012. 6 pp, pp. 816-821. (doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-816).


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Existing work on auctions assumes that bidders are symmetric in their types — they have the same risk attitude and their valuations are drawn from the same distribution. This is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where highly heterogeneous bidders with different risk attitudes and widely varying valuation distributions commonly compete with each other. Using computational service auctions that are emerging in cloud and grid settings as a motivating example, we examine how an intelligent agent should bid in such multi-unit auctions with asymmetric bidders. Specifically, we describe the equilibrium bidding strategies in three different settings that are distinguished by the levels of uncertainty about the types of other agents. First, we consider a setting with full knowledge about all agents’ types, then we consider the case where the types are uncertain, but the number of bidders is known. Finally, we consider the case where both the number of bidders and their types are uncertain. Our experiments show that using the equilibrium strategies derived from our full analysis leads to increased utility (typically 20?25%) for the participants compared to previous state-of-the-art strategies

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-816
Venue - Dates: 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2012), France, 2012-08-27 - 2012-08-31
Related URLs:
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 340114
Date :
Date Event
August 2012Published
Date Deposited: 13 Jun 2012 10:30
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 16:58
Further Information:Google Scholar

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