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Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
We model aggregate information release, in a dynamic setting with random matching, as a conscious, preference-driven choice. We introduce a "planner", who possesses and selectively reveals aggregate information. Aggregate information is gathered slowly, by taking small samples from the population, and can only be revealed after the dynamic process has stabilized. By selectively revealing information, the planner may upset a given self-conforming equilibrium, in order to achieve a preferred outcome for him. Hence, some self-conforming equilibria are "unstable" relative to public information release. We show that only equilibria supported by heterogeneous beliefs can be information-unstable. We provide several real-life examples of manipulation by means of public information, showing the relevance of the theoretical analysis.
0020-7276
991–1008
Maniadis, Zacharias
70ffa309-94c9-487c-982f-778294ea2a13
Maniadis, Zacharias
70ffa309-94c9-487c-982f-778294ea2a13

Maniadis, Zacharias (2014) Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 43, 991–1008. (doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0415-0).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We model aggregate information release, in a dynamic setting with random matching, as a conscious, preference-driven choice. We introduce a "planner", who possesses and selectively reveals aggregate information. Aggregate information is gathered slowly, by taking small samples from the population, and can only be revealed after the dynamic process has stabilized. By selectively revealing information, the planner may upset a given self-conforming equilibrium, in order to achieve a preferred outcome for him. Hence, some self-conforming equilibria are "unstable" relative to public information release. We show that only equilibria supported by heterogeneous beliefs can be information-unstable. We provide several real-life examples of manipulation by means of public information, showing the relevance of the theoretical analysis.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 27 February 2014
e-pub ahead of print date: 11 March 2014
Published date: November 2014
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 341894
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/341894
ISSN: 0020-7276
PURE UUID: 7026879e-dd55-4992-b5da-eb5a1dcc23d5
ORCID for Zacharias Maniadis: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-3225-0835

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 06 Aug 2012 16:20
Last modified: 21 Nov 2021 03:07

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