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The Securitization of Development Debate within the Global Governance Literature: A Critique

by

Melita Lazell

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 2011
Since the late 1990s, theorists have attempted to understand an apparent securitization of development within the policies produced by global governance networks and institutions (Beall et al., 2005; Duffield, 2007; Woods, 2005). The key assumptions central to much of the securitization of development debate are that: significant areas of the South are excluded from formal global economic networks, but are reintegrating through parallel economic activity; the discourses of security and development are linked by global governance institutions, such that significant areas of the South are conceived as an international security threat; the major agencies of global governance are unified through a liberal consensus, and pursue liberal change through the distribution of aid and through development programmes.

This research is concerned with the ways in which this debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, and its limitations. This theoretical and empirical evaluation takes a number of forms including: an analysis of the policy discourse of key global governance institutions; an examination of world economic trends; a statistical project investigating the distribution of development aid; and a case study of development programming.

This thesis argues that the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of global governance through its identification of both liberal societal transformation as a key rationale of global governance and the security-development nexus as a central framework for North-South relations. It further provides important insights into the productive power of liberal global governance networks and develops a fruitful application of post-structural analysis to the problematic of global development.

This research also identifies theoretical and empirical limitations within this debate. In light of these, an approach is proposed which takes greater account of firstly, the structural dynamics of the global economy and secondly, the internal contradictions and complexities inherent within the discourses of global governance. The former would involve greater engagement with the literature that demonstrates a complex and varied picture of global economic expansion and contraction. This research further suggests that the effect of the axiom that there can be no development without security is ambiguous. And also argues that the suggestion that global governance pursues liberal change through the distribution of aid needs qualification. Finally, further analysis to determine the utility of engaging with the governmentality literature is proposed.
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Melita Lazell

declare that the thesis entitled

The Securitization of Development Debate with the Global Governance Literature: A Critique

and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

• this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
• where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
• where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
• where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
• I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
• where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
• none of this work has been published before submission

Signed: ...........................................................................................................

Date: ............................................................................................................
Acknowledgements

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For great is his love toward us, and the faithfulness of the LORD endures forever.
Psalm 117, verse 2
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>community-driven development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>community-driven reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danida</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General for Development (of the EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7 leading industrial states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 least developed states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (of the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>international financial institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>Jamaican Constabulary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCRMP</td>
<td>Jamaican Constabulary Reform and Modernisation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSR</td>
<td>justice and security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGDF</td>
<td>Sirajgani Local Government Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission on Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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</table>
Theorising development and security problems has traditionally produced two distinct fields of study. However, following humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, theorists have attempted to understand an apparent securitization of development within the policies produced by global governance networks and institutions (Beall, 2005; Duffield, 2007; 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001; Thomas, 2001; Woods, 2005). The journal Security Dialogue has recently published a special issue on the security-development nexus, which elicited numerous replies (Reid-Henry, 2011; Security Dialogue, 2010 issue 41 (1)). This securitization of development debate is primarily situated within the critical global governance literature (Cochrane et al., 2003; Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001a), but also straddles the critical development (Jenson 2010; Thomas, 2001), security (Aning, 2010) and human geography (Pelling and Dill, 2010, Reid-Henry, 2011) fields. These are critical in the sense that they stand as alternatives to orthodox liberal and realist traditions, and are influenced by neo-Gramscian thought, Critical Theory (Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001; Thomas, 2001) and post-structuralism (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2007).

A critique of the securitization of development debate situated within this literature, is the major focus of this thesis. Whilst critical approaches to the study of the securitization of development are not homogenous, they share certain theoretical assumptions that inform their critique of orthodox approaches to the study of global governance and their conceptualisation of the securitization of development. The central figures contributing to this debate include Duffield (2001a), Hoogvelt (2001), Castells (1998) and Dillon and Reid (2000), as well as Williams and Young (1994), Young (1995), Bradbury (2003), Thomas (2001) and Selby (2003). Coming from various critical traditions, all question orthodox understandings of global governance and contribute to the debate surrounding the securitization of development. Of these contributors, Duffield has often led the way. His work is the most significant, comprehensive and influential, encompassing the central assumptions of this debate and substantially impacting upon it (Cochrane et al., 2003; Thomas, 2001; Reid-Henry, 2011). Whilst Duffield is regarded as the main protagonist, the range of key figures in this debate are the focus of critique and their work is referred to throughout this thesis, which also highlights the points of divergence between them.

conceptualisation of a security-development nexus and Duffield (2004a; 2002a), Dillon and Reid (2001; 2000) and Dillon (2003), as well as Selby (2003), Williams and Young (1994) and Young (1995) point towards a specifically liberal form of global governance. Whilst these scholars all contribute to an understanding of the securitization of development, their work is rooted in different traditions and these diverse influences are discussed in chapter two.

This research identifies the strengths and limitations within the securitization of development debate and offers alternatives or modifications that take into account the qualifications and inconsistencies identified. It is guided by the following research questions: in what ways, if any, does the securitization of development debate aid our understanding of contemporary global governance? and what are its limitations?

In order to assess the contribution of this debate to the study of global governance, a review of the orthodox global governance literature was conducted. Following this review it became clear that the deficiencies within orthodox theory could be categorised into three areas: global governance and the global economy; global governance and (in)security; and power within global governance. The work of Duffield and others concerned with the securitization of development makes a significant contribution to these three areas.

With regard to the first it is argued that, rather than the global economy being expansionary, significant areas of the South are structurally excluded from formal global economic networks (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). At the same time, the core states of the global economy are strengthening and deepening their economic links, whilst the South has reintegrated itself into global networks through parallel economic activity (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2002a; 2001a).

Concerning global governance and (in)security, it is argued that the discourses of security and development are linked (referred to as the security-development nexus) by global governance institutions, such that significant areas of the South are conceived as an international security threat (Beall at al., 2006; Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2010; 2007; 2001a; Thomas, 2001).

Finally, with regards to power, the major agencies of global governance are understood to be unified through a liberal consensus, around which international development policy is coordinated. Liberal norms condition how global governance conceptualises the relationship between North and South, and its substantive regulation and management through global development policy (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2000;
Duffield, 2002a; 2001a, Overbeek, 2005). And further, to negate any potential security threat from non-liberal populations, global governance seeks to pursue liberal societal transformation in the South (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2004a; 2001a).

This research takes these three areas – global governance and the global economy, global governance and (in)security, and power within global governance - as its organising structure and systematically examines the arguments made within the securitization of development debate in relation to each.

The Thesis

The thesis has four central contentions. The first regards the theoretical limitations of the securitization of development debate (contention A). It is better at accounting for what Barnett and Duvall (2005) refer to as the productive power of global governance, than the structural power of global capitalism. This is evident, for example, in inconsistencies regarding the causes of the structural exclusion of Southern populations.

Secondly, the related empirical critique demonstrates that the proposition that Southern populations are increasingly excluded from formal global economic networks, needs substantial qualification (contention B).

The third contention uses evidence of development policy discourse to argue that the identification of a security-development nexus is crucial to an understanding of contemporary global governance. On the other hand, there are at least two different narratives at the nexus of security and development, and tensions within the liberal discourse framing global governance. This thesis, therefore, points towards complexity rather than consensus within the networks and institutions of global governance (contention C).

The final contention concerns development practice (contention D). Using empirical evidence gathered for this research, this thesis questions the extent to which a security-development nexus actually impacts upon the distribution of development aid. And further, questions the suggestion that global governance institutions seek to induce institutional change in the South through the distribution of official development assistance (ODA). It does, on the other hand, demonstrate that through development intervention, global governance seeks subjective change at the local level.
Introduction

of Southern populations in order to create the conditions for societal peace, stability
and development.

In summary, taking orthodox theories of global governance as its starting point, this
thesis uses theoretical and empirical critique to argue that the securitization of
development literature can aid our understanding of global governance in a number of
ways, including its characterisation of a security-development nexus, and liberal
societal transformation as an important rationale of global governance. It also sheds
light upon a number of limitations and qualifications within the securitization of
development debate, and in light of these insights, suggests modification and
alternatives.

Methodology

The principal concern of this research is to critically examine the securitization of
development debate and assess its contribution to the study of contemporary global
governance. It examines whether this diverse body of work can provide a coherent
theoretical framework with which to understand contemporary global governance and
also whether the assumptions made and conclusions drawn, have an empirical
foundation. This entails an empirical, as well as theoretical, critique.

There are both discursive and material aspects to the accounts contributing to the
securitization of development debate and these require different methods of
evaluation. There are two elements to the former. Firstly, claims are made regarding
the ideas informing global development policy. For example, the notion that
underdevelopment and conflict in the South are mutually sustaining is considered
fundamental to how the global governance complex constructs its conceptualisation of
the South (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2007; 2001a). Secondly, the wider discourse of
global governance is characterised as liberal consensus, and is understood to play a
unifying and coordinating role amongst global governance actors (Duffield, 2001a:73).

In terms of the material aspect of the securitization of development debate, it is
argued that global capitalism is no longer necessarily expansive, since significant areas
of the South are structurally excluded from the formal networks of the global economy
(Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2002a; 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). Furthermore, the logic of the
security-development nexus is understood to influence the distribution of development
resources (Beall et al., 2005; Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2004a; 2001a). And, in line with
a liberal consensus, it is argued that global governance networks seek to induce
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democratic change through the distribution of aid, and furthermore, pursue the liberal transformation of Southern societies through development programmes (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a; Thomas, 2004b).

In order to evaluate both the discursive and material dimensions, a number of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, are utilised. The discursive claims are evaluated through an analysis of global development policy discourse. Thus, for example, in order to evaluate the extent to which the security-development nexus has become the new common sense understanding of global politics, it is necessary to examine the policy discourse of a number of global governance institutions. The material claims are evaluated through an investigation of historical global economic trends, contemporary economic data, a statistical analysis of aid distribution and a case study examination of development programmes. So, for example, in order to determine whether the security-development nexus has affected the distribution of development resources, trends in the distribution of development aid are examined.

Figure 1 illustrates where each of these methods is employed within the thesis. It shows the chapter headings and research questions guiding each chapter. These methods will now be explained in more detail. The four contentions (set out above) which flow from this research are shown in brackets. Following this the structure of the thesis is set out.

Figure 1 Methodological Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Global Capitalism as a Structurally Exclusive System</td>
<td>Is the idea of exclusion conceptually sound, and does exclusion have an empirical base?</td>
<td>Theoretical evaluation, World economic trends, Contemporary economic data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: The Security-Development Nexus</td>
<td>To what extent does global development policy discourse and practice reflect the logic of the security-development nexus?</td>
<td>Analysis of discourse, Analysis of aid distribution, Theoretical evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Liberal Consensus and Policy Coordination</td>
<td>To what extent does global development policy discourse reflect a liberal consensus, and coordination around this consensus?</td>
<td>Analysis of discourse, Theoretical evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Selective Inclusion and Liberal Societal Transformation</td>
<td>To what extent is global development practice selectively inclusive and aimed towards the liberal societal transformation of the South?</td>
<td>Analysis of aid distribution, Case study of development programmes, Theoretical evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Evaluating Theory (contention A)**

Theory can be evaluated in terms of its empirical foundations (Neufeld, 1995), internal logic (Stoker, 1995), and purpose (Cox, 1981; Linklater, 1996; Neufeld, 1995). In addition to evaluating the strength of its empirical foundation (using the qualitative and quantitative methods discussed below) a theoretical critique of the securitization of development debate is central to this research.

With respect to internal logic, theory must be coherent and consistent (Stoker, 1995). This is of particular importance in relation to accounts of the securitization of development because they attempt to generalise about systemic changes in global politics. Theory must have logical coherence and depth, which “links together in a complex whole, a set of ideas and hypotheses” (ibid:17). Coherence requires internally consistent arguments, without contradictory statements. For example, chapter three argues that structural changes in the nature of global capitalism as well as development policy are, at different times, identified by Duffield as driving exclusion, without an explanation of the relationship between these two driving forces (Duffield, 2001a).

Whilst consistency overlaps with coherence, I use it to mean that the concepts, terms and variables used in a theory are defined clearly and logically (Waltz, 1979). These definitions, once established, must be consistently applied. The language used to refer to them also needs to be clear, understandable and consistent. For example, we might ask whether the concepts of North and South meet these criteria.

Both coherence and consistency are needed if theoretical claims are to be evaluated empirically. Neufeld, following Richard Bernstein, argues that it is necessary for theory to shift away from a positivist approach, without neglecting empirical analysis. This incorporates (i) a concern with achieving an interpretive understanding of the intersubjective meanings which, in part, constitute the social world and (ii) an interest in criticising that world as part of the effort to change it in a way consistent with the goal of human emancipation (Neufeld, 1995:4). As discussed above, empirical claims about the nature of the capitalist world, global governance, and the North-South relationship are made within the securitization of development debate. These claims, which have both inter-subjective and material dimensions, are evaluated through the methods detailed below. Whilst these methods cannot conclusively refute or prove the securitization of development accounts, they can, for example, give an indication as to the extent to which the security-development nexus is reflected in the development
policy and practice of global governance. And can therefore warrant a reassessment of
the claims made and identify limitations.

It is widely agreed that one of the primary purposes of theory is to explain social
phenomena. But what is the purpose of explanation? According to Isaak the point of
theory is to explain and then predict so that we can “ultimately ... make well founded
practical decisions” (Isaak, 1975:137). This is what Cox calls ‘problem solving theory’
(Cox, 1981:128). Cox contrasts problem solving theory with critical theory, the point of
which is not necessarily to explain and predict. Linklater comments that “critical-
thoretical knowledge searches for evidence of change on the assumption that present
structures are unlikely to be reproduced indefinitely” (Linklater, 1996:281), suggesting
that prediction is sometimes of little value to knowledge. Critical theory therefore
focuses on identifying contradictions within the current system and those forces which
have the potential to aid its transformation for the better. According to Neufeld,
theories of world politics must be “as competent and comfortable in theorizing change
in the world order as it is in analysing continuity” and “guide practice which can
address normative concerns as well as questions of practical efficacy” (Neufeld,
1995:3). Thus, we might ask how useful contributions to the securitization of
development debate are in explaining change in the nature of the global order.

Furthermore, Neufeld writes that critical theory should uncover constraints upon
human autonomy and reveal the origins of these constraints ( ibid:17); “the tradition of
thorising associated with the notion of critique served as an instrument of the
delegitimization of established power and privilege” (Neufeld, 1995:14). Critical theory
intends “not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, but to analyse the underlying
social structures which result in these abuses, with the intention of overcoming them”
(Devetak, 1996:146). It is therefore the task of critical theory to provide both a
historical and structural explanation of the power relations framing the prevailing
world order. Critical theory is not simply an objective tool whose function is only to
make sense of the world in order to mange it more efficiently, but seeks to understand
how current social structures came about and how to change them for the better
(Zalewski, 1996:345). In evaluating the securitization of development debate,
therefore, we must ask whether it contains a robust account of where power lies and
how power is employed in relation to the networks and institutions of global
governance.

Finally, scholars stress that international theory should be concerned with substantive
issues in global politics. Marsh and Stoker write that “above all, political science must
deal with the big issues” (Marsh and Stoker, 1995:290). But, “on what grounds does
one identify substantive issues?” (Zalewski, 1996:349). A substantive issue can be judged on the extent of its relation to the emancipatory interest of critical theory. Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with “securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness” (Ashley, 1981 cited in; Devetak, 1996:145). For example, in answering the question posed above, Zalewski states that

[t]he loss of life ... has been a central feature of the study of international politics. Why not alter this core of the subject to consider seriously the leading cause of death in the world – coded by the International Classification of Diseases as Z59.5 – or in more simple terms, poverty. It is surely a serious and substantive issue that this is the world’s biggest killer (Zalewski, 1996:351).

From this perspective, it can be argued that the securitization of development debate does deal with ‘the big issues’. It theorises on the causes of global poverty and inequality, as well as war, security and power. It also identifies contradictions (such as the parallel economy) and forces of change (such as violent conflict).

In summary, theory can be evaluated in terms of its empirical claims, internal logic, and purpose. Reflecting on such issues, this research aims to establish in what ways, if any, the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance.

*Global Economic Trends and Contemporary Data (Contention B)*

Hoogvelt (2001), Castells (1998) and Duffield (2001a) claim that we are experiencing a new phase of capitalist retraction and exclusion. Hoogvelt develops this argument most systematically and thoroughly. Her work is therefore taken to represent the argument that capitalism is currently an exclusionary system, and is the subject of investigation. Using trade, FDI and international capital flow data, Hoogvelt argues that economic links between the North and South are decreasing. In the post-war period, she argues, FDI has been re-directed away from the periphery and into the core. Furthermore, world trade data demonstrates a decline in economic interaction between North and South. Similarly, international capital flows to the South are concentrated on a small number of newly industrialised countries. A substantial body of research investigates historical global economic trends from the 1700 to the present (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; Bordo et al., 2003; Ferguson, 2003; Williamson, 2002). This includes
comprehensive analysis of global trade, including regional breakdown of exports and imports, and the historical levels of trading between particular regions (Maddison, 2001), FDI flows, and the impact of colonialism on the North and South (Ferguson, 2003; O’Brian, 1982). Hoogvelt’s key claims regarding the contemporary phase of ‘capitalist involution’ are evaluated in light of long-term historical global economic trends. Whilst different criteria and methods are used to estimate historical economic trends, in evaluating Hoogvelt’s argument, this analysis uses a number of studies whose estimates can be compared and cross-referenced.

Furthermore, current data from UNCTAD on world FDI and trade flows are examined to assess the extent to which they corroborate Hoogvelt’s ‘involution’ argument. Alternative measurements of FDI and trade are presented, as well as more recent figures using the same measurements as Hoogvelt (2001).

**Analysing Global Development Policy Discourse (contention C)**

In analysing global development policy discourse, I use Vivien Schmidt’s definition of policy discourse as

> ... whatever policy makers say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy programme. As such, discourse encompasses both a set of policy ideas and values and an interactive process of policy construction and communication (Schmidt, 2002:210).

As such, policy documents and interviews with staff of global governance institutions are used to evaluate the discursive dimensions of the securitization of development debate. The documents consist primarily of research papers, policy guidelines, policy papers, conference reports, speeches and policy reviews published by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the governments of the US, UK, Sweden and Denmark, published over approximately the last 15 years (the choice of institutions is justified below). These include, for example, government white papers (DFID, 2000), OECD guidelines for its members (OECD DAC, 2001a) and World Bank conference reports (Treverton, 2005). There were no major problems in obtaining these documents and articles. Most were available on the internet and others were requested directly.
In addition, a greater understanding of global development policy was gained through interviews conducted with staff from the OECD, World Bank, EC, UNDP and the Swedish government. Thirty interviews with high ranking staff working for these institutions were conducted (for a full list of interviewees see appendix 1). These were carried out for a number of reasons: to supplement and corroborate the primary documents; to gain a more in-depth knowledge of the ideas justifying global development policy; and to clarify policy. In addition, the interviews gave a number of further insights. Firstly, they clarified how ideas and discourses have shaped the structure of institutions. For example, interviewees discussed how ‘experts’ in certain fields were employed and whole departments created in response to the idea that development and conflict are mutually sustaining. Secondly, employees who had worked in certain institutions for a number of years were able to give a long-term perspective on policy change. For example, the OECD has recently redefined ODA to include aid for security objectives. Staff considered the pressure from donors for this redefinition as one in a long line of ‘trends’ which donors consider important for a short period, and subsequently drop from their agenda. Finally, interviewees gave an insight into possible future policy directions. This did mean, however, that as well as interesting and salient information, the interviews produced a large amount of irrelevant data. This proved very time consuming when it came to transcribing the interviews. Indeed from planning through to presenting the information, interviews are renowned for being “greedy of resources” (Mason, 2002). Nevertheless, the interviews provided a deeper insight into the ideas and assumptions that underpin global development policy, and the institutional context in which global development policy is generated.

The Geographical Distribution of Aid (Contention D)

An analysis of aid distribution is used to shed light upon two elements of the securitization of development debate: the extent to which the logic of the security-development nexus is reflected in development practice; and the extent to which global governance selectively includes states into aid networks on the basis of their adherence to a liberal framework of governance. To this end, this thesis brings together a wide range of studies that investigate the geographical distribution of ODA. However, no previous studies directly considered these arguments. Therefore, the review of previous studies is supplemented by two original statistical projects designed and carried out for this thesis. Both involve an analysis of ODA from a sample of bilateral and multilateral donors in the period 1991-2002. Year-on-year results are compared to reveal any trends. The first project models the relationship between the amount of aid a state receives and the level of recent domestic conflict that state has
experienced. And the second models the relationship between the amount of aid a state receives and whether it is perceived as adhering to liberal norms.

The recipients’ Conflict Intensity Level was used as an indicator of whether they were perceived as a security threat (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php). Conflict Intensity Level gives each conflict location an intensity level of minor, intermediate, or war, depending on the number of battle related deaths in a given period.

Acquiescence to liberal norms was represented by the widely used political rights and civil liberties index, published yearly in the ‘Freedom in the World Survey’ (http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.htm). Political rights refer to the freedom to organize into political parties or groupings, the existence of party competition and an effective opposition, as well as the existence and fairness of elections, including the possibility to take over power via those elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of the media, the right to open and free discussions, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of religious expression, the protection from political terror and the prevalence of the rule of law (Karatnycky, 1999). For full list of indicators see appendix three.

Using these variables this analysis investigated whether there was any correlation between how much ODA a state received and firstly, whether it was perceived as an international security risk, and secondly, whether it was perceived to adhere to liberal norms.

Previous literature has shown that recipient need affects the amount of ODA a country receives (Trumbull and Wall, 1994, Neumayer, 2003d). Thus the following variables, which are generally used as a proxy for recipient need, were controlled for: Population; Gross Domestic Product; and the Human Development Index score. For a full account of this statistical project see Appendix 2.

**Case Study of Development Programmes (Contention D)**

The extent to which global development programmes reflect the logic of liberal societal transformation cannot be evaluated quantitatively. This proposition is not about whether liberal change has taken place, which could possibly be examined quantitatively through, for example, a study of a state’s civil rights and political liberties scores (http://www.freedomhouse.org). Rather, Bradbury (2003), Thomas (2004b) and Duffield (2002a) argue that, in response to the security-development
nexus, the liberal transformation of southern populations is a central objective of global governance. A qualitative approach was therefore utilised. A case study analysis of two different high profile development programmes was conducted in order to examine the extent to which liberal societal transformation is reflected in actual development programmes. The reason for choosing to undertake a case study examination was to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics, patterns and nuances of these programmes, in order to examine the extent to which they pursue liberal societal transformation. These were instrumental case studies (Berg, 2007:291); the cases were investigated in-depth, not simply to elaborate the case per se, but with the intention to contribute to the critical evaluation of the securitization of development debate.

The two types of development programme examined are local level development programmes and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes. There are a number of reasons for this choice. Firstly, both are referred to within the critical literature as reflecting the new logic of global governance. For example, Williams and Young write that the construction of liberal governance includes the creation of a liberal public sphere or civil society and the creation of modern patterns of behaviour (Williams and Young, 1994), inferring local level transformation. Moreover, Duffield argues that the concept of ‘liberal peace’ embodies a new or political humanitarianism that includes security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy (Duffield, 2001a:11). Secondly, these programmes represent the macro level and micro level transformation which, it is argued, societal transformation requires (Williams and Young, 1994). SSR involves transformation within state institutions (macro-level), whilst local level development requires change within communities (micro-level). Finally, conducting two case studies, rather than one, improves the ability to generalise about a broader context, in this case global development programmes, and makes the conclusions drawn from the research more robust.

Primary and secondary evidence on these cases was acquired. This included documents describing the aims and methods of particular projects, and those reviewing the success and limitations of, and lessons learned from, projects. In addition, information about each of the case studies was gathered from the interviews.

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1 This type of case study can be distinguished from an intrinsic case study, which is undertaken when a researcher wants to better understand a particular case for its own sake and not to understand or test theory.
The Selection of Global Governance Institutions

The selection of global governance institutions whose global development policy discourse, aid distribution and development programmes are examined, reflects those identified within the securitization of development debate and the wider critical global governance literature. Western based international institutions are emphasised by Duffield as being at the core of global governance networks: “the consensus building activities of intergovernmental organisations such as the EU and OECD have constructed a broadly convergent and coherent policy position” (Duffield, 2001a:74). Furthermore, Duffield uses the European Union and the UNDP as examples of global governance institutions linking conflict with security in the South, and pursuing liberal societal transformation as a result (Duffield, 2001a:99-107). In addition, Overbeek (2005:50) and Hoogvelt (2001:147) situate international institutions including the World Bank and OECD, as well as the G7, at the centre of global governance networks. According to these authors Western based international institutions make up the core of the global governance complex. Included in this analysis, therefore, are the OECD, the UNDP, the EC and the World Bank.

Whilst Duffield recognises the power of Western based international institutions, he also emphasises that the power of Western governments has not diminished:

While the political effect of globalisation has been to qualify and attenuate nation-state competence, it would be wrong to over hastily equate that attenuation with a growing weakness of the states themselves … it is not so much that the power of states has declined as a result of globalisation, but that governments are attempting to use their formal position and the resources they control to assert their authority in new ways (Duffield, 2001a:73).

Duffield concludes that “Northern governments are pivotal players in the strategic complexes that constitute liberal peace” (ibid:73; see also Duffield, 2002b:153). The UK and the USA are large donors, key members of the G7, and, it is argued, play a central role in the global governance system (Soederberg, 2006). As such, the global development approach of the UK and US governments is examined. In addition, Duffield uses Scandinavian states to demonstrate the coherence of global development policy:

During the 1960s and 1970s, Scandinavian aid policy was different from that of the rest of Western Europe. Scandinavian countries not only tended to give more aid, reflecting the strength of the social-democratic movements within
them, they were also more likely to support progressive or radical policies …
this situation has now changed … the aid policy of the Scandinavian countries
in relation to conflict and social reconstruction is now little different from that
favoured by their European neighbours (Duffield, 2001:74).

The governments of Denmark and Sweden are also therefore included. Denmark and
Sweden, along with Norway, the Netherlands and Canada, have traditionally been
regarded as ‘like-minded’ states, set apart in terms of development policy from the
other countries of the North (Narman, 1999). They therefore provide a robust test as to
how far the propositions made within the securitization of development debate are
reflected in global development policy and practice.

Accordingly, the institutions whose global development policy discourse, aid
distribution and development programming is analysed for the purpose of this
evaluation are: the OECD, the UNDP, the EC, the World Bank and the US, UK, Swedish
and Danish governments. The focus on the key actors identified by scholars
contributing to the securitization of development debate and other critical global
governance theorists, in the emerging global governance complex is maintained.

This research therefore utilises a number of different methods. In order to be reflective
about the theoretical assumptions underpinning both orthodox (chapter one) and
critical (chapter seven) approaches to global governance the insights provided by
Critical Theory are utilised. In addition a statistical analysis forms part of the evaluation
of the key material contentions made within the securitization of development debate.
Whilst this may appear at odds with critical theory’s critique of positivism, Porpora
argues that the problem with positivism is not the use of statistics in itself, but the
elevation of statistics from evidence to explanation (2011:49). The use of quantitative
techniques here provides a valuable form of evidence with which to assess the claims
made within the securitization of development debate, and does not conflict with the
post-positivist approach of this research. Aspects from differing methodological
approaches are utilised in order to provide a multi-dimensional critique of the
securitization of development debate, which, as discussed above, has a number of
central contentions that require both theoretical and empirical evaluation.
The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is comprised of seven chapters and, as noted above, is organised around three themes – the relationship between global governance and the global economy, the relationship between global governance and (in)security, and power within global governance. Chapter one is concerned with the deficiencies of orthodox global governance theory; chapter two sets out the key contentions of the securitization of development debate; chapter three evaluates how the relationship between global governance and the global economy is theorised within this debate; chapter four evaluates how the relationship between global governance and (in)security is understood; chapters five and six assess how power is theorised within the securitization of development debate; and chapter seven brings this research together and draws out the central contentions of this work. Each chapter is outlined here briefly, to give an overview of the study.

The objective of chapter one is to set out the key shortcomings of orthodox approaches to the study of global governance. This provides the foundation for assessing, in subsequent chapters, how the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. It argues that orthodox theory offers only a partial or limited understanding of the three areas noted above (global economy, (in)security and power), and identifies orthodox global governance theory as problem solving theory.

The objective of chapter two is to set out the contribution of the securitization of development debate to the study of global governance (a brief overview is given on pages two and four, so is not rehearsed here). This is again organised around the three themes of economy, (in)security and power. Prior to this, the key theoretical approaches which have influenced the securitization of development debate are documented.

The central purpose of chapter three is to assess the extent to which the idea of structural exclusion is conceptually sound and consistent, and to assess its empirical base. Thus the first half of the chapter analyses the inconsistencies within and limitation of the idea of structural exclusion. For example, the appropriateness of theoretical concepts is assessed. The second half evaluates the empirical evidence for increasing economic exclusion. It examines historical economic trends to assess the extent to which structural exclusion represents a new phase of global capitalism and questions the conclusions drawn by Hoogvelt, through a study of more recent data and alternative measurements of world FDI and trade flows.
The purpose of chapter four is to investigate how far global development policy and practice reflect the logic of the security-development nexus. It initially examines the discursive dimension of the proposition which holds that global governance conceives underdevelopment and conflict in the South as mutually sustaining and perceives the South as a threat to the liberal world, and that this understanding unifies the disparate actors of global governance (Bradbury, 2003, Duffield, 2001a, Woods, 2005). The validity of this contention is assessed through a comprehensive review of development policy discourse. This chapter subsequently examines the material dimension of this claim; that the security-development nexus requires development resources to be used to prevent and resolve conflict in the South (Duffield, 2001a, 2007; Woods, 2005). Through a review of a wide range of studies examining the geographical distribution of aid and an original statistical study modelling the relationship between aid distribution and conflict over a 12 year period, this claim is investigated.

Chapters five and six are both concerned with the forms of power utilised by global governance. The purpose of chapter five is to investigate the extent to which the politics of global governance is permeated by a liberal consensus fostering policy coordination. This claim relates specifically to conflict and security in the South, the dissemination of liberal democracy, and economic development. Thus, rather than examining, for instance, the education or health policy discourse, this examination focuses specifically on how conflict, security, liberal democracy and economic integration are constructed within the global development policy discourse.

The purpose of chapter six is to investigate the extent to which global governance selectively includes states into aid networks on the basis of adherence to liberal norms and pursues the liberal transformation of Southern populations. The former is assessed through an analysis of the relationship between the amount of aid a state receives and whether it is perceived to govern within a liberal framework. The latter is assessed through the case study analysis of two types of development programmes; SSR and local level development projects. In order to assess the claims made within the securitization of development debate, this case study investigates: whether programmes are directed towards transforming attitudes and beliefs in accordance with a liberal discourse; what role non-state actors play; and whether these programmes are directed towards the pursuit of peace and stability in developing societies.

Chapter seven, the concluding chapter, seeks to evaluate how the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. Following an overview of the thesis, this chapter is organised around the three themes
of the global economy; (in)security; and power. Each of these three sections draws from the thesis as a whole rather than just the corresponding chapter, to assess the extent to which the deficiencies within orthodox approaches are overcome within the securitization of development debate. In light of the research of the previous chapters the limitations within this debate are then identified and alternatives or modifications suggested. Subsequently, the final concluding arguments and implications of the thesis are set out. The wider relevance of the research is discussed and avenues for potential future research are highlighted.
Chapter One

Orthodox Global Governance Theory

Introduction

The purpose of this first chapter is to elaborate the key shortcomings of orthodox approaches to the study of global governance. The limitations of these approaches provides the starting point for assessing how the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. This chapter argues that there are three important areas where orthodox theory offers only a partial or limited understanding with regard to global governance. These are the global economy, (in)security and power. The critique of the securitization of development debate which makes up the core of this thesis is then organised around these three themes.

Accordingly, after a brief section outlining the ontology of global governance within the mainstream literature (section 1.1), this chapter discusses how each of these three areas are theorised. Section 1.2 looks at how orthodox global governance theory understands the relationship between global governance and the global economy. Section 1.3 unpacks how the relationship between global governance and (in)security is theorised, and 1.4 assesses how power in the global governance system is understood. The final section, 1.5, identifies mainstream theories of global governance as problem solving theory and outlines the response of these theories to such a challenge.

This chapter argues that orthodox approaches to global governance tend to neglect the role of ideas in the creation of economic structures, conceptualising the global economy as non-political and largely benign. Global governance is linked to effective sources of order in the world rather than insecurities, and some of the more opaque dimensions of power within the global governance system are ignored (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 1; Soederberg, 2006: chapter two).

1.1 The Ontology of Global Governance

The orthodox global governance literature largely springs from within the liberal tradition of International Relations, more specifically from what has been termed neo-liberal institutionalism (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Baldwin, 1993; Keohane, 1998; 2005; Long, 1995; Young, 1992, 1999; Zacher, 1992) and the more recent literature
that links global governance to globalisation and the relocation of authority that this has brought.

This ‘globalisation’ school is primarily represented here by the leading figure in this field, James Rosenau, who has produced a large body of work on globalisation and global governance (Rosenau, 1997; 2000; 2002; 2005; 2006). Others writing in a similar vein include Nuscheler, who adopts Rosenau’s idea of a “horizontally and vertically networked”, rather than hierarchical, global governance structure (Nuscheler, 2002: 161), and Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) who argue that governance resources are no longer concentrated in the hands of states and have become more dispersed, leading to a global governance system in which numerous actors and institutions coexist.

For realists, the fundamental tenet of anarchy means that relations between states, as the unit of analysis, rather than the emergence of global governance, are understood to be the central concern of International Relations theory. International institutions are not perceived to have any independent power, but mirror the state hierarchy (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995). Therefore, whilst realists include notions of ‘international governance’ within their analysis, there is no realist theory of global governance as such. Indeed, Gilpin argues that "the idea of a realist theory of international governance is a contradiction in terms" because the fundamental proposition of political realism contends that there is no legitimate authority to which sovereign states are subordinate and give allegiance to within the international system (Gilpin, 2005:237). International relations continue to be dominated by power politics and struggle between nation states (Krasner, 1985). Nevertheless, the following sections of this chapter do comment on how the global economy, insecurity and power in relation to global governance are understood by realists.

Across the neo-liberal institutionalist and orthodox ‘globalisation’ literature, global governance is conceived not as an overarching organisation, but as a set of interlocking actors including states, international organisations, NGOs, the private sector, and public and private transnational movements (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009; Halliday, 2000: 19; Keohane and Nye, 2000).

It is argued that a key difference between the neo-liberal institutionalist conception of global governance and Rosenau’s approach is that the former continues to uphold the state as a central actor within the global arena, whilst the latter regards the state as just one of a multitude of governance sites. However, whilst neo-liberal institutionalism arose out of a desire to understand cooperation between states at the international
level, it has developed further to include cooperation and steering mechanisms across states, civil society and the private sector, such that Keohane and Nye argue that:

> governance need not necessarily be conducted exclusively by governments and the international organisations to which they delegate authority. Private firms, associations of firms, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and associations of NGOs all engage in it, often in association with governmental bodies, to create governance; sometimes without governmental authority (Keohane and Nye, 2000:12).

Whilst state power has not decreased, other entities have joined the state in the governance arena (Keohane and Nye, 2000). Keohane and Nye’s approach has moved closer to Rosenau’s in relation to the scope of global governance.

A starker difference marking out Rosenau’s approach is that he seeks to free his analysis of global governance from the domestic/international distinction, whereas neo-liberal institutionalists continue to work with this separation. For Rosenau, and others, governance now clearly involves much more than the state (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009:48). It is multilayered and includes the steering and control mechanisms at the local, substate and transworld level. Rosenau thus formulates an extensive definition of global governance:

> the global stage is ... dense with actors large and small, formal and informal, economic and social, political and cultural, national and transnational, international and subnational, aggressive and peaceful, liberal and authoritarian, who collectively form a highly complex system of global governance (Rosenau, 2002: 72).

In theorising global governance, Rosenau argues, we should think of governance in the world, rather than governance of the world. The latter implies “a central authority that is doing the governing”, whilst the former, “suggests patterns of governance wherever they may be located – in communities, societies, nongovernmental organisation” (Rosenau, 1997:10). Understanding global governance “is no longer served by clinging to the notion that states and national governments are the essential underpinnings of the world’s organisation” (Rosenau, 2006:111). And the world is too interdependent, and authority too dispersed, for any one country to command hegemonic leadership within a system of global governance (Rosenau, 2002:76; 2005:135).
Global governance is instead conceived as containing several contradictory tendencies. This was initially theorised as ‘cascading interdependence’; following the breakdown of long-standing authority relations at every system level from the individual to the global, the dynamics of systemic integration on the one hand and systemic disintegration on the other are effecting increased interdependence amongst nations, at the same time as fragmenting them into subgroups and subnations (Rosenau, 1984: 256-257). Emphasising globalisation and localization, Rosenau and others have subsequently termed this phenomenon ‘fragmengration’. Fragmengration is a new epoch in which worldwide tensions derive from the “simultaneity of dynamics promoting integration, centralisation and globalisation on the one hand, and those generating disintegration, decentralisation, and localisation on the other hand” (Rosenau, 2000:177; see also Nuscheler, 2002). These tendencies have seen a relocation of authority, the weakening of the state, the proliferation of NGOs, and a dispersion of the sites out of which authority can be exercised and compliance generated (Rosenau, 2006: 115-116). Global governance therefore, refers to the steering, coordination and control mechanisms of a collectivity at various levels including local, regional, international and transnational.

Neo-liberal institutionalists maintain that global governance has become necessary because of the need to govern the processes of globalisation and interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 2000). The goals of global governance networks are for the most part presumed to be good and uncontested i.e. peace, prosperity, safety from ecological collapse or financial stability (Halliday, 2000:23). Governance beyond the state, it is assumed, arises from the functional benefits which, in an interdependent world, states can realise through the strategic coordination of their policies and activities (Held and McGrew, 2005:12; Keohane and Nye, 2000:20). These mechanisms of global governance pursue the realisation of common purposes or resolve collective problems in the context of an interdependent, globalising world. These mechanisms are understood to exercise authority in a variety of ways in particular issue areas. These can include laws, norms, markets and architecture that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group (Keohane and Nye, 2000:12).

Rosenau’s (2005) and Dingwerth and Pattberg’s (2009) approach appreciates more fully the complexities of global governance, which includes constructive as well as destructive forces, such as transnational criminal networks. In theorising the rationale of global governance, however, it is similar to the neo-liberal approach. Interdependence, argues Rosenau, means that social, cultural, political and economic dynamics at any level of the global system have far reaching consequences that can “ripple across and fan out within provincial, regional, national, and international levels”
Chapter One

(Rosenau, 2005:47). In the face of interdependence, Rosenau argues that the task of
global governance is to facilitate order in the complexities of modern life (Rosenau,
2002:70). And, in line with Keohane and Nye, global governance consists of steering
mechanisms through which authority is exercised to proceed towards desired goals
(Rosenau, 2002, 72).

Theories within both the realist and liberal tradition make similar assumptions and
focus on similar questions in their study of global governance, and both can be
distinguished from critical theories of global governance which take a post-positivist
approach (Smith, 1996). This includes neo-Gramscian approaches, represented for
example in the work of Robert Cox (1993, 1992) and Stephen Gill (2005, 2003), from
which the securitization of development literature in part takes its conceptualisation of
global governance, and the Foucault inspired work of for example, Jan Selby(2003) and
Michael Dillon (2003), who have contributed to the securitization of development
debate. The ontology of global governance expressed within the critical literature is
explored in chapters two and seven and therefore is not discussed here; suffice to say
that in contrast to the orthodox literature, neo-Gramscian theories of global
governance understand global governance in the context of transformations in global
capitalism and ongoing social conflicts, whilst for post-structuralists, global
governance broadly involves the “development of often insidious new ways of defining,
invigilating, managing and indeed governing social relations” (Selby, 2003:8).

This section has sketched an outline of the ontological base of global governance, as
understood within the orthodox literature and, while there may be differences between
orthodox accounts, the limitations of these theories are similar and often stem from a
positivist epistemology and, as problem-solving theories, they lack reflectivity (Cox,
1981; Smith, 1996). In relation to the three areas identified in the introduction, the
following sections expand upon the outline given here, and identify the deficiencies of
orthodox global governance theory in each of these areas. The first of which is the
global economy.

1.2 The Relationship between the Global Economy and Global Governance

Orthodox theories of global governance tend to give only a partial account of the role
of global governance in producing and consolidating the ideas that enable and sustain
the contemporary global economic structure, which is conceived as inevitable and on
the whole ‘good’. There is a predisposition to separate the economic and political,
treating them as two discrete realms and, furthermore, the structural power of global
capitalism is ignored. The way in which organisations such as the World Bank, private sector interests and think tanks may promote particular global economic policies through privileging a neo-liberal discourse is not problematised, and its detrimental effect on equality and poverty is sidelined (for an alternative view see Cammack, 2005). Instead, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Bank are treated as rational, functional institutions, created out of the desire of states to facilitate cooperation and standardise procedure. On the whole the current institutions governing the global economy are assumed to be benign (Keohane, 1989:26-27).

Rosenau depicts international financial institutions (IFIs) as neutral arbiters and managers of the global economy, deriving authority from “the specialised knowledge on which their judgements are based and the respect they have earned for adhering to explicit and consistent standards” (Rosenau, 2006:139). Rating agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or, in the private sector, Standards and Poor’s Rating Group are regarded as politically neutral, necessary, beneficial and effective instruments of governance (Rosenau 2002:75; 2005:59). Rosenau does not address how global inequalities may be exacerbated and entrenched through control mechanisms such as credit rating agencies or how their operation may depend upon a particular political and economic framework. Sinclair, on the other hand, recognises credit rating agencies as knowledge-producers and private makers of global public policy, and thus inherently political (Sinclair, 1994a; 1994b). This approach is further illustrated by Grindle who understands the move from state-led to market orientated economies during the 1980s as a difficult but inevitable transformation in the development of Southern states (Grindle, 2000). In contrast to Hay (2002:194), who recognises that policy change is often preceded by changes in the ideas informing policy, how or why neo-liberal economics became popular and how Southern states were induced to take such drastic reforms is not investigated by Grindle (2000). As Ruggie argues, international institutions tend to be depicted in strictly instrumental terms and the role of economic institutions in creating, diffusing and curtailing knowledge, and deciding what is acceptable knowledge is not problematised (Ruggie, 1998:3).

According to Grindle, initial economic reform in the South in the 1980s largely failed to produce economic growth because of weak domestic institutions. Consequently, it is now recognised by policy-makers that strong domestic institutions are needed to manage macroeconomic policy, and thus development interventions must encourage strong governance alongside market orientated economics (Grindle, 2000). However, whilst recognising that market orientated economies can only be instigated through explicit institutions and policies, the perception that this type of economic system is
inevitable, remains. Global governance is understood to set the rules of the game and
minimise the cost of globalisation, rather than assist its consolidation.

The way in which global economic policies are justified through a particular discourse
is therefore subsumed, as is the possibility that “conventions routinely drawn upon in
discourse embody ideological assumptions which come to be taken as mere ‘common
sense’” and “contribute to sustaining existing power relations” (Fairclough, 1989:77).
How power relations are exercised and enacted through discourse and, at the same
time, discourse is shaped and constituted by relations of power, is not investigated
(ibid:43). In contrast to orthodox global governance theory, which sidelines the role of
discourse and ideas, Escobar argues that discourse

sets the rules of the game: who can speak, from what point of view, with what
authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must
be followed for this or that problem, theory, or object to emerge and be named,
analyzed, and eventually transformed into a policy or plan (Escobar, 1995:41).

Furthermore, Rodrik’s work demonstrates that within the traditional literature the
ontological separation of the political from the economic realm is deemed possible. In
a hypothetical but desirable world, he argues, where national markets are fully
integrated into the global economy, but politics remains nationally organised,
economic policy making bodies would be insulated from political participation and
debate (Rodrik, 2000: 351).

Whilst there is a tendency within liberal global governance theory not to fully
acknowledge the links between the economic and political realms, there appears to be
more of an attempt to explain these links within some strands of realist thought.
Gilpin, for example, attempts to theorise under what short-term conditions certain
international economic systems will emerge. These conditions include a particular
ideological commitment by the powerful (Gilpin, 1986). He goes on to criticise liberal
exponents for “assuming the pre-eminence and autonomy of economic and
technological forces over all others in effecting political and social change” and
“neglecting the political base on which this interdependent world economy rested”
(Gilpin, 1986:312).

Liberal theories of global governance, as well as many realist approaches, however,
provide only limited analysis of how global capitalism emerged, is sustained,
expanded, or might be in the process of changing. There is little understanding of the
structural power of the global economy and its exclusionary and unequal tendencies.
Indeed, Rosenau maintains that global markets “are not systematic in any harm they cause” (Rosenau, 2000:194). And in discussing international labour standards, Keohane and Nye remark that trade unions within rich countries push for such standards to be binding within the WTO, whereas poorer countries resist international standards (Keohane and Nye, 2000:29-30). How the structure of the global capitalist economy may drive these opposing positions is not considered. Neither is the possibility of exploitative exchange relations between North and South (Gill, 2003).

That globalisation poses risks and challenges, especially to the poor, is however, acknowledged. Keohane, for example, argues that global capitalism combines great opportunity with ‘systemic risk’ (Keohane, 2001:3), and Grindle maintains that economic globalisation has the potential to cause economic dislocation, the destruction of social safety nets, and the acceleration of environmental damage (Grindle, 2000:179). Globalisation, argues Grindle, is introducing a more risk filled world to developing countries, whilst poor populations have limited capacity to tap into its benefits (ibid: 180-184). However, neither Keohane nor Grindle ask why global capitalism embodies systemic risks, or what the current contradictions within the global economy are, and the extent to which these contradictions contribute to global insecurities is not explored. Rather risks and contradictions, such as the global parallel economy, are perceived as aberrations to be overcome, rather than part of the structure of the global economy.

According to this view it is the task of global governance to deal with these risks (Allison, 2000:84). As argued by McGrew (2005:282), within liberal theories of global governance there remains an assumption that international institutions can be engineered to realise progressive purposes and that the politics of these institutions can be understood as relatively autonomous from wider structures of global economic and social power (see for example Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). Global governance is thus envisaged as the most appropriate mechanism for managing the global economy through facilitating cooperation over rules and procedures that will allow the global market to flourish (Rodrik, 2000:351). Keohane and Nye, for example, argue that

[although we think world government is unfeasible, we are not complacent about the effects of globalisation without some coherent means of governance … we need … a set of practices for governance that improve coordination and create safety valves for political and social pressures (Keohane and Nye, 2000:14).]
The possibility of overcoming disagreement through arbiters such as the WTO and IMF is promoted, whilst the voices of those who contest the fundamental structure of the global economy are sidelined. That the poor do not have a voice within these institutions is recognised, but the possibility that this can and will be remedied is upheld (Grindle, 2000). This institutional exclusion is not linked to wider global political economic structures, but viewed as an anomaly which has its origins in the weak institutions of poor, excluded states (ibid). The exclusionary tendencies of the underlying structures of the global economy are not probed and policymakers in poor countries are encouraged to adapt their policies to the exigencies of globalisation (ibid: 196-2000). As Keohane and Nye remark, the nature of political systems and institutional weaknesses in developing countries may be decisive in their failure to benefit from globalisation (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 15).

Global capitalism is implicitly perceived within much of the orthodox literature as a natural and normal way for societies to be organised, requiring no explanation or understanding in terms of its origins, constitutive rules or contradictions (Keohane and Nye, 2000), although as noted, Gilpin does attempt to theorise under what short-term conditions the current system emerged (Gilpin, 2005). The literature does not consider how the current global economic structures may contribute to or exacerbate global inequalities (which are recognised), but instead looks to the current system of global governance and a global market economy to mitigate challenges such as poverty. Economic globalisation is considered organic, whilst the emergence of global governance is taken to be rational and functional.

1.3 The Relationship between (In)security and Global Governance

Both realist and liberal theories give an impoverished account of the relationship between insecurity and global governance. In realist theory security is taken to mean national security and involves a state permanently seeking security from external threat in an anarchic world; the pursuit of security characterises state behaviour (Waltz, 1979). Economic inequalities between states indicate their relative material strength, which in large part determines the hierarchy of states in the international system, and limits what states can do to protect their own security. More recently within realist thought, the uneven nature of globalisation is taken to be a potential security threat, as developing states can create instability through transnational crime and terrorist networks (Barnett, 2004).
Liberal accounts of global governance have a greater awareness of different dimensions of security and economic globalisation is conceived both as a threat to and a source of security, whilst the rationale of global governance is understood as the creation of order. Global governance is largely understood to be the mechanism through which the threats posed by globalisation and interdependence can be managed and mitigated. Rosenau and Keohane agree that the need for global governance has intensified since the end of the cold war because of the increasing interdependence that characterises the whole world, such that the problems of global warming or financial crises are challenges to all of humankind (Keohane, 2005:120; Rosenau, 2002); cooperation is needed to establish a humane and stable world. According to Zacher, interdependency within the economic and environmental realms will increase, necessitating more and stronger international regimes (Zacher, 1992:99). These challenges are such that states on their own cannot manage them. Scholte writes that governments "are quite unable by themselves to effectively regulate phenomena like ... global ecological problems, global arms trade, and global finance" (Scholte, 2000:327). Thus in theorising global governance, Rosenau argues that there is a need to explore how authority is "employed to exercise control with respect to the numerous issues and processes that states are unable or unwilling to address" (Rosenau, 2000:188). Global governance is therefore linked with effective sources of order:

If governance is about the maintenance of collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the collective processes of rules through which order and goals are sought – as the ensuing inquiry presumes ... (Rosenau, 2000:175 italics added).

In defining global governance, Rosenau maintains that governance denotes the steering mechanisms of a social system that endeavours to provide security and prosperity (Rosenau, 2005:46). He does not tackle whose security or prosperity, or whether in seeking security and prosperity for some, global governance institutions may adversely affect the security and prosperity of others. The power structures underpinning what can legitimately be conceived as a security threat are not probed. The mechanisms of global governance are therefore perceived to be the appropriate ones through which insecurity within societies across the globe, the cause of which may, for example, be corruption, people trafficking, pollution and crime, can be tackled (Rosenau, 2002:78-79). Selby argues that whilst resistance, opposition and obstruction do play an important role within Rosenau's model of global governance, these are always conceptualised as problems to be overcome through the extension of the mechanisms of global governance (Selby, 2003:10). Resistance, he continues, is
always depicted within Rosenau’s work as “the absolute antithesis of governance”, whereas, governance is “equated with ‘order’, ‘stability’, ‘authority’ and ‘control’” (ibid:10). This is also true of Franz Nuscheler’s work, which posits that in order for states to deal with the challenges associated with globalisation, new regulative or organization structures are required (Nuscheler, 2002).

Global governance is also linked with the diffusion of liberal democracy, conceived as, at worst, a benign process, and at best the key to peace and prosperity within the world today. (Halliday, 2000:32). As McGrew argues, within liberal theories of global governance

the mutually reinforcing dynamics of transnational economic integration, the diffusion of liberal democratic growth and the growth of international governance creates the conditions for an expanding zone of liberal peace, in which war increasingly becomes an irrational or unthinkable instrument of interstate politics (McGrew, 2005:268).

Democratic Peace theory, a strand of liberal global governance theory, maintains that the shared norms and institutional constraints of democratic states mean that when conflicts of interest arise they rarely escalate to the point where military force is threatened (Doyle, 1995). Instead disputes are settled through mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful diplomacy. Democracy is thus viewed as a major source of peace, and this has been used to justify its promotion by Western states, throughout the world. The contested or violent nature of the diffusion of liberal democracy does not tend to be a subject of investigation (for an alternative approach see Ayres, 2006; Bradbury, 2003; Miall, 2003).

Rather, the central and urgent challenge within the liberal global governance literature is how to make global governance more effective, just, responsive and democratic (Halliday, 2000). Or, as Rosenau puts it, “how the authority of governance can be brought to bear on the challenges posed by the prevailing disarray” (Rosenau, 2002:70-86). In taking this view these theories do not fully explore how insecurities including resource shortages, ethnic rivalries, unemployment and inflation may be created or made worse by established mechanisms of global governance, and the related structures of global capitalism. They do not seriously consider the extent to which global governance institutions prioritise the security of some over others and are complicit in creating economic or environmental insecurity. The relationship between World Bank policy and environmental destruction illustrates these conflicts (Rich, 1990; Reed, 1992).Whilst the links between the global economy and insecurity are
recognised, global governance institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are presented as the most appropriate mechanisms through which states can deal with the insecurities thrown up by the global economy. In accepting the current global governance networks and linking them with effective sources of international order, liberal theories of global governance “fail to penetrate beyond the dynamics of global politics to the underlying structures of power” (Held and McGrew, 2005:13).

1.4 The Account of Power within Global Governance

Barnett and Duvall provide a framework for theorising power in global governance which can be used to demonstrate how realist and liberal accounts of the modalities of power at work within the global governance complex are limited (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Realist’s preoccupation with state survival limits the account of power they give. Whilst liberals take greater account of institutional power, they tend to ignore the more opaque forms of power.

Theorising Power in Global Governance

Barnett and Duvall define power as “the production, in and through, social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate”. Four possible forms that power can take are identified: compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and productive power (Figure 2) (ibid:3).

Compulsory power refers to relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another, for example, when one state threatens another with military power. Institutional power is in effect when actors exercise indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Structural power is described as

... the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct working relations to one another. One expression of this form of power is the workings of the capitalist world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labour with their respective deferential abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes (ibid:3).

This involves the production and reproduction of internally related positions of subordination or domination that actors occupy. Productive power is the socially
diffuse production of subjectivity. This type of power defines, for example, what constitutes legitimate knowledge and shapes whose knowledge matters.

**Figure 2. Barnett and Duvall’s Taxonomy of Power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>power works through interaction of specific actors</th>
<th>direct forms of power</th>
<th>diffuse forms of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compulsory Power</td>
<td>Institutional Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power works through social relations of constitution</td>
<td>Structural Power</td>
<td>Productive Power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Barnett and Duvall, 2005)

Compulsory power and structural power are defined as direct forms of power. Direct power entails some immediate and tangible causal/constitutive connection between actors. Institutional and productive forms of power are diffuse. Diffuse power is deployed when the causal relationship between actors is not immediate or direct. Diffuse power enables the deployment of power even if the connections between actors are detached, or operate at a physical, temporal and social distance.

The second dimension, shown in Figure 2, refers to the social relations through which power works. Power is either an attribute of particular actors and their interactions or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and capacities. The former - interaction of specific actors - can operate, for example, by the pointing of a gun and the issuing of commands. The latter – social relations of constitution – refers to underlying social structures and systems of knowledge that advantage some and disadvantage others (ibid:9).

**Compulsory and Institutional Power**

The realist account of power is often one-dimensional. Preoccupation with the state, and specifically the state trying to guarantee its own survival in an anarchic international system, means that realists tend to focus on the relative material power of any particular state vis-à-vis the rest of the international system (Wohlforth, 1993:2). Power is defined as the “capabilities or resources...with which states can influence each other” (Wohlforth, 1993: 4). Hence Gilpin writes that “[t]he central concerns of the state are its national interests, as defined principally in terms of military, security and political independence ... power and power relations play the major role in
international affairs” (Gilpin, 2005:238). Whilst power is central to realist theory, it is conceptually limited largely to the power of the sovereign state to maintain or increase its security. Realists tend to emphasise what Barnett and Duval call compulsory power, which refers to relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another (Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

Whilst realist accounts recognise that institutions have power, they maintain that this largely reflects power relations between states. Thus the UN is characterised primarily as a creature of its member states reflecting, in the Security Council, the pre-eminence of some states over others (Jackson and James, 1993: 8). Similarly Gilpin argues that “decision-making authorities in the IMF, WTO and World Bank continue to reside mainly with the United States and Western Europe” (Gilpin, 2005:242). Mearsheimer argues that what is most impressive about international institutions is “how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995:47). The most powerful states in the system, he argues, “create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it” (ibid:13). This understanding of institutional power is limited to mean a reflection of the distribution of power in the state system (ibid:7); the system of global governance cannot transcend geopolitics. As Krasner argues, efforts to create alternative political organisation to stand above or beside the sovereign state have failed (Krasner, 1993; 302). Thus Ruggie writes that

the only institutions that neorealists deem worthy of serious consideration are traditional alliances; otherwise, institutions are viewed as mere emanations of state power, such as the major economic institutions, or as window dressing (Ruggie, 1998:7).

Liberal theories of global governance confer greater power on international governmental and non-governmental organisations than realists, and recognise institutional power at play in the international system, beyond the power of the member states within any institution (Keohane and Nye, 2000). However, it is argued that this approach is in danger of exaggerating the autonomous power and efficacy of global institutions (Held and McGrew, 2005:13); whilst realists recognise that institutions are not immune from the wider structures of power, liberal theories of global governance tend not to sufficiently address the highly unequal power of different states and, as a consequence, how states may pursue their interests through international institutions. This is not true of all liberal accounts of global governance, however. Young recognises the “asymmetries in the distribution of power” within key institutions. The result of which, he argues, is to “circumscribe the effectiveness of
institutional arrangements”, as powerful members feel less pressure to comply, whilst weak members may feel coerced into compliance (Young, 1992:186). This account does not however tackle the productive and structural power that may come to bear through global governance institutions.

*Productive and Structural Power*

The positivist epistemology of realist and liberal strands of global governance theory makes it difficult to consider the ‘social relations of constitution’ as these are often not easily observable or quantifiable in an empiricist sense. Without an understanding of productive and structural power, global governance and the global economy are conceived as possessing democratic qualities:

> The very dynamics of fragmengration have embedded within them one major functional equivalent of democracy. By decentralising authority in disparate and localised sites, fragmengration has greatly inhibited the coalescence of hierarchical and autocratic centres of power. It is as if the politics of globalised space, through having both integrative and fragmented components, mimics the global market with its shifting loci of limited decision-making authority, currency swings and productive breakthroughs (Rosenau, 2000:193).

A central theme of Rosenau’s analysis is that often “the practices and institutions of governance can and do evolve in such a way as to be minimally dependent on hierarchical, command-based arrangements” (Rosenau, 2006: 122). Furthermore, whilst Keohane tackles the lack of accountability in global governance and finds intergovernmental organisation such as the IMF and the WTO to be relatively accountable compared to other global actors (Keohane, 2005: 130), he does not take into account the productive power of these institutions. Within a pluralistic global governance system policy outcomes are understood as a result of bargaining, negotiation and coalition building. How institutions of global governance may produce and privilege certain knowledge which may benefit some groups over others, is not fully investigated.

The example of sovereignty can illustrate how productive and structural power can be ignored within orthodox accounts of global governance. In his neo-liberal institutionalist critique of realist theory, Donnelly notes that sovereignty is essentially “uncontested as the foundation of modern political discourse” (Donnelly, 2000: 139). As sovereignty has become more important, he argues, strong states are more limited
than they were during the colonial period in what they can do to weak states (ibid: 145). The implication is that powerful states are restrained by the international norm of sovereignty and can no longer use compulsory power against weaker sovereign states; “If a country threatens to default on its debt, it is inconceivable that Western naval vessels would lob a few shells or fire missiles at the capital” (ibid: 145). However, sovereignty is often defined by the powerful. The Bush administration defined under what circumstances states lose their right to sovereignty and used this interpretation to justify military interventions (Muppidi, 2005). Those who employ productive power to construct ideas regarding sovereignty can impose their agenda on weaker states. The notion of sovereignty as limited allows Western agencies to make decisions, not as neo-colonialists but as defenders of human rights, peace and prosperity (Macrae and Leader, 2000:13).

Furthermore, powerful states and global governance agencies can and do undermine the sovereignty of weaker nations using productive and structural power. Global governance agencies were able to impose structural adjustment on much of the global South taking over the governance of national economic policy – a realm which under the conditions of traditional sovereignty, would have been within the jurisdiction of the national government. In doing so, two forms of power were exercised. Productive power was used to establish a broad ideological acceptance of neo-liberalism by global governance and structural power was utilised when structural adjustment policies were enforced using conditionalities attached to debt-restructuring.

In their failure to fully deal with the structural power of global capitalism and the productive power of the global governance complex, orthodox theories of global governance contribute little to our understanding of the unequal relations between North and South; the unequal structure of global capitalism and the power employed by the North through development policy, are sidelined. McGrew concurs: “beyond the peculiar Western zone of peace … [liberal internationalist’s] explanatory power and normative appeal may be less apparent” (McGrew, 2005:268).

1.5 Orthodox Theory as Problem Solving Theory and its Response to Critique

There are, therefore, a number of shortfalls within the orthodox literature of global governance, which can best be described, using Cox’s framework, as problem solving theory (Cox, 1981; Gill, 1997). The theories reviewed here have three characteristics of problem solving theory. Firstly, they take the prevailing social and power relations, and institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. "For
problem solving theorists ...the key focus is reform of the world as given, for on the whole it is taken to be good” (Schechter, 1999:241). Orthodox theories of global governance look to the prevailing global governance system to diffuse any conflict, tensions or crisis that might emerge and associate the global governance system with order. Such an approach is “value bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework” (Cox, 1981:130). As a consequence, argues, Devetak, “it remains oblivious to the way power and interests precede and shape knowledge claims” (Devetak, 2009:164). The problem with this approach, as Linklater observes is that “if international order works to the advantage of the most privileged groups then the well-meaning aim of managing an existing order has the unpalatable political effect of neglecting marginal groups and subordinate interests” (Linklater, 1996:281). In contrast, critical theory “does not take institutions and social power relations for granted, but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981:129). Critical theory therefore focuses on identifying contradictions within the current system and those forces which have the potential to aid its transformation for the better.

Secondly, as discussed above, orthodox theories of global governance tend to omit an explanation of the origins of current social structures, including global governance and the global economy. Problem-solving theorists view theory as an objective tool whose function is to make sense of the world in order to manage it more efficiently, whereas critical theorists seek to understand how current social structures came about and how to change them for the better (Zalewski, 1996: 345). This links to the third characteristic of problem-solving theory which can be identified within orthodox global governance theories; they do not seek to uncover constraints upon human action. In the tradition of Hegel and Marx, Neufeld writes that:

A defining characteristic of human existence throughout history has been the presence within human communities of a system of constraints on human autonomy which are themselves humanly produced. However, because the true origins of these constraints are rarely recognised – because for example, social distinctions are perceived to be part of nature, and thus ‘naturally sanctioned’ – constraints are seen as unchangeable (Neufeld, 1995:17).

Orthodox theories of global governance do not seek to uncover these constraints and explain how they came into being, but tend to accept the unequal and hierarchical nature of the current social structures.
Engagement of the mainstream global governance literature with the criticisms put forward in this chapter have largely come in the form of responses to post-positivist critique of realist International Relations theory, possibly because it was these theorists that initially bore the brunt of the criticism from Critical Theory. Smith argues that traditional theory has to a large extent failed to seriously engage with such criticisms and the responses discussed here give an idea of the lack of understanding and serious engagement between orthodox theory and post-positivist critique (Smith, 1996:34).

Mearsheimer attempts to deal with the challenge of critical theory, but fails to fully comprehend this approach (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995). He combines ideas from constructivism, post-modernism and Critical Theory to create his version of Critical Theory, which is presented as internally contradictory. Mearsheimer misunderstands the aim of Critical Theory, arguing that it is directed towards changing state behaviour “so that states stop thinking and acting according to realism”, and assumes that states are the central unit of analysis for Critical Theorists (ibid: 38). Rather than questioning the underlying assumptions of realism, he reiterates them as the reasons why Critical Theorists are wrong – changing the way states think is not possible “because the structure of the international system forces states to behave as egotists” (ibid:40). Mearsheimer provides little consideration of any of the challenges discussed in this chapter.

Keohane has also assessed the ‘reflectivist’ challenge and found that it does not require a fundamental change to the rationalist research programme (Keohane, 1988). Reflective theories will only be useful if they develop new facts about international institutions, develop testable theories and prioritise an empirical research programme (Keohane, 1989:174). As Smith argues Keohane’s approach is to “propose that judgement between rationalist and reflective theories takes place on criteria that not only favour rationalism, but … are exactly the criteria that reflective accounts are attacking” (Smith 1996:13). Keohane’s assessment is also challenged by Ashley (1990), who argues that it privileges a certain interpretation of empirical research and ignores the research programmes pursued by ‘reflectivist’ scholars.

Waltz accepts that realism is ‘problem-solving theory’ and understands this approach as different, but just as (if not more) valid than Critical Theory (Waltz, 1986). Rather than tackling the epistemological challenge of Critical Theory, Waltz argues that his approach could just as well theorise the issues that Cox and Ashley believe to be missing from realist theory.
Gilpin maintains that he does not understand most of Ashley’s critique of neorealism and of the parts he does understand argues that Ashley “has a very narrow and constricted comprehension of the variety and richness of realist thought (Gilpin, 1986). He fails to address the fundamental challenge that theory is always for someone and for some purpose, as the following quote demonstrates:

Realist writers tend to believe that their general perspective on the relationship of economics and politics provides a much better explanation of what has transpired over the past decade ... than do those of their liberal and Marxist ideological rivals (Gilpin, 1986:310 italics added).

Whilst Gilpin understands liberalism and Marxism as ideological and therefore ‘for some purpose’, realism is understood as objective. Furthermore, in trying to counteract Ashley’s assertion that neo-realism is state centric, he writes that “the actors in international relations are those entities capable of putting forth demands effectively” (ibid:316). This illustrates the argument put forward by Critical Theorists that problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it; Gilpin does not try to uncover the underlying structures that allow some entities and not others to put forth demands effectively.

It is therefore hard to find serious engagement with the criticisms levelled at traditional International Relations theory, from which the orthodox global governance approaches discussed in this chapter have in part arisen.

Conclusions

This chapter has discussed how realist and liberal approaches give a limited account of global governance, and can be described as having the characteristics of, what Cox terms, problem-solving theory. This chapter argued that there are three key areas in the study of global governance which are not sufficiently understood by these orthodox approaches: the global economy, (in)security and power.

The ontological basis of global governance within the mainstream literature was initially set out: what is being studied by neo-realists, neo-liberal institutionalists and orthodox globalisation theorists, in their attempts to understand global governance. It went on, in section 1.2, to outline how the relationship between the global economy and global governance is understood within this literature and highlighted a number of limitations to this understanding. The power of ideas in affecting change or justifying
the status quo is not fully explored, and often ignored (Grindle, 2000). Global governance institutions are understood to be insulated from the wider structures of the global economy (and for liberals – state power). And the management of the global economy is perceived to be, to a large extent, separate from political power and its total separation is advocated (Rodrik, 2000). The current global economic system is variously understood as inevitable, natural and to a large extent benign (Rosenau, 2000, Grindle, 2000).

Subsequently, section 1.3 discussed how security and insecurity are understood within the mainstream global governance literature. Economic globalisation is perceived to be both a threat and a source of international security and to mitigate the former is a key rationale of contemporary global governance. Orthodox theories take an instrumentalist approach to correct perceived problems. Global governance is thus associated with the maintenance of order, and, in managing and facilitating economic globalisation, the pursuit of prosperity. Global governance has also been linked to the spread of democracy and the ensuing order and peace this can bring. As such the contested nature of, and links between, insecurity, global governance and the global economy are not fully explored.

Barnett and Duvalls’ account of power in global governance was set out in section 1.4, which went on to argue that realists give a one-dimensional account of the power at work in global governance by focussing on the material power of states. Whilst liberal theories understand that institutions have power, they tend to isolate international institutions from wider power structures of the state system and the global economy. Furthermore, less obvious and observable forms of power – ‘the social relations of constitutions’ – are only partially or superficially investigated. The structural power of global capitalism is sidelined, as is the productive power of the global governance complex.

Section 1.5 characterised orthodox approaches as problem-solving theory. They tend to work with the prevailing system, rather than theorising how particular structures are made possible and do not attempt to uncover constraints upon human action, embedded within social structures.

In investigating the research question ‘in what ways, if any, does the securitization of development debate aid our understanding of contemporary global governance?’, the remainder of this thesis is structured to take into account the deficiencies of the mainstream approaches to global governance highlighted here. It investigates what the securitization of development debate offers in terms of its understanding of the
Chapter One

global economy, (in)security and power, and, in chapter seven, the extent to which it overcomes the limitations of orthodox theory. Before this analysis, the following chapter explicates the central arguments made by Duffield and others in their account of the securitization of development.
Chapter Two

The Securitization of Development Debate within the Critical Global Governance Literature

Introduction

The previous chapter examined how orthodox theories conceptualise global governance and discussed the key deficiencies within these theories. To recapitulate, chapter one argued that orthodox theory provides only a limited account of, firstly, the relationship between global governance and the global economy, secondly, the relationship between global governance and (in)security, and thirdly, power within the global governance complex. This second chapter sets out the key propositions of the securitization of development debate, through examining its understanding of the relationship between global governance and the global economy, (in)security, and power. These propositions are then examined within the remaining five chapters, in order to analyse in what ways, if any, this debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, and its limitations.

The securitization of development theme has grown substantially since the late 1990s and is influential within both the security and development fields, and within the increasing body of literature dealing with global governance (Security Dialogue, 2010 issue 41 (1); Thomas, 2001; Wilkinson, 2005). To varying degrees contributors to this debate argue that within the context of a contracting global capitalist system, a liberal global governance complex links the discourses of security and development in what can be described as a 'security-development nexus', such that the South is conceived as an international security threat. Authors who systematically develop this claim within the context of a liberal global governance complex include Bradbury (2003), who makes this case with reference to Somalia, and Duffield (2001a), Hoogvelt (2001:195) and Wilkin (2002), who argue that the synthesis of the two discourses of security and development is a coherent strand of global governance. Duffield’s 2001 book “Global Governance and the New Wars”, most fully develops this theorising and Duffield has further explored these issues in numerous journal articles (Duffield, 2001b, 2002a, 2004a), and a second book (Duffield, 2007). His work has been influential within the critical development (Thomas, 2001), security (Hettne, 2010) and global governance (Cochrane et al., 2003) literature. Because of its wide influence and comprehensive nature, his account of the securitization of development forms a substantial part of the exposition within this chapter, which also draws upon a range of
sources from this debate. In this way the wider securitization of development literature is explicated and tensions between these accounts highlighted.

Fundamentally, Castells (1998), Duffield (2002a; 2001a) and Hoogvelt (2001), argue that global capitalism transformed in the 1970s, as a result of crisis, from an expansive and inclusive system, to an exclusionary and contracting one. As such, much of the South is said to be excluded from the official networks of global capitalism, whilst economic links within the core (or North) are said to be widening and deepening. This is referred to as a new phase of global capitalism, in which capitalism is withdrawing from areas that hold no value for it, resulting in rising inequality and social exclusion in those areas (Hoogvelt, 2001). Within this new phase of contracting global capitalism, a coordinated system of global governance has emerged, whose primary *raison d’être* is to secure the liberal capitalist West against non-liberal, excluded populations. Security is pursued through development policy and ideology which attempts to diffuse contemporary liberal democratic and economic tenets. Development, increasingly permeated by security concerns, is understood to be pivotal in regulating, managing, transforming and indeed redefining the relationship between global governance and non-liberal areas. Furthermore, it is argued that development ideology and policy are coordinating mechanisms, providing a common language around which global governance actors unify and pursue their common objectives (Duffield, 2001a; Wilkin 2002). Global governance, as conceptualised within this debate, cannot rest whilst it faces non-liberal entities, but is compelled to try and spread ‘liberal peace’ across the globe, in order to secure its hegemony (Duffield, 2001a; Young, 1995). This differs from past imperialisms, which sought primarily to conquer and rule territories directly. The power residing in contemporary global governance is more concerned with enabling non-liberal societies to self-govern in liberal ways (Williams and Young, 1994).

Much of the securitization of development debate has developed within the critical global governance literature. In terms of its philosophical and methodological approaches, important aspects of the debate continue in the emancipatory and critical tradition of critical theory, in that they have an “ethical and political content … concerned with explaining the world in order to change it for the better” (Rupert and Smith, 2002:2). In line with critical theory, significant contributors to the securitization of development debate imply that social, political and economic life, and thus knowledge, are historically constructed and connected to power. Critical theory’s emphasis on the role of ideology, language and discourse in the production, maintenance and transformation of relations of power, is reflected in the concern with
the ideology and discourse initiated and disseminated through global governance networks (Duffield, 2007; 2001a; Overbeek, 2005; Stern and Öjendal, 2010).

With regard to the historical account of global capitalism, Castells (1998), Duffield, (2001a) and Hoogvelt (2001) develop the ideas of Cox and others within the neo-Gramscian tradition. Cox recognises that global capitalism was restructured in the 1970s in response to capitalism’s endemic crisis. Global production, he argues, has become more flexible and a new global division of labour segregates workers along the lines of ethnicity, race and gender. Cox argues that while international production has expanded, a large part of the world’s population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy (Cox, 1999:9). Furthermore, he implies that this excluded group may be perceived by global governance institutions as a potential security threat (Cox, 1995). Duffield and others develop these ideas further and argue that a significant proportion of the global South are now structurally excluded from, and irrelevant to, the official networks of the global economy, and add a further dimension by including the parallel economy in their analysis of global capitalism (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2002a; 2001a; Hoogvelt 2001). Furthermore, Duffield places at the centre of his early analysis the claim that the excluded South is perceived by global governance networks as a potential security threat to the liberal capitalist West, bringing Cox’s peripheral idea to the fore.

A number of accounts within the securitization of development debate are also influenced by the conceptualisation of global governance within the neo-Gramscian literature. Firstly, neo-Gramscian theories of global governance recognise a level of coordination and communication between different actors at the global level, with institutions such as the OECD and World Bank vital in formulating and dispersing ideas. Gill adds that global governance is imbued with certain values and conceives a political project attempting to make “transnational liberalism, and if possible, liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development” (Gill, 2003:132). This idea is development within the securitization of development debate, with a number of authors explicitly arguing that global governance is a coordinated complex, unified through a specifically liberal consensus (Duffield, 2001a; Wilkin, 2002). Secondly, the role of policy as a tool of global governance is emphasised by neo-Gramscian accounts. For example, Cox argues that the purpose of global governance networks is to bring about a policy consensus which is in the interest of global capitalism (Cox, 2002:33). This argument is reformulated by Duffield and Hoogvelt, who claim that development policy is used to manage and regulate the global South, whilst policy discourse has a function in defining the South and coordinating global governance actors (Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001).
In conceptualising global governance as a specifically liberal project, several authors draw upon Foucault’s work in order to gain further insight into the contemporary modality of global governance (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2000; Duffield, 2007; Selby, 2003). Global governance is emphasised as a form of global biopolitics that seeks to foster and promote liberal life, rather than the juridical sovereign kind of power that threatens death (Dillon and Reid, 2001:41). This type of power examines the ‘detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed” (ibid:41).
Thus Duffield writes that whilst the term geopolitics interconnects and interrogates states, territories and alliances, since the 19th century, effective states have expanded their ability to support life within those territories. Thus populations, livelihood systems and life processes have become the subject of governance (Duffield, 2007:5). In theorising the global governance of development, this Foucauldian concept of biopolitics is expanded (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2007).

In line with critical development studies these writers accept that neo-liberal economics underpins both the Washington and post-Washington consensus, and also that the good governance agenda of the post-Washington consensus marks a reorientation of the development orthodoxy (Castells, 1998; Dillon and Reid 2000:118-119; Duffield, 2001:29-30; Hoogvelt, 2001:178-196; Thomas, 2001:160). However, in contrast with much of this literature the analysis of global development policy goes beyond Washington and, in line with the conceptualisation of global governance outlined above, global development policy is conceived as formulated and disseminated by, not only the key development institutions of the World Bank and IMF, but also other global governance agencies such as the OECD, Northern governments, private military companies and NGOs (Duffield 2001a: chapter 3). Furthermore, the reorientation of development policy in the 1990s is understood not solely as a response to external criticism, or the acceptance that good governance is needed to ensure economic growth, but also as a response to the recognition by global governance of the links between conflict and poverty in the South, and international security (the security-development nexus).

Finally, whilst it may not be explicitly acknowledged, there are three ways in which the securitization of development debate is indebted to the concept of “securitization” as developed by theorists associated with the Copenhagen School. Firstly, according to Barry Buzan (a leading theorist of the school), the process of securitization is a speech act - saying the words makes something an issue of security (Buzan, et al., 1998:26). Securitization is, therefore, always a political act of will. In their conceptualisation of development as a security issue, scholars contributing to the debate utilise this same
approach. The securitization of development, argues Wilkin (2002), has ensued through the merging of the orthodox security and development discourses. Buzan’s concept of securitization as a speech act necessitates a ‘securitizing actor’, a representative of what is being threatened (often the state) that has the power to define something as a security threat. Within the securitization of development literature, this is often conceived to be a global governance institution such as the World Bank or a state representative.

Secondly, Buzan argues that securitization is not a reaction to something actually being a security threat. It is not necessary for a real existential threat to exist for an issue to be securitized – only for the issue to be presented as such a threat (ibid:24). Again, this is in line with Duffield’s conceptualisation. He argues that whilst the empirical evidence linking conflict and underdevelopment is weak, the discourse assumes this link and presents underdevelopment as a potential international security threat (Duffield, 2001a; see also Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Conversely, Thomas (2001) and Wilkin (2002) imply that the connection is tangible, but that the corresponding policy responses reproduce inequality and injustice.

Thirdly, the securitization of something allows it to be dealt with in ‘emergency mode’. “The special nature of security threats” argues Buzan, “justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). To count as a security issue, a securitizing actor needs to generate the endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise apply (ibid:5): “Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (ibid:23). Within the securitization of development debate it is argued that because development is now conceptualised within a security framework, it is legitimate for global governance to manage and seek the transformation of non-liberal populations, overriding traditional conceptions of sovereignty and cultural norms.

Although the securitization of development debate may utilise a number of ideas from the securitization literature, the Copenhagen school argues for a legitimate widening of the traditional security framework to include, for example, economic or societal security, whereas this debate problematises the presentation of underdevelopment as a security concern.

As discussed, the sections in this chapter will mirror the three areas discussed in chapter one, for which orthodox theories provide an insufficient account: the relationship between the global economy and global governance (section one), the
relationship between global governance and (in)security (section two), and power (sections three and four). Thus section one examines the accounts, given with the securitization of development debate, of the global economy and its relationship to global governance, which is centred on the idea that global capitalism has evolved into a structurally contracting system. Section two sets out the security-development nexus, examining the idea that the discourses of security and development are now linked by the networks of global governance. And sections three and four examine how power within the global governance system is understood. Section three examines how power is constituted through a system of liberal global governance and section four looks at how power is utilised through selective inclusion and liberal societal transformation.

2.1 Global Capitalism as a Structurally Exclusive System

Within the securitization of development debate, either implicitly or explicitly, the global economy is conceived as being divided according to the level of integration into the formal global economy. Those areas which are fully integrated into the global economy are termed ‘the North‘ – these are the core regionalised systems of the global information economy (Japan/East Asia, Western Europe and North America). ‘The South’ refers to the rest – all areas formally outside or only partially or conditionally integrated into these regionalised systems or networks (Duffield, 2001a:4). For Duffield, the division of North and South is an empirical starting point and a useful definition in that the ‘South’ includes regions which have not historically been regarded as underdeveloped, such as the Balkans and parts of Russia (Duffield, 2004b). Again we can see how this literature has been influenced by wider debates in academia with clear parallels between this portrayal of the global political economy and World Systems Theory (Hopkins et al., 1983; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; 1989). However these writers point out that this core/periphery division may be as much social as territorial, although the majority of the destitute and dispossessed continue to be geographically concentrated in the South (Hoogvelt, 2001).

These authors agree that rather than the global economy being characterised by integration, many societies in the South are increasingly excluded from the official global economy (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). From this perspective, a core group of industrial states are consolidating their economic links with each other, to the exclusion of a large part of the world. Rather than continuing to expand in a spatial or geographical sense, it is argued that the competitive financial, investment, trade and productive networks that link the core regionalised systems of the global economy have been thickening and deepening since the 1970s (Duffield,
The South can no longer rely on the supply of its raw materials and cheap labour to ensure its inclusion within the conventional world economy. Corporations are increasingly withdrawing their business and investment from large parts of the Third World. Investment is risky, the workforce lacks appropriate skills, telecommunications are inadequate and the politics unpredictable. This reluctance to invest can be seen throughout the African continent which, save for a few lucrative niches, such as diamonds, has suffered a collapse in commercial investment since the 1970s (Castells 1998:82-92; Duffield, 2001:5). Thus, Castells summarises that FDI is bypassing Africa at a time when it is growing substantially elsewhere (Castells, 1998:90). The North and South are, therefore, no longer as deeply interconnected through economic linkages, which have narrowed and shrunk. Rather, the relationship between the North and South is characterised by the networks of international public policy, which have thickened and developed new organisational forms (Duffield, 2001:8-9).

Whilst Castells (1998) and Duffield (2002a: 2001a) include accounts of structural exclusion in their analysis, Hoogvelt (2001) provides the most comprehensive argument for the structural exclusion of the global South from the formal global economy. Indeed, Duffield’s thesis to some extent relies upon her exposition (Duffield, 2002a: 1053; 2001a:3 and 6). According to Hoogvelt, the world economic crisis that began in the 1970s has led to a restructuring of the world economy and has transformed the way in which production and distribution are organised (Hoogvelt 2001:xiii). She maintains that a new phase of ‘capitalist involution’ is upon us, meaning “an intensification of trade and capital linkages within the core of the capitalist system and a relative, selective withdrawal of such linkages from the periphery” (ibid: 89-90). Globalisation, she argues,
entails a process of intensification of linkages within the core of the global system, while its counterpart, ‘peripherisation’, becomes a process of marginalisation and expulsion that cuts across territories and national boundaries, rendering areas within the traditional core subject to the same processes of expulsion as large swathes of territory in Africa, Latin America and Asia (ibid:140-141).

Hoogvelt uses trade, investment and capital flow statistics to demonstrate that global capitalism is excluding and expelling ever more people from its interactive core, whilst economic links within that core, are thickening. She argues that the indicators commonly cited as evidence of capitalism’s global reach – world trade, FDI, and the expansion of all international capital flows – when closely investigated, do not provide
confirmation of a greater globalisation of the world economy, but instead testify to a
deepening of economic links in the core and the simultaneous exclusion of the
periphery (ibid). Following Hoogvelt, each of these indicators is examined in turn.

The level of foreign trade is conventionally measured by the ratio of the volume of
world trade (expressed as the sum total of world merchandise exports and imports at
current prices) to the volume of world output. According to Hoogvelt, from a height of
33% in 1933, this figure reduced dramatically during the world wars, and from the
1950s began to grow, and reached a new high of 43% in 1996 (ibid:68-69). Whilst at
face value these figures support the idea of expanding world trade, Hoogvelt points
out that this increased intensity of world trade, does not translate into an increase in
the extensity of foreign trade. Instead, she argues that globalisation amounts to "an
accelerated withdrawing, a shrinking of the global map, rather than an expanding
phenomenon, and one which expels ever more people from the interactive circle of
global capitalism" (ibid:70).

The increased intensity of foreign trade relates to a small core of advanced
industrialised and newly industrialised states. Using UN Trade Statistics and UNCTAD's
Trade and Development Reports, Hoogvelt argues that any growth in the share of
developing states' trade can be attributed almost entirely to the first tier Newly
Industrialised Economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
Hoogvelt's analysis indicates that in 1996, the developing countries had a 29.1% share
of commodity world trade, an increase of 6% since 1990. However, these 4 Asian
economies made up a third of the 29 per cent, accounting for more than the 6 percent
increase (ibid:70-73). Of the 1996 share contributed by the developing countries,
Africa was responsible for 1.7% and Asia 22%, with the NIEs holding 10.8 per cent of
this figure. This leads Hoogvelt to argue that if these four Asian Tiger economies were
reclassified into the 'industrial group', in 1996 this group would have accounted for 78
per cent of world trade, while that of the non-industrial group would decline to 19 per
cent (ibid:74). Hoogvelt endeavours to highlight the fact that a large group of people in
Southern countries do not participate in the global trading system and that world trade
figures stand as evidence of a thickening network of economic exchange within the
core, the graduation of a small number of peripheral nations with a comparatively
small population base to ‘core status’, and above all to a declining economic
interaction between core and periphery (ibid:76).

Hoogvelt identifies FDI as the second indicator commonly cited to demonstrate the
increasing globalisation of the world economy. She argues that in relation to world
exports, international production (defined as production subject to foreign control and
decision) in the 1930s was comparable with international production in the 1970s. Levels of FDI in the post-war period, as a percentage of trade, are therefore, not new. What is new, Hoogvelt argues, “is the geographical redirection of such flows away from the periphery and into the core of the system” (ibid:78). She goes on to note that,

[i]n the colonial period, up to 1960, the Third World received half of the total direct investment flows. This percentage had declined to a third in 1966, and to a quarter in 1974. By 1988-9, it had dropped still further, to 16.5 per cent. But over half of this remaining trickle went to the regions of East, South and South-East Asia (ibid:78).

By 1997, this figure had increased to 38 percent. However, Hoogvelt argues, much of this investment went to eight coastal provinces in China. “China now accounts for two-thirds of the total FDI flow into East Asia and a third of the inflow for all developing countries” (ibid:78). Conversely, Africa’s share of all FDI to developing countries dropped from 13 per cent in 1980 to less than 5 per cent in the late 1990s (ibid:173). Furthermore, Hoogvelt cites Hirst and Thompson’s research, which maintains that 30% of the world’s population received 86% of all FDI in the first half of the 1990s. This means that a large majority of the world’s population are excluded from foreign investment flows (Hirst and Thompson, 1999).

The third area discussed by Hoogvelt is the expansion of international capital flows and their pattern of integration. She observes that in assessing these wider international resource flows, it is very difficult to compare the present with the past. New financial instruments, new ways of borrowing and lending, and new methods of the international transfer of resources are constantly being invented, necessitating new classifications for statistical data collection, and making previous distinctions obsolete (Hoogvelt, 2001:80). Furthermore, there is what Hoogvelt calls an interactive web of cross-penetration of capital flows, making it almost meaningless to try and trace ownership of assets and liabilities to their respective national roots, adding to the problem of comparing past and present. National balance of payments statistics conceal a huge variety of international transactions, for example: “lending by American banks operating in Britain to Americans in American dollars, or to British residents in American dollars, or to American residents in Britain in sterling” (ibid:83). Of net flows to developing countries, Hoogvelt quotes UNCTAD:

Despite the much acclaimed absolute rise in capital inflows of developing countries in the 1990s, they have averaged around 5 percent of GDP since the beginning of the decade which was roughly the level prevailing before the
outbreak of the debt crisis of the 1980s. If China is excluded, the ratio during 1990-1998 was more than one percentage point lower than during 1975-1982 (UNCTAD, 1999:101, cited in Hoogvelt, 101).

Furthermore, 60 per cent of these flows in the period 1990-1998 went to only six countries - Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Argentina, Indonesia and China. Hoogvelt also writes that, according to the UNDP, only 25 developing countries have access to private markets for bonds, commercial bank loans and portfolio equity. The rest are excluded because they lack a credit rating. Much of the global South, she writes, is unbankable, in that it cannot offer a safe return on investment. As a result, capital flight from these countries has increased, as elites invest their money in the financial markets and institutions of the core countries. Between 1975 and 1985, an estimated US$165-200 billion was placed by individual investors from the South into international financial markets (Hoogvelt, 2001:89). Hoogvelt concludes, therefore, that

[t]he use of global… trade and investment flows, and expressing these as a percentage of ‘global’…world product, creates an image of a ‘global’ economy that stretches from Anchorage to Cape Town, from Helsinki to Santiago de Chile. It does not – not anymore! An ambitious net of capitalist catchment may have been cast during the colonial era, but having caught the fish it pulled back and settled comfortably on the shores of a relatively small part of the world (ibid:78).

At the same time, it is argued that production and labour have been made more flexible, and knowledge or information has overtaken land, labour and capital as the most valued dynamic of production. The critical aspects of the “new economy” are “expertise, creativity and intelligence or information” (ibid:110). In this context, Hoogvelt writes, a fundamental cleavage has opened up between, on the one hand, networks of capital, labour, information and markets, and, on the other hand, population and territories deprived of value and interest to the dynamics of global capitalism (ibid:130).

Based on the empirical evidence set out above, Hoogvelt maintains that the capitalist system is shrinking and excluding societies from its networks. The linkages between the core and periphery, in terms of the volume of both trade and capital flows, which increased during earlier phases, have now diminished. In addition, Hoogvelt emphasises that the geographical distribution patterns of the excluded are new and constantly evolving. The global division of labour is rendering a core-periphery relationship that cuts across national and geographic boundaries, so that the excluded
exist within the traditional core and periphery: “Core-periphery is becoming a social relationship, no longer just a geographical one” (ibid:138).

Manuel Castells considers this further, providing evidence of exclusion as a social rather than a geographical (spatial) category, affecting, in some cases, whole populations and in others, discrete communities (Castells, 1998:73). Castells proposes that the restructuring of capitalism in the 1970s was linked to the rise and consolidation of the Washington consensus, underpinned by neo-liberal economics. In some parts of the world, this restructuring has been characterised by economic growth and greater opportunities for profit, and a section of humanity has experienced a rise in living standards. Along with its progressive character, informational global capitalism is intertwined with rising inequality and social exclusion, and this exclusionary logic is a source of instability within the system (ibid:70). Thus, under global capitalism, the bulk of the population in Western Europe enjoys amongst the highest living standards in the world, and in world history. Areas that are not valuable from the perspective of informational capitalism, and that do not hold significant political interest however, are bypassed by flows of wealth and information, and “ultimately deprived of the basic technological infrastructure that allows us to communicate, innovate, produce, consume and even live in today’s world”. This process, argues Castells, induces an extremely uneven geography of social/territorial exclusion and inclusion, which disables large segments of people “while linking up trans-territorially, through information technology, whatever and whoever may offer value in the global networks accumulating wealth, information and power” (ibid:74).

From this standpoint, global capitalism that was once expanding, is now contracting and consolidating in those regions which enhance capital accumulation, circumventing sections of societies which are of marginal value. This pattern is not fixed, but variable and reversible. Excluded areas can be integrated, and areas that are no longer useful can be abandoned. In the networks of the global economy, only segments of economic structures, countries, regions and populations are linked, and they are linked in proportion to their particular role and contribution to the international division of labour. Global capitalism, therefore, is now characterised by simultaneous development and underdevelopment, social exclusion and social inclusion.

There is of course a huge concentration of capital, technology, skills and informational infrastructure within the ‘core of the global economy’, namely, the USA, Japan, Western Europe and, increasingly, the four Asian Tigers. At the same time, most of Africa is ‘structurally irrelevant’ to the global economy. However, “there are several centres and several peripheries” (Castells, 1996:107). There are areas of structural irrelevance.
leading to areas of social exclusion throughout the globe, concentrated within poor countries, but also within the ‘core’. In the North, exclusion is concentrated in discrete communities, whereas in the South whole populations are excluded.

In a departure from Hoogvelt’s thesis, Duffield is keen to point out that in parallel with this process of capitalist contraction “the South has re-integrated itself into the liberal world system through the deepening and expansion of a wide range of trans-border shadow economies” (Duffield, 2001a:46). The marginalisation of the South has led to new forms of economic integration and wealth creation through non-official, non-liberal and often criminal, economic networks that run in parallel to the official global economy (Duffield, 2002a). Duffield has described the parallel economy as economic activity that is non-conventional and cross-border in character (Duffield, 2001a:145). Parallel economic networks include an array of goods and services, with drugs and arms being the largest and most profitable. The parallel economy also manages trade in legal goods and services through illegal or unrecorded channels. Estimates of money laundered from the global trade in drugs range from $85 billion to $130 billion per annum, whilst overall profits from all kinds of activities within the parallel economy have been estimated as high as $750 billion a year (Castells, 1998:138). These parallel economic networks are non-liberal in the sense that they are not organised in terms of liberal norms, formal rules or free market values. For example, rather than having a free market ethos, shadow economies are more likely to pursue informal protectionism (Duffield, 2002a1058). Parallel economic networks, it is argued, link local resources to international markets, thus practically re-integrating Southern populations into the global economy. For example, Bhattacharyya writes that

[i]f the emerging networks of global capital consign some to exclusion from the participation in all the good things of life, then the criminal economy seems to offer reintegration for these lost black holes...What distinguished this global criminal economy is not its criminality as such but its ability to connect illicit trade to the formal networks of the global economy proper (Bhattacharyya, 2005:32).

According to Duffield, the re-integration of the South into the world economy through parallel networks limits the extent to which Southern societies are literally excluded, leading Duffield to observe that: “As well as a closing of doors or severing of relationships, exclusion is also a subordinating social relationship embodied in new relations of connection, interaction and interdependence” (Duffield, 2001a:5). The South, he continues, has effectively re-integrated itself into the liberal world system through the spread and deepening of all types of parallel economic activity (ibid:5).
Parallel economic and political complexes, including mafias, drug cartels and arms traders, are establishing themselves within the spaces abandoned by formal economic networks (Duffield, 2002b: 160; 2001a). Duffield points out, for example, that in Angola only 10% of the country’s estimated GNP is thought to be produced through conventional, legally established and publicly recognised economic practices (Duffield, 2001a:141). Unconventional economic networks, which are local-global in nature, may therefore provide the channels through which marginalised groups are integrated into the liberal world system.

This situation is often facilitated by weak or retreating state structures and the lack of substantial civil society in many parts of the developing world. According to Bhattacharyya, informal economic networks also become alternative governance structures. Illicit economic networks bypass weak and ineffective states and in the process set in motion a form of development that exacerbates the erosion of the state (Bhattacharyya, 2005:39). In the vacuum left by crumbling state institutions, organised crime can provide many of the services, such as protection of commercial businesses, that citizens expect from the state (ibid:89). Alternative routes to economic participation in the globalised economy are therefore managed by non-state, rather than state, actors.

Parallel economic networks, it is argued, may not be egalitarian or redistributive, but offer alternative forms of social regulation. They shape economic possibilities, execute political power, and establish cultures, rules of exchange and codes of conduct. In contrast to the ‘lost decade’ perception of the 1980s, Duffield argues that through parallel networks, actors in the South created alternative forms of existence while maintaining respectable flows of all types of domestic consumables, medical supplies, goods, and so on, that support millions of people (Duffield, 2002a: 1059). Liberal globalisation, he argues, rather than subjugating the entire world to its regulation, is actually creating opportunities for a different type of development (ibid). This new type of development is characterised by non-liberal forms of rights, political legitimacy, autonomy, protection, social regulation and wealth creation, and the parallel economy is an integral part of these new structures. In this way the poor have forged a process of ‘actual development’, which has come about as an “indirect, subversive, and antagonistic response” to structural adjustment, market liberalisation and the activities of aid agencies (Duffield, 2001a:159). Actual development had come about not because of official development efforts but despite them (Duffield, 2002a:1059).

Writing in the same vein, Bradbury argues that it is important to understand state collapse in Somalia as a response to global political and economic transformations that
have been taking place since the 1970s (Bradbury, 2003:13). These include market
deregulation, trade liberalisation, rapid advances in telecommunications technology,
and the emergence of liberal democracy as a template for good government and the
basis for market-led development. Third world societies, argues Bradbury, have
adapted to such changes through emerging political complexes, by means of which
some people are able to make a living and survive. Emerging political complexes “can
take both illiberal and liberal forms ... such as warlord entities, fundamentalist states
or more benign sub-national state-like authorities” (Bradbury, 2003:14). This analysis
“views state collapse not as a breakdown per se, but as an adaptation or response by
state rulers and societies to changes in the global political economy” (Bradbury,

Whilst Duffield and Bradbury connect non-liberal ‘actual development’ with structural
exclusion from the formal global economy (and reintegration through the parallel
economy), Duffield argues that global policy makers, as well as academics, make the
mistake of implying that exclusion from the formal economy creates a “void of scarcity
that leads to growing resource competition, breakdown, criminalisation and chaos”
(Duffield, 2001a:6). Too literal an interpretation of economic exclusion, Duffield
argues, gives the impression that exclusion generates conflict and social breakdown in
the ‘borderlands’. There is a danger that economic exclusion is seen as facilitating
spirals of decline, poverty and societal breakdown. This interpretation is evident in the
work of Castells and Hoogvelt. Castells argues that the rise of global capitalism since
the mid-1970s has coincided with the collapse of Africa’s economy, the disintegration
of many of its states and the breakdown of most of its societies (Castells, 1998: 82-83). And Hoogvelt argues that, as globalisation proceeds, whole regions and areas are
excluded from its benefits, and states within the periphery collapse into zones of
instability (Hoogvelt, 2001:160). Whilst adopting the idea of structural exclusion and
integration through parallel economic networks from Hoogvelt and Castles, Duffield
also challenges how they interpret this exclusion:

The view of global exclusion developed by writers such as Castells (1996; 1998)
and Hoogvelt (1997) tends to articulate with images of borderland chaos and
social regression. The danger is that exclusion is interpreted literally, giving the
impression of an emerging economic void: a landscape of deepening scarcity
upon which one of the few possible trajectories is that of increasing resource
competition leading to a downward spiral of conflict and social breakdown
(Duffield, 2002a:1054).
According to Duffield, the idea that significant areas of the South are excluded from the global economy leads global governance institutions and academics to conceive the South as unstable and dangerous (Duffield, 2001a:7). When economic exclusion, followed by civil war, is seen as a form of social regression, it establishes both a justification and legitimacy for intervention. Within this context the “threat of an excluded South fomenting international instability through conflict, criminal activity and terrorism is part of a new security framework. Within this framework underdevelopment is becoming dangerous” (ibid: 2). It is to this aspect of the securitization of development debate that we will now turn.

2.2 The Security-Development Nexus

In the context of global capitalism as a structurally exclusive system, the securitization of development debate maintains that the logic of a security-development nexus provides the framework for North-South relations (Beall at al., 2005; Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a; 2001b; Thomas, 2001; Woods, 2005). According to this argument, an emerging system of global governance conceives underdevelopment and conflict in the South as mutually reinforcing. As such, underdevelopment is now perceived as a serious threat to the liberal world (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2010:56&69; 2001a; Wilkin, 2002). Cox first identified the South as a potential security threat in the 1980s. The marginalisation, poverty and potential revolt of millions, he argued, presented a major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony (Cox, 1981:149). Duffield (2007; 2001a) develops this idea, arguing that it is not just the hegemony of international capital that needs to be made secure against the marginalised, but the Western liberal system.

Contributors to the securitization of development debate, to varying degrees, hold that underdevelopment in the South is perceived by the global governance complex as a major source of conflict and societal breakdown. Securing these unstable regions is considered unsustainable without development, and development ultimately impossible without security. Development concerns, it is argued, have become increasingly important in relation to how security is understood (Thomas, 2004b). For example, it is now generally accepted that international organisations should gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping to rebuild war-torn societies in a way that will avert future violence (Duffield, 2010:57, 2001a: 1-2).

As a consequence of the conflict and insecurity it breeds, underdevelopment is now considered a serious international security concern, a role previously occupied by
interstate conflict (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a; Thomas, 2001; Wilkin, 2002; Woods, 2005). The threat of an excluded South fomenting “international instability through conflict, criminal activity and terrorism is now part of a new security framework” (Duffield, 2001a:2). The notion of globalisation as understood by the global governance complex leads to the idea that nationally unimportant problems no longer exist. Since they do not respect geographical boundaries, the "ripple effects of poverty, environmental collapse, civil conflict or health crises require international management” so that they do not inundate and destabilise Western society (Duffield, 2007:1). Hence “an ever-growing amount of economic resources and political will is being poured into the security-development nexus and the attendant revamping of national and multi-lateral institutions” (Stern and Öjendal, 2010:6). According to these accounts, the security concerns of global governance networks are directed towards those who are hostile to the fundamental values and interests of the Western liberal system, which include peace, stability, freedom, democracy and rule of law. By linking insecurity and underdevelopment, development, it is argued, has emerged from decades of failure, reinvigorated with a new mandate (Duffield, 2001a:15-17). As such, “by the mid-1990s ... the main international donor governments had already refined their aid budgets as strategic tools of conflict management and resolution” (Duffield, 2010:57), and currently, the security-development nexus is understood as part of the globalised fight against terrorism (Stern and Öjendal, 2010:6) Beall et al (2005) similarly focus on the geopolitical underpinnings of the security-development nexus and argue that Northern security has become a primary objective of development. As a result, they raise the concern that the autonomy of agencies administering development funding is under threat (ibid).

The most serious threats within this security-development framework are what are considered ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states. For example, quoting from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2002:2), Bradbury writes that, as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001,

the US-led anti-terrorist coalition is ... concerned with ‘inoculating failed or failing states against occupation by al-Qai’da or its successors’, and supporting politics, in whatever form, ‘that would allow more effective counter-terrorist cooperation in the future’ (Bradbury, 2003:8).

According to Bradbury, the equating of underdevelopment with security threats, means that the North will increasingly continue to engage with the South, even though the global system is now an exclusionary one. Bradbury notes that alleged links between Somali Islamist movements and al-Qaida networks validate air and maritime
surveillance of Somalia, a state on the margins of global capitalism, by several Western countries (ibid:8). The humanitarian imperative to protect the security and rights of war-affected civilians in Somalia, writes Bradbury, has been replaced by a concern with international, and specifically American, security. This, he argues, reflects a convergence over the past decade of security and development policy and also reflects the prevailing liberal view of state collapse and internal conflict as symptomatic of 'underdevelopment' (Bradbury, 2003:9).

The security-development nexus is understood to unify global governance actors: it has become "the common sense understanding of global politics" (Wilkin, 2002:640). Wilkin suggests that the security-development discourse provides a coherent ontology and epistemology for global governance. This, firstly, offers a description of the world that enables actors and institutions to operate within it, and secondly, directs the focus of study and constrains the kind of questions about global poverty that might reasonably be asked and answered (ibid:640-641). Duffield also maintains that the security-development nexus plays a symbolic, unifying role, rather than an informational one, and provides a focus and a rationale for development within the global governance system: development can no longer be ignored, but, as a vital aspect of Western security, must be promoted and managed in a more vigorous manner than previously (Duffield, 2001a). Whilst the empirical evidence linking underdevelopment to conflict is ambiguous, it is argued that the perception that they are mutually reinforcing is fundamental to development policy today (Duffield, 2007; 2001a).

Wilkin argues that the world view embedded within the security-development nexus holds that problems of development are problems of particular weak states: their political institutions and lack of commitment to ‘sound’ governance. From this perspective, therefore, the task of global governance is to provide weak and failed states with the institutional capacity to overcome these particular weaknesses (Wilkin, 2002:638). For example, the global development discourse on Somalia holds that conflict and state collapse are temporary problems that can be rectified through development aid, the aim of which is the creation of a modern liberal democratic state which will negate future conflict (Bradbury, 2003). Duffield agrees that the security-development nexus situates the causes of conflict firmly within the domestic sphere. Internal dynamics, such as poor governance, are understood to be at the root of underdevelopment, conflict, political instability and inequality, whereas liberal development is seen as having the capacity to resolve and prevent conflict (Duffield, 2001a:28). As such, the contribution of colonialism, the cold war and globalisation to contemporary underdevelopment are suppressed (Dzelilovic, 2000).
Within the development and security literature, the notion of human security has been widely discussed (Poku and Graham, 1998; Thomas, 2000). Whilst there is disagreement over the precise meaning of the concept (Burgess and Owen, 2004), it is generally accepted that the notion of human security elevates the security of the individual above the security of the state. In contrast to traditional security approaches, “human beings and their complex social and economic relations are given primacy” (Thomas, 2000:5). According to Thomas, human security has both objective and subjective aspects. At the objective level, human security means the satisfaction of basic human material needs, whereas the subjective refers to human dignity, including personal autonomy and meaningful participation in community life. However, Duffield places concern for human security in the South in the context of the security-development nexus and argues that human security is “axiomatic of the post-cold war remerging of development and security” (Duffield, 2004a:3). Within this framework, he argues, basic education, health and employment provision, along with effective forms of representation and justice are not only worthy developmental aims, but are also understood as positive contributions to global security, through, for example, reducing the instability and conflict which can threaten wider international security (ibid). Failure to achieve human security, he writes, “risks disillusionment, internal war and mobilization of transborder networks and flows that threaten the cohesion of borderland states and hence the weft of global order itself” (Duffield, 2007:112).

Illustrating a further point of division within the securitization of development debate, Thomas (2001) and Wilkin (2002) understand human security as an alternative to the current conceptualisation of the security-development nexus by global governance networks. From this perspective, a human security approach has the potential to enhance democratisation and global social justice.

2.3 Liberal Global Governance

It is argued that this security-development nexus is underpinned by a liberal consensus, which fosters increasing coordination between the networks of global governance, and leads to a radical commitment to transform societies in the South to reflect liberal norms and expectations (Bradbury, 2003; Dillon, 2003; Duffield, 2001a:2).

Economically, this liberal paradigm includes neo-liberal market orientated economics, whilst, politically, liberal principles of democratic representation, individual liberty, rule of law, good governance, accountability, and civil society empowerment and
participation are advocated (Duffield, 2001a). From understanding liberalism as a coherent ideology or set of principles, Duffield moves, in later work, towards a Foucauldian understanding. A defining characteristic of liberalism, writes Duffield, “is that it takes people and their life and freedom as its essential reference point” (Duffield, 2007:5). This implies Foucault’s conception of biopolitics (Foucault, 2010), which Duffield refers to as “a form of politics that entails the administration of the processes of life at the aggregate level of population (Duffield, 2007:5).

There are a number of critical global governance theorists contributing to the securitization of development debate who, in agreement with Duffield, perceive global governance as a definitively liberal project. Selby, for example, argues that global governance is about “extending and overcoming resistance to liberal democratic values and procedures”, and “ordering people and things through recourse to reason, knowledge and expertise” (Selby, 2003:6). According to Selby, this liberal project masks relations of power and dominance, whilst conveying a pluralistic, post-ideological conception of the world. Similarly, Dillon and Reid maintain that global governance utilises normative political theory, liberal philosophy and a commitment to an international rule of law (Dillon and Reid, 2001). These authors conceive global governance as a liberal project directed towards the management of populations (biopolitics), rather than territory (geopolitics), within a liberal framework. Others are more inclined to focus primarily on neo-liberalism as the ideology of global governance. Overbeek, for example, uses the term neo-liberal global governance, because, he argues, neo-liberalism is a common ideological framework, which has been transformed into a universal and moral idea, through which a class-based exploitative hierarchy is maintained (Overbeek, 2005:50).

How then is this liberal consensus formed and reproduced? Overbeek’s conceptualisation of global governance includes international institutions (such as OECD, IMF, World Bank and WTO) and groupings of dominant states (G7) engaging in the legal and political reproduction of neo-liberalism and ensuring that through regulatory, surveillance and policing mechanisms, neo-liberal reforms are locked in (ibid:50). According to Overbeek, by positioning themselves as experts, these international institutions are key in spreading neo-liberal ideas. They bring together senior civil servants, business executives and technical specialists in working groups and conferences, creating epistemic communities which formulate, legitimate and diffuse neo-liberal policy reform (ibid:52). In this conceptualisation, global governance refers to the authoritative allocation of values in policy areas that potentially affect the world as a whole and its component parts (ibid:40). The structures of global governance do not determine people’s actions in any mechanical sense but constitute
the context of habits, pressures, expectation and constraints within which action takes place (Cox and Sinclair, 1996:97 cited in; Overbeek, 2005:42). In common with Cox (1993), Overbeek applies the Gramscian concept of hegemony to understanding how global governance maintains an underlying class-based exploitative hierarchy. Organic intellectuals of the dominant social groups formulate and disseminate intellectual and moral ideas, transforming them into ‘universal’ ones that bind subordinate groups into the existing moral order (Overbeek, 2005:42).

Barnett and Finnemore also recognise the importance of international institutions in the construction of a liberal order. They argue that international organisations construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place. “They help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold and … do so in ways compatible with liberalism and a liberal global order” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005:162). Furthermore, they argue that historically, the creation of international institutions has been part of a larger liberal project emanating from the West (ibid:166). According to this view, international organisations were not only created, from the mid-nineteenth century, to promote greater, more profitable and peaceful interaction between states, but also to champion core liberal values such as freedom, autonomy and liberty “against the lingering absolutism of the day” (ibid:166).

In other words, these ‘technical’ activities were hardly apolitical and value-neutral and instead were serving cultural ends” (ibid:166). With the end of the cold war, it is argued, the relationship between international organisations and the construction of a liberal world order became more explicit: advocates and staff of international organisations maintain that the world is being transformed by globalisation, and that international organisations are essential to manage and guide this process (ibid). International organisations and clubs, including the OECD, the IMF and the G7, therefore, shape the discourse within which the terms and concepts that circumscribe policy and action are defined. They have the authority to define what is thought of as legitimate or ‘expert’ knowledge and set the boundaries for the type of questions that it might be appropriate to pose.

Whilst Barnett and Finnemore put international institutions at the core of global governance, the securitization of development literature gives a role to both state and non-state actors in the formation of liberal consensus. Global governance, it is argued, resides in the “networks and linkages that bring together different organisations, interest groups and forms of authority in relation to specific regulatory tasks” (Duffield 2001a:44). Global governance is composed of innovative strategic complexes linking state and non-state actors, public and private organisations, and military and civilian
organisations. Dillon and Reid emphasise that NGOs and civil society organisations are embedded within the networks of global governance (2000:21). Along with state and private organisations, civil society groups pursue a liberal agenda of peace, stability and transformation, and profess the universality of their moral and ethical values. The system of global governance is characterised as non-territorial, fluid and adaptive. Civilian organisations are placed within the dominant system, and do not reside at a moral point of reference, disembroiled from the tainted structure of the overarching system. For Duffield (2001a:12), Dillon and Reid (2000:21) and Young (195:537), NGOs do not represent an opposition to the institutions of the liberal capitalist system, but form a strategic part of global governance.

Furthermore, as well as international organisations, dominant states and NGOs being engaged in the production and diffusion of ideas, Duffield, following Harrison (2004), draws attention to the practice of identifying, encouraging and cultivating ‘post-interventionary’ elites in Southern states whose interests, objectives and beliefs overlap with those of global development institutions. Specific practices by the World Bank, UN and donor governments include establishing workshops, secondments and training programmes for these elites and securing positions of influence for ‘pro-reformers’ in key ministries and private consultancy companies (Duffield, 2007:167).

According to this view, the networks of state and non-state actors communicate a liberal ontology through the common language of global development policy discourse, which has a role in constructing, consolidating and articulating liberal consensus. Policy draws together and motivates strategic actors. The role of policy "in allowing different networks to communicate is illustrated in the liberal consensus that now exists in relation to the causes of conflict and the method of societal reconstruction" (Duffield, 2001a:73). At the same time, the institutions and networks of global governance seek to coordinate development policy around this consensus (ibid). Duffield uses the example of Scandinavian governments to illustrate the increasing coordination of development policy arguing that, where once these governments had a distinctive development policy, their policies towards conflict and reconstruction are today increasingly in line with their European neighbours (ibid:73-74). Thomas agrees with this assessment, suggesting that the “growing perception of an assumed causal link between poverty/development and security has given added urgency and boost to the growing coordination of development governance and policy” (Thomas, 2004b).

Whether the current period should be regarded as a new phase of neo-imperialism is a further fault line within the securitization of development literature. Hoogvelt
maintains that in the age of globalisation, imperial power manifests itself in new ways. For example, as globalisation proceeds and areas of the periphery collapse into zones of instability, imperialist intervention continues through state-sponsored strategic control over resources in foreign states (Hoogvelt, 2001:160). Conversely, Duffield argues that when scholars attempt to understand the emerging structures of power through the concept of imperialism, they fail to recognise that the nature of power and authority may have changed radically. For Duffield, imperial power aspired to “direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and administrative means of authority” (Duffield, 2001a:34). Liberalism, on the other hand, through biopolitical mechanisms, is based upon “the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes”, and does not aspire to control territory (ibid:34; see also Young, 1994). It is a non-territorial networked relation of governance. Power in this form is much more opaque and complex. Rather than coercion, power is based upon the principles of cooperation and partnership (Duffield, 2001a:34). This fault line broadly reflects a blurred division between those who draw influence from neo-Gramscian literature and those who utilise a Foucauldian approach. As a comparison of his 2001 and 2007 books demonstrates, Duffield’s prolific work moves from the former to the latter.

Taking their lead from Gramsci (as well as Foucault), scholars contributing to the securitization of development debate emphasise that the structures and conditions that constrain action are not only economic, but ideological and discursive. Global governance, unified by a liberal consensus, constitutes a coordinated system of global rule, which provides the structure and conditions in which agents act (Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001; Overbeek, 2005). Therefore, global governance cannot only be thought of as a set of powerful governments and international institutions, but also a system of global rule through hegemonic discourse and ideology. The contemporary hegemonic ideology and discourse, it is argued, reproduces key liberal ideas such as the sanctity and autonomy of the individual, and democracy as the most desirable and just form of governance, as well as liberal economic notions, such as the virtues of the market (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005:163). The final section looks at how the global governance complex executes this liberal power.

2.4 Selective Inclusion and Liberal Societal Transformation

Power within this global governance system is conceived as selectively inclusive and directed towards the transformation of societies in the South through the diffusion of liberal norms and values. Through regulation and surveillance, selective inclusion
involves the labelling and categorising of Southern societies on the basis of their adherence to liberal values (Dillon and Reid, 2000; 2001; Duffield, 2001a; Overbeek, 2005). The relationship between populations in the global South and the networks of global governance are then defined and managed accordingly. Thus, the extent to which populations are perceived to be in-line with a normative liberal framework establishes lines of exclusion and inclusion (Duffield, 2010:58, 2001a:34). Selective inclusion therefore involves Southern states and societies existing in a subordinate relationship to global governance, which has the power to decide which populations are deviant and which fall in line with its values. When states in the South show themselves willing to subscribe to a donor-approved development path they gain access to the wider networks of global governance, whilst failure to conform to the expectations of liberal power will result in exclusion from governance networks, through, for example, sanctions or restrictions on access to donors (Dillon 2003:24; Duffield, 2001a:4). In the face of declining ‘imperial power’, it is argued, the networks of global governance have found new methods and systems of governance through which to assert their authority.

Unlike the more general logic of inclusion and subordination that existed when the capitalist world system was geographically expansive … inclusion under global liberal governance is more discerning and selective. Southern governments, project partners and populations now have to show themselves fit for consideration … they have to meet defined standards of behaviour and normative expectations (Duffield, 2001a:7-8).

Selective inclusion utilises sovereign power. Again, following the work of Foucault, Duffield contrasts the traditional form of sovereign power which had the “right to take life or let live” with a new form of sovereignty, which has the power to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Duffield, 2004a:8). Utilising the work of Agamben (1998), he describes sovereignty as the power to decide the exception, the power to fix the boundary between who or what is included or excluded as acceptable life (Duffield, 2004a:8). Sovereign power is that which constitutes the other. Jensen makes a similar observation: “sovereignty is constituted through the ability to name somebody as the embodiment of the extreme emergency … whose death cannot be ritualized, nor can those killing them be prosecuted” (Jensen, 2005:565). As does Dillon, who argues that the very rationale of liberal global governance is the improved self-regulation of whatever processes it addresses. And that self-improvement cannot simply be left as a desirable goal of governance, but has becomes a positive social, moral and political obligation. It is for these reasons, he continues, that global liberal governance not only develops as a complex network of improvement, correction and punishment, but
ultimately, based upon a commitment to universally acclaimed values, it has also to
decide whom it is permitted to kill (Dillon, 2003:29). Thus global governance identifies
“the recalcitrant, the deviant, and the unsafe” and prescribes

... quite despotic and brutal forms of care, punishment and containment.
Consider, for example ... the detailed political conditionalities that have
progressively been attached to global aid and global development assistance
policies throughout the last decade (ibid:24).

The fact that global governance is a selectively inclusive system does not imply that it
excludes societies totally. Rather, selective inclusion denotes the form of the
relationship between weak states and the global governance system. Liberal norms and
expectations, whilst ambiguous and often contradictory, provide a yardstick with which
to measure the extent of surveillance or conditionality that should govern North-South
relations. Thus, if a state is identified as “recalcitrant, deviant or unsafe” (ibid:24), it is
subject to surveillance and conditionalities. This logic, it is argued, is embodied in the
idea of liberal peace, which “combines and conflates ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary
liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection
towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction)” (Duffield, 2001a:10-11; see
also Dillon and Reid, 2000), and is a system of carrots and sticks where cooperation
paves the way for development assistance and access to wider global governance
networks, while non-cooperation risks varying degrees of conditionality and isolation
(Duffield, 2001a:34). Liberal peace is concerned to resolve and prevent conflict and
criminality in the ‘borderlands’ because these outlying areas are understood to
threaten wider security.

Selective inclusion is therefore explicitly linked to the security-development nexus. The
idea that underdevelopment produces insecurity provides justification for continued
surveillance and containment of weak states when they fall short of the norms and
values expected by the global governance system (Bradbury, 2003). According to
Duffield, there is a “growing intrusion of international relations of governance” and a
new willingness and acceptance by international aid agencies to intervene in regions of
the South (Duffield, 2001a:31). The concept of selective inclusion, therefore,
“encompasses both new types of restriction and emergent and subordinating forms of
North-South integration” (ibid:5).

Development policy is the key tool around which to motivate, organise and coordinate
the agents of liberal peace and the primary vehicle for the implementation of selective
inclusion (Dillon, 2003; Duffield, 2010:57, 2001a). Through the mechanisms of
development, global governance institutions measure and define all aspects of life in developing countries (for example, the UN’s Human Development Reports), and Southern governments, it is argued, must follow neo-liberal economic prescriptions, adhere to international standards of good governance, or subscribe to donor-approved poverty reduction measures in order to access the wider networks of global governance (Dillon, 2003:24; Duffield, 2001a:7-8).

Rather than being concerned with economic growth, development policy is a “deliberate policy of comprehensive social transformation” (Dillon and Reid, 2000:119; see also Young, 1995). Development agencies seek to “proselytize the attitudes and behaviours that liberal states deem to reflect acceptable ... ways of life” (Duffield, 2010:57). This liberal transformation is conceived as an ideological response to the security-development nexus. Whilst global governance is based upon liberal economic and political principles, it perceives non-liberal complexes on its borders; societies and groups structured around violent and disruptive forms of political and economic organisation, which are hostile to the fundamental values and interests of the Western liberal system, which include peace, stability, freedom, democracy and rule of law (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001a). As such, global governance is dedicated to obtaining peace and security, and preventing war in the ‘borderlands’ through transforming these peripheral areas, using the Western ideal of contemporary liberal economic and political tenets. Development is now about transforming societies in line with liberal modernity to ensure that they are stable and secure, and do not present a threat to international security (Duffield, 2010:57, 2001a:22). Bradbury agrees, referring to the case of Somalia. He points out that global governance networks, specifically NGOs, believe that in order to negate the international security risk posed by Somalia, the Somali state must be reconstructed through international development efforts. Societal transformation, according to Duffield (2001a) and Bradbury (2003), is deemed necessary because underdevelopment and conflict are presumed to have implications for international security and stability.

Williams and Young agree that the project of global governance is not only about categorising, defining and managing populations, but is predisposed to transforming them (Williams and Young, 1994). This process of socio-economic transformation, they argue, is portrayed as one of transition to a liberal democratic state, a liberal civil society and a market economy, and at the personal level the corresponding creation of a liberal self and modern patterns of behaviour (ibid:99). They highlight that the project of societal transformation in the South is not only about the macro-socio change of promoting good governance, but also about changing the behaviour, values and beliefs of individuals and communities. Liberal societal transformation, argues
Young, involves transformation at the micro-level, encouraging communities to set aside loyalties to extended family, clan or community, and establishing a distinct division between the public and private spheres (Young, 1995:543). This transformation project emphasises contemporary liberal economic and political tenets, but also, according to Young, displays an intense desire to dominate people and communities and to impose the deliriums of liberalism on everyone else (Young, 1995:528-530).

According to the prevailing wisdom of the security-development nexus, underdevelopment is not only considered dangerous, but also has domestic roots. Rather than being considered the result of structural factors (e.g. an unfair international trading system) the causes, and therefore solutions, for underdevelopment are located at the domestic level (Duffield, 2001a:42; Thomas, 2004b). War and conflict in the South are conceived as arising from poverty, resource competition and weak institutions, whilst individual liberty, free-trade and the prosperity it engenders can create the conditions for peace in currently non-liberal areas. Duffield notes that alternative structural views such as dependency theory, which hold that the legacy of colonialism, global inequality and unfair terms of trade were the root causes of poverty, inequality and conflict in the global South, are no longer considered in the formulation of global development policy. In contrast to the cold war era, there is no credible alternative to the economic and political structures promoted by global governance. There is a single liberal path of progress, reflecting the dominant values of the developed countries (Duffield, 2001a:22-23). The main burden of responsibility for solving what are seen as problems of underdevelopment, has been placed on Southern actors; hence the liberal societal transformation of Southern societies (Duffield, 2001a:28, 2002a). Thomas concurs and argues that the development-security nexus justifies a response by the liberal governance network aimed almost exclusively at transforming domestic economies and societies in the Third World, rather than transforming the global capitalist economy, or indeed both (Thomas, 2004b:4).

Through the processes and policies of development, therefore, “societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise ... this process of transformation cannot be left to chance but requires direct and concerted action” (Duffield, 2001a:15). Thus development is no longer assumed to be a by-product of economic growth; rather, the transformation of society is specifically targeted (Dillon and Reid, 2000). Effecting social transformation, argues Duffield, is itself now a direct and explicit policy aim and furthermore, development resources must be used to shift the balance of power
between groups and even to change attitudes and beliefs, creating the conditions for social cooperation and harmony (Duffield, 2008:157; 2001a:15-39).

A range of non-state actors including international NGOs, governments, military establishments, IFIs, private security companies, IGOs and the business sector are perceived to be involved in this process of transformation in the Global South. NGOs, Duffield argues, are playing the role that native administrations did during colonial times, whilst Young notes that international development NGOs’ emphasis on grassroots participation should be understood entirely within Western preconceptions about the state and the person (Young, 1995:537). Rather than NGOs opposing World Bank development strategies, they are instructive in carrying out its agenda. NGOs, it is argued, provide a conduit of micro-interference that complements the macro-level interference at state level. The World Bank and NGOs share doubts about the capacities of Third World governments and contempt for cultural tradition that does not square with Western notions of rights and justice (Williams and Young, 1994:99).

Liberal societal transformation is conceived as a division of labour between state and private agencies. Duffield calls this the ‘civil-political complex’ because “non-state actors are more than sub-contractors within this complex. They are adaptive and self-orchestrating governmental authorities in their own right” (Duffield, 2004a:1; see also Dillon and Reid, 2000 and Duffield, 2002b: 153; 2001b). Such networks are strategic in the sense of pursuing a radical agenda of social transformation in the interests of global stability (Duffield, 2001a:12). Western states have not been weakened by this civil-political complex, but have “repositioned themselves as strategic actors within new and emerging public-private networks of international power and authority” (Duffield, 2004a:7). The civil-political complex has given Western states new tools of governance and new modes of intervening (Duffield, 2001a:8, 2001b:315).

The linking of security and development per se is not new. For example, during the Cold War, development and security were indivisible, such that security concerns largely dictated development policy. The enemy of national security was identified as capitalism or communism, and economic aid was used for strategic purposes to contain one or the other. Whilst linking security and development issues may not be new, it is argued that the institutional form of the security-development nexus – the civil-political complex working for liberal societal transformation in the South – is new.
Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to explicate the securitization of development debate, so that its usefulness to the study of global governance can be analysed in the remaining five chapters. This chapter set out the principle propositions central to much of this debate as follows: global capitalism is an excluding and contracting system; the global governance of development takes place within the framework of a security-development nexus; global governance is unified through a liberal consensus; and to negate any potential threat from non-liberal populations, global governance seeks to pursue liberal societal transformation in the South.

Section 2.1 set out the argument that, rather than the global economy being characterised as expansionary, significant areas of the South are structurally excluded from the formal global economic networks (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). At the same time, the core states of the global economy are strengthening and deepening their economic links. However, according to Duffield, the South has reintegrated itself into global economic networks through parallel economic networks which have also become governance structures (Duffield, 2001a).

In this context, global governance conceives and manages the global South through the logic of the security-development nexus (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a). Underdevelopment and the conflict it perpetuates, is conceived as a serious threat to international security. The discourses of security and development are linked by global governance institutions and development is now viewed as a security issue. This argument was set out in section 2.2.

Section 2.3 explicated the idea that the major agencies within the global governance complex are unified through a liberal consensus which is constructed, consolidated and articulated through international development policy (Dillon and Reid, 2000; 2001; Duffield, 2001a; Overbeek, 2005). At the same time, the agencies of global governance seek to coordinate global development policy through a liberal consensus.

Liberal power is displayed through selective inclusion, which involves labelling and categorising Southern societies on the basis of their adherence to liberal values. The relationship between these societies and the networks of global governance are then defined and managed accordingly. For example, rather than being isolated, weak non-liberal states may face a moratorium on aid, humanitarian intervention or increased multilateral surveillance (Dillon and Reid, 2000; 2001; Duffield, 2001a; Overbeek, 2005).
The liberal consensus also underpins a commitment to transform societies in the South so that they reflect liberal norms and values. Driving this is the belief that war and conflict in the South are perpetuated by underdevelopment. In order to avoid instability and conflict, societies must be transformed in line with liberal modernity. The networks of global governance, therefore, pursue a liberal agenda of peace, stability and transformation, professing the universality of their moral and ethical values (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a). Selective inclusion and liberal transformation were addressed in the final section of this chapter (2.4).

Through a critique of the propositions set out in this chapter, the remainder of this thesis is dedicated to investigating in what ways, if any, the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, overcoming the deficiencies of orthodox theories of global governance, and what its limitations may be.

We will now move to critique the first of the contentions outlined above, namely that global capitalism is a structurally exclusive system.
Chapter Three

Global Capitalism as a Structurally Exclusive System

Introduction

The central purpose of this chapter is to assess the extent to which the idea of structural exclusion is conceptually sound and consistent with the wider securitization of development debate, and to assess its empirical base. This forms the first contribution to the wider research question: in what ways, if any, does the securitization of development thesis aid our understanding of contemporary global governance, and what are its limitations?

Chapter two identified three key propositions of this debate. This chapter examines the first, namely, that significant areas of the South are structurally excluded from formal global economic networks. The formal global economy, as opposed to the informal or parallel economy, constitutes economic activity which is legal or officially recorded by national governments and IFIs, such as the IMF. This includes official FDI, trade and capital flows. The concept of structural exclusion raises a number of theoretical and empirical issues and these are examined here with the aim of shedding light upon the validity of the concept of structural exclusion.

The first half of this chapter, section 3.1, analyses the theoretical inconsistencies within and limitations of the idea of structural exclusion as follows:

Firstly, in theorising structural exclusion, Duffield (2001a) and Hoogvelt (2001) make use of binary concepts such as included/excluded and North/South. The validity and appropriateness of these notions is discussed and alternative theoretical concepts, which overcome some of these limitations, are identified.

Secondly, there is a tension within Castell’s, Duffield’s and Hoogvelt’s accounts regarding the source of structural exclusion. Structural changes in the nature of global capitalism, as a result of its transformation in the 1970s, are often connected with Southern exclusion, whilst development policy, especially structural adjustment, is also identified as a source of exclusion (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). This analysis seeks clarification of the relationship between the transformation of capitalism and structural adjustment policies.
Thirdly, whilst Duffield (2001a) argues that the Global South is no longer of interest to global capitalist networks of accumulation, he maintains that the networks of global governance pursue the liberal transformation of Southern populations, which includes establishing globally integrated market economies. The apparent tension between structural exclusion and economic integration as global development policy, is examined.

Having examined the theoretical limitations, section 3.2 assesses the empirical foundation upon which it is argued that we are experiencing a new phase of capitalist retraction from the South. Restating the conclusions made by Hoogvelt (2001), Duffield argues that by the end of the nineteenth century peripheral areas were typically incorporated into the capitalist world system on the basis of their raw materials and cheap labour (Duffield, 2001a:3). Since the 1970s, however,

> the trend has been for investment, trade, finance, production and technology networks to concentrate in and between the metropolitan regional blocs centred on North America, Western Europe and East Asia at the expense of outlying areas (Duffield, 2002a:1053).

The inclusion of the South within the conventional networks of the global economy, he argues, can no longer be taken for granted (Duffield, 2001a:3-4). Duffield does not provide the evidence for this assertion, but references Hoogvelt (2001) and Castells (1998). As noted in chapter two, Hoogvelt provides the most comprehensive empirical basis for this proposition and is therefore the subject of critique. There are two parts to this: the first part examines historical global economic trends and identifies a body of literature that questions whether the global South was ever integrated into formal global economic networks, seriously qualifying whether we are experiencing a new period of capitalist retraction. The second part uses contemporary economic data to evaluate the validity of the data used by Hoogvelt to argue that significant areas of the South are increasingly excluded from the formal networks of the global economy. Hoogvelt's thesis rests on the use of relative data. That is, FDI and Trade as a proportion of the total world amount. However, if we look at these indicators as a percentage of GDP, the picture is more ambiguous. Furthermore, if we use more recent figures but the same relative measurement used by Hoogvelt, and take into account regional and country variations, the argument that we are witnessing the increasing exclusion of Southern states, needs modification.
3.1 Limitations of the Concept of Structural Exclusion

*Is the use of Binary Analysis Convincing?*

In arguing that significant areas of the South are structurally excluded from the formal global economy, Castells (1998), Duffield (2001a) and Hoogvelt (2001) make use of at least three related binary categories: formal economy/parallel economy, exclusion/inclusion and North/South. The implication is that the polarisation of the globe takes the following form with the referents North and South relying on the concepts of exclusion and inclusion which in turn rely, in part, on the concepts of the parallel and official economy.

| South, Exclusion, Parallel economy | North, Inclusion, Formal economy |

In other words, exclusion means a lack of integration into the official global economy, but reintegration through parallel networks. Whilst these categories have some validity, the manner in which they are presented is, in part, problematic.

Firstly, the literature makes use of the formal economy/parallel economy distinction. However, Duffield (2001a) points out that there is often a fine line between what is defined as illicit, and licit, and arbitrary distinctions between the formal and non-formal economy often have to be made. Goods and capital may pass in and out of what are considered legal and illegal channels, and then there are of course plenty of grey areas. Meagher, however, argues that distinctions can and should be made, because the ‘informal’ as opposed to the ‘criminal’ aspects of the parallel economy have very different social and historical dynamics and warrant different responses from the state and development community. Whilst Castells’ analysis focuses specifically on global criminal networks, particularly high profile criminal gangs with international reach, Duffield tends to blur the informal and the criminal. According to Meagher this seriously weakens the empirical and analytical value of such perspectives on transborder trading networks (2003:59). In addition, she argues that estimating parallel economic flows is problematic, and tends to be “vague and subject to exaggeration” (ibid:63).

Furthermore, even if one can distinguish between formal and parallel economic networks, these distinctions do not translate into geographical areas. Nordstrom, for example, demonstrates that even within the ‘core’ OECD countries, parallel economic
activity is strongly in evidence (Nordstrom, 2001). She estimates that over half of Russia’s economy, 50% of Italy’s economy, and up to 30 percent of the USA’s economy are beyond the state’s purview (Nordstrom, 2001:220). It is important, therefore, not to conceive the North as a geographical unit linked solely to the global economy through formal economic networks, and the South as a geographical unit, which is reintegrated through the parallel economy, as Duffield tends to (Duffield, 2002a; 2001a:5).

More importantly, Meagher challenges the idea that Africa can overcome economic marginalisation through parallel economic networks (Meagher, 2003). The networks of globalisation, she argues, relate to economic integration through production rather than through trade. Integration through trade in primary products and finished goods, which make up the majority of transborder trade in West Africa, has been overshadowed by the global intra-firm trade in component parts and services between parent companies and affiliates (ibid:69). Transborder trading networks operate with comparatively low technology and are unlikely to obtain any advantages within the framework of computerised global production networks (ibid:69). With regards to smuggling Meagher argues that, with the exception of criminal commodities, “West Africa’s parallel trading networks do not have the capacity to insinuate African goods into international markets behind the back of the official international trading system”. As such “African participation in international smuggling networks is largely at the lower end of the trade where they are, at best, glorified couriers and middlemen rather than ‘barons’[sic]” (ibid 69). Even Africa’s involvement in the illegal smuggling of diamonds accounts for only about 10% of the final value of the international illegal diamond trade. Furthermore, transborder parallel networks importing manufactured goods from Asia into Africa has had a negative impact on the native industrial sector. Higher basic production costs and the inability to evade official taxes make local industry unable to compete (ibid:70). Challenging the view that the South has “reintegrated itself into the liberal world system through the spread and deepening of …parallel and shadow transborder activity” (Duffield, 2001a:5), Meagher concludes that “transborder trade is structurally incapable of re-integrating West-Africa into the global economy, by the back door or otherwise” (Meagher, 2003:71). Whilst they may have facilitated global trade and private accumulation, parallel economic networks have tended to undermine manufacturing, financial stability, and infrastructure investment (ibid:71).

Moving on to the inclusion/exclusion categorisation; the term ‘exclusion’ suggests the absence of any economic interaction between areas demarcated as excluded and the global economy. Contrary to this implication, excluded areas do have substantial
economic ties with the formal global economy. These links include parallel economic networks, as Duffield acknowledges, but also official financial interactions including the international debt regime, currency speculation and hedge funds. Hoogvelt, whilst using the term ‘exclusion’, acknowledges that money is being made by the rich out of areas labelled as excluded. During the 1980s, for example, she notes that capital was accumulated from the privatisation of companies in poor countries and furthermore that “emerging stock markets proved an attractive hunting ground for the active money managers of core countries investment funds and more speculative instruments such as hedge funds” (Hoogvelt, 2001:184). David Harvey calls this form of wealth creation ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003). This overcomes the confusion over the concept of exclusion. Through accumulation by dispossession people may be excluded from the formal capitalist system, but their land, resources and assets are actually fought over and money is made from them. For example, public assets such as universities or water are privatized and opened up for investment.

Harvey, along with Hoogvelt, accepts that there was a crisis of capitalism in the 1970s which led to significant changes in its mode of operation. This crisis, he argues, was a result of the overaccumulation of capital. In order to overcome the problem of overaccumulation, capitalism needs an ‘other’ within which to invest its surplus capital. Capitalism must locate or create something outside of itself if it is to confront the pressure of overaccumulation. In the past the problem of overaccumulation had been dealt with by finding an ‘other’ by imperialist expansion, such that capitalist countries could invest their surplus capital in their colonies. Today, in a post-colonial world, the ‘other’ is a product of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, by which capitalism can forestall crisis (Harvey, 2003).

Accumulation by dispossession is a variant of what Marx called primitive accumulation: the "process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production", transforming the producer into wage-labourer. Primitive accumulation is therefore “the historical process of divorcing producer from the means of production” (Marx, 1990:874-875). While Marx theorised that this was a precursor to expanded reproduction, Harvey argues that “all the features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentioned have remained powerfully present within capitalism’s historical geography” (Harvey, 2003:145). This includes the commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations, the conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights, and the suppression of the rights to the commons. The neo-liberal project of privatisation, which began in the early 1980s can be understood in this way: “assets held by the state or in common were released into the market where overaccumulating capital could invest in them, upgrade
them and speculate in them” (ibid:158). For example, many formerly common property resources, such as water, have been privatised at the insistence of the World Bank and brought within the capitalist logic of accumulation.

The same goal can be achieved by the devaluation of existing capital assets and labour power (Harvey, 2003:151-152). Through economic crises, such as the Asian financial crisis, valuable assets are thrown out of circulation and devalued. They lie dormant until surplus capital is invested giving them renewed potential for capital accumulation. The danger, argues Harvey, is that such crises might spin out of control and become generalised. Crises are therefore coordinated and managed by the international financial system, including the IMF, whose function is to “orchestrate devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur without sparking general collapse” (ibid:151-152). Thus, Harvey writes that in some cases

[t]he aim of appropriating or controlling the surpluses of others is not ... to absorb them into the circulation of capital, but to have the power to devalue them and even destroy them (militarily if necessary), thus confining the impacts of devaluation to the places of others (Harvey, 2006:94).

New mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession have also opened up. Harvey highlights for example the way in which patented intellectual property rights can be used against whole populations whose practices have played a crucial role in the development of the patented resource, for example, genetic material or seed plasma (Harvey, 2003:147-148). Accumulation by dispossession solves the problem of overaccumulation by seizing or devaluing assets that overaccumulated capital can then invest in and make profitable.

In this model, the assets and resources of Southern populations are not wholly excluded from the networks of global capitalism; rather exploitation is still a significant part of the unequal relationship between North and South. Whilst “investment is risky, the workforce lacks appropriate skills and education, telecommunications [are] inadequate [and] politics unpredictable” (Duffield, 2001a:5) throughout the South, opportunities exist and are being taken for capital accumulation. Bayart (2000) agrees, rejecting the idea that Africa (which is central to Hoogvelt’s argument) is marginalised within the world economy. He flags up that the data used to illustrate this is relative (an issue discussed below), and excludes that volume of business conducted informally (as Duffield recognises). But, moreover, he argues that Africa remains part of the world economy through private and public development aid; through its still significant exports of primary products; through the
import of consumer goods; through its debt; through its receipt of direct investment; and through emigration and remittances (Bayart, 238). Africa is thus “a player in the process of globalisation” (ibid: 240).

Furthermore, in line with Duffield’s conceptualisation of a civil-military complex, Bayart argues that the West now prefers to act through private operators, including both commercial companies and NGOs. He cites examples including the role of Sandline in Sierra Leone acting for the British government and the “shadowy world of security companies, pilots and mercenaries from the republics of the former Soviet Union” (239). Bayart uses these examples of the privatisation of relations between Africa and the rest of the globe as evidence of its deeper insertion into the world economy, rather than as representing novel ways for the West to govern an increasingly excluded continent, as Duffield argues (2001a).

The third issue concerns the categories of North and South. These are problematic because the idea that there are pockets of exclusion throughout the globe is increasingly pervasive, as is the notion that parallel economic networks operate globally (Castells, 1998:70-71). As geographical categories, defined by their relationship to the global economy, a North/South distinction may not reflect reality. Hoogvelt suggests that a geographical core and periphery has been replaced by a social core and periphery (Hoogvelt, 2001:65). However, the statistics used by Hoogvelt to illustrate the contracting nature of capitalism, presume and reinforce the idea of a geographical divide. Hoogvelt’s evidence demonstrates an unequal geographic relationship and implies that the ‘core’ equates to Europe and North America, plus Japan. Hoogvelt does discuss a ‘new global division of labour’ and gives examples of manufacturing jobs moving from the USA to Singapore, and then to Thailand, as multinationals chase the cheapest production costs, thus increasing unemployment in the USA (ibid:135-139). However, the non-geographical nature of the core-periphery relationship does not appear to be examined in the same rigorous empirical fashion as the geographic North/South divide. Whilst Hoogvelt’s and Duffield’s initial starting point holds that the North and South are social as well as geographic categories, their analysis continues on the basis that the globe is polarised largely by rich and poor country blocs.

Castells examines ‘North’ and ‘South’ as social categories in a more robust fashion, demonstrating that there are “several centres and several peripheries” (Castells, 1996:107). There are areas of structural irrelevance, he argues, leading to areas of social exclusion throughout the globe, concentrated within poor countries, but also within the ‘core’. To support his analysis, Castells firstly examines income inequality
within countries, demonstrating increasing social exclusion, not just between North and South, but within states in the North and the South. During the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased in many countries including the United States, the UK, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Thailand, and Russia (Castells, 1998:80). Castells investigates America further, as a model of what may happen throughout the West, and presents a host of statistics to demonstrate the increasing polarisation of American society. He goes on to demonstrate the structural irrelevance of whole, predominately black neighbourhoods within the inner-city ghettos of America. Such ghettos, he argues, are examples of areas that hold no value for informational capitalism and are therefore bypassed by flows of wealth and information. In analysing the growing dereliction of the ghetto, Castells argues that the globalisation of the manufacturing industry has resulted in a substantial reduction of low-skilled jobs, which historically brought black migrants into urban areas and constituted the stable core of their employment (ibid:138). Furthermore, the shrinking of the public sector, and social services in particular, has reduced the availability of public jobs, which were the main employment opportunities for inner-city women, including black women.

Whilst taking seriously the idea of the South as a social category, Castells downplays the idea that areas of irrelevance within ‘core’ states contain the potential for capital accumulation, a criticism that can also be levelled at Duffield’s treatment of the South, as discussed. Harvey cites two examples of how this occurs in the housing market. Firstly, in the US a house in poor condition is bought cheaply, given some cosmetic improvements and sold on at an exorbitant price, with the aid of a mortgage package arranged by the seller, to a low-income family. If the owner then has difficulty meeting the payments or dealing with maintenance problems, the house is repossessed (Harvey, 2003:152). Secondly, in Thatcher’s Britain a large stock of social housing was privatized, and those on low incomes bought up these properties at a relatively low cost. Once the transfer had taken place, however, those in central locations were bribed or forced out and working-class housing estates were turned into “centres of intense gentrification” (ibid: 158). Thus, as discussed, whilst people in both the North and South may be excluded, money can be made from their assets and resources.

The Relationship between Structural Adjustment Policies and Structural Changes in the Global Economy

There is a tension within the securitization of development debate regarding the source of structural exclusion. Structural changes in the nature of global capitalism, as a result of its transformation in the 1970s are often identified as the drivers of
exclusion, whilst development policy, especially structural adjustment policies, are also identified as a source of exclusion (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; see also Hoogvelt, 2001). Specifically both are cited as propelling parallel economic activity, through excluding societies from the formal economy. Duffield and Castells argue that as the formal capitalist system has contracted, the South has found new mechanisms of exchange in the parallel economy through which to link up with the global networks. Marginalisation from the emerging informational economy and the decline of commercial investment has, according to Duffield, resulted in a drive for new forms of informal economic integration (Duffield, 2001a:150). For Castells, the process of exclusion, and the insufficiency of integration policies has led to ‘perverse integration’, through the criminal economy (Castells, 1998:74).

However, both Castells and Duffield also maintain that specific structural adjustment policies of the 1980s drove the proliferation of the parallel economy in Russia and Africa respectively. Castells argues that “organised crime in contemporary Russia and the ex-Soviet republics is the result of the chaotic, uncontrolled transition from statism to wild capitalism” (Castells, 1998:172). In agreement, Duffield writes that in Africa … the impact of structural adjustment served to accelerate the dismantling of non-viable state patronage networks based on public bureaucracies. As an alternative, the process of privatisation encouraged by the IFIs has seen many Southern rulers develop transborder networks as a new basis for political power. At the same time, whilst the downsizing for the public sector and standing armies has increased the ranks of the unemployed, it has also provided the necessary personnel for the expanding shadow economy (Duffield, 2001a:150-151).

Whilst these two phenomena may be complimentary, these theorists often leave out an examination of their relationship and appear to use them interchangeably. They are intertwined, but do refer to differing causal relationships. Structural adjustment was a set of deliberate global development policies, whilst the transformation of global capitalism refers to changes in the capitalist mode of production brought about by its persistent crisis. Examples of these changes include the geographical shift of industrial production and an individualisation and networking of the labour process (Castells, 1998:134-173).

Harvey’s analysis overcomes this ambiguity by systematically linking crisis with the introduction of structural adjustment policies. For Harvey, the neo-liberal structural adjustment of economies in Russia, China and throughout Africa is a central part of
accumulation by dispossession, by which capitalism overcomes crisis. Structural adjustment policies succeeded in transferring assets that were previously held in common into private hands through ‘releasing’ them onto the market.

Overaccumulated capital could then be invested and profits made from these seized assets. Furthermore, loans which gave leverage to the West in terms of SAPs are also seen as part of this process. Poor countries are ‘hooked in’ to the system of capital circulation through loans, making them ‘sinks’ for surplus capital, for which they are then judged liable (Harvey, 2003:118-119). These processes forestalled the crisis of capitalism, which Harvey understands as one of overaccumulation.

Accumulation by dispossession is described as the sinister and destructive side of spatio-temporal fixes to the overaccumulation problem (ibid: 136; see also Soederberg, 2006: chapter two). A temporal fix refers to the way in which surplus capital is invested in long-term capital projects, such as education and research, such that re-entry of capital into circulation is deferred (Harvey, 2003:109). Spatial fixes involve investment in new markets, new production capacities and new resource, social and labour possibilities, such that capital is geographically moved and absorbed (ibid:116).

As discussed above, Hoogvelt makes a similar argument that the privatisation of assets in Africa has facilitated capital accumulation in the core, but does not explicitly link structural adjustment to capitalist crisis (Hoogvelt, 2001:185). Harvey’s analysis provides a clearer picture of the relationship between structural changes within the global capitalist system in the 1970s and structural adjustment policies, than Castells’, Duffield’s’ or Hoogvelt's work, for example.

The process of accumulation by dispossession is briefly considered in Duffield’s later work (2007:11-12), but the focus on global capitalism as a contracting system, excluding ever larger swathes of the South from its formal economic networks, negates the salience of this economic process in understanding the unequal relationship between North and South. There is clear evidence, discussed below, that the South is not integrated into the formal networks of the global economy to anywhere near the extent to which Northern economies are (in this sense we could use the term ‘excluded’), and the idea of accumulation by dispossession is not in tension with this. Rather Harvey argues that there are opportunities for capital accumulation in the South (and that such opportunities can be created), not that the economic networks of the South are as fully embedded into global economic networks as those of the North. In this sense Duffield is right to argue that exclusion is not synonymous with a void. However, it is the process of accumulation by dispossession, rather than just the
parallel economy, which ensures excluded areas are not void of economic links to the core. This is important for the following discussion which identifies a tension in Duffield’s work between the idea of exclusion and liberal societal transformation.

**Economic Integration as Global Development Policy**

Whilst arguing that significant areas of the South are excluded from the formal global economy, Duffield maintains that the South is being subjected to a process of liberal societal transformation (Duffield, 2002a). The reason behind liberal social transformation in the first instance, according to Duffield, is to enhance Western (often called global) security, and integration into the global economy is perceived to be a key part of this (Duffield, 2002a:1050; 2001:11). There is a tension therefore between Africa being perceived as ‘unbankable’ and a drive towards global economic integration, which is evident in global development policy.

This tension is particular to Duffield’s work, as he attempts to theorise both the changing nature of global capitalism and the liberal societal transformation of Southern societies (2001a). Scholars who prioritise the liberal transformation of southern societies (Dillon and Reid, 2000;2001; Williams and Young, 1995; Young 1994) tend to sideline the structural power of global capitalism and vice versa (Hoogvelt, 2001). Such a division is broadly reflective of the fault lines between neo-Gramscian and post-structuralist accounts of the securitization of development, noted in chapter 2, which Duffield makes some attempt to straddle. Within official global development policy discourse, weak integration with the global economy is linked to underdevelopment and increasing poverty, which in turn is understood to exacerbate conflict and state instability, which can ultimately effect global security through criminal activity and terrorism (DFID et al., 2001; DFID, 2005a:8; USAID, 2002a). Integration is therefore a key aim of development policy because, fundamentally, it is only through integration that the South can reduce poverty and sustain the conditions for peace and stability (Danida, 2006; DFID 2000a; DFID et al., 2001:4; USAID, 2002a). In the context of economic decline, it is argued, inequality and the “lack of access to basic services contribute to perceptions of injustice that can motivate people to violence” (DFID, 2005a:8). One of the key reasons behind the discourse of economic integration therefore, is security, but this appears to be in tension with the idea of exclusion:

> [t]he inclusion of the South within the conventional economic flow and networks of the global economy – even when raw materials and cheap labour
are available, even as unequal and exploited subjects – can no longer, as in the past, be taken for granted (Duffield, 2001a:4).

Harvey’s idea of ‘capitalist imperialism’ containing two logics of power – territorial logic and capitalist logic is informative here. Following Arrighi (2002), Harvey defines capitalist imperialism as the intersection of two distinct but intertwined logics of power – the politics of state and empire (the logic of territory), and the process of capital accumulation (the logic of capital) (Harvey, 2003:26). The former is a distinctively political project on the part of actors whose power is based in command of territory and a capacity to mobilise its human and natural resources towards political, economic and military ends (ibid:26).

The latter is “a diffuse political-economic process in space and time in which command over and of capital takes primacy” (ibid:26). The motivations and interests of agents within these two logics of power are not indistinguishable. Instead, the capitalist holding money capital will wish to put it wherever profits can be had, and typically seeks to accumulate more. Politicians and statesmen typically seek outcomes that sustain or augment the power of their own state vis-à-vis other states (ibid:27).

According to Harvey, capitalist imperialism is distinct from other conceptions of empire in that the logic of capital typically dominates over territorial logic, although the politics of state and empire continues to have a role (ibid:33). Inequality between states is produced by the uneven way in which wealth and power become highly concentrated in certain places by virtue of asymmetrical exchange relations, and this is where the political dimension re-enters the picture: “one of the state’s key tasks is to try to preserve the pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space, that works to its own advantage” (ibid:32). The relation between these two logics of power should be seen, Harvey argues, as problematic and sometimes contradictory. For example, “the endless accumulation of capital, produces periodic crises within the territorial logic because of the need to create a parallel accumulation of political/military power” (ibid:183). Harvey points to the Vietnam War and the invasion of Iraq as examples which cannot be solely understood in terms of the requirement of capitalist accumulation (ibid:29-30). The politics of state and empire (territorial logic) must also be taken into account as a source of these conflicts. For example, whilst in the short term the invasion of Iraq did not reduce the price of oil, in the long term having some control over this resource is essential for the security of the US.
As far as the capitalist logic is concerned there is a need and opportunity to exploit assets and resources in the South for capital accumulation (accumulation by dispossession), but no call for formal links between the global economy and the South to go deeper – resulting in the ‘exclusion’ documented by Hoogvelt (2001). However, the territorial logic which prioritises security perceives the global economic integration of the South as a key aspect of enhancing global security, hence the push towards liberal societal transformation and corresponding economic integration. The idea of capitalist imperialism can be instructive in explaining a situation of economic exclusion (and accumulation by dispossession) and a parallel process of (the pursuit of) integration. However, the territorial logic in not necessarily in opposition to the capitalist logic. Privatisation of Southern assets satisfies both the capitalist and territorial logics of power. It can satisfy accumulation by dispossession, as discussed above, and is considered to contribute towards global economic integration which is presumed to aid global stability and security (USAID, 2002a).

The salience of the ‘capitalist imperialism’ model can be further demonstrated when we consider Duffield’s concept of ‘surplus life’, which is developed from the initial idea of exclusion. Surplus life is created by the global capitalist system and is a “population whose skills, status or even existence are in excess of prevailing conditions and requirements” (Duffield, 2007:9); in essence those who are ‘excluded’ or ‘irrelevant’ as Castells (1998) calls them. This surplus life exists as a threat to the West through criminal activity, terrorism or revolt. Capitalism creates this problem and also needs protecting from it. This is where the territorial logic steps in, dealing with the surplus population through development, including liberal societal transformation (discussed in chapter two).

There are, however, limitations to the idea of territorial logic when trying to understand networked global governance. For example, it is wedded to the idea of political power residing within states and emphasises compulsory power (Harvey, 2003:183). The logic of liberal peace, as conceived by Duffield (2001a) may have greater merit in understanding the rationale of global governance and the productive power it employs. This is discussed further in chapters five, six and seven. This chapter however has highlighted that, while Duffield’s work explores the political motivations of global governance through his discussion of liberalism and liberal peace, the capitalist logic (which Harvey elaborates) is under theorised. Greater attention to the structural power and constraints of global capitalism in understanding the securitization of development may be instructive. For example, SAPs provide a spatial fix for overaccumulation. This has the unexpected consequence of increased
parallel economic activity, including criminal networks, which exist as a threat to the West. This justifies and gives meaning to the logic of liberal peace, seeking liberal transformation in the South. More is said about these complex ‘boomerang effects’ in chapter seven.

In analysing whether the idea of structural exclusion is conceptually sound and consistent with the wider securitization of development thesis, this discussion raises a number of limitations which in part may be overcome by employing Harvey’s understanding of the capitalist logic of power, including accumulation by dispossession as a spatial fix for overaccumulation. Having considered the theoretical limitations of the structural exclusion argument, the following discussion examines its empirical base.

3.2 The Empirical Evidence

As noted in the introduction, Hoogvelt (2001) provides the most comprehensive analysis of ‘involution’ and indeed Duffield uses Hoogvelt’s investigation as a source for his proposition regarding exclusion (Duffield, 2001a; 2002a). It is therefore primarily Hoogvelt’s analysis which is examined here.

Global Economic Trends: Is Structural Exclusion a New Phenomenon?

There is considerable agreement within the existing globalisation literature that a much greater proportion of global economic activity takes place between the core industrialised countries of the North, to the exclusion of Asia, Latin America and, primarily, Africa (Hoogvelt, 2001; Williamson, 2002). Whilst some commentators may herald ‘globalisation’ as ushering in a new era of economic connectivity, statistical evidence consistently demonstrates that significant areas are only partially integrated into the formal global economy (Ferguson, 2003; Kiely, 1998; UNDP, 1999). There is, however, disagreement over whether this is a new phenomenon. As discussed in chapter two, Castells, Duffield and Hoogvelt present structural exclusion as a characteristic of the current phase of capitalism, which began in the 1970s (Castells, 1998; Duffield, 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). Prior to this period, capitalism was expansionary:

There is considerable agreement among economic historians that capitalism as a mode of organising social and economic life began not only in one minuscule
corner of the globe, namely north-west Europe, but from its very beginnings, while it was itself still in the process of being formed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, involved outward expansion, gradually encompassing ever-larger-areas of the globe in a network of material exchanges ... By the end of the nineteenth century the project of a single capitalist world economy had been completed in the sense that the grid of exchange relationships now covered practically all the geographical areas of the world (Hoogvelt, 2001:14).

Hoogvelt contrasts this with contemporary global capitalism:

The use of global (in the sense of aggregate) trade and investment flows, and expressing these as a percentage of ‘global’ (again in the sense of “aggregate”) world product, creates an image of a 'global' economy that stretches from Anchorage to Cape Town, from Helsinki to Santiago de Chile. It does not – not anymore! An ambitious net of capitalist catchment may have been cast during the colonial era, but having caught the fish it pulled back and settled comfortably on the shores of a relatively small part of the world (Hoogvelt, 2001:78).

In contrast to this position, evidence suggests that the South historically has been excluded from the formal global economy, such that Hoogvelt is not describing a new phenomena (O'Brien, 1982; Williamson, 2002).

Economic historians categorise recent economic history into two centuries of globalisation and one period of global retreat (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; Williamson, 2002). The first global century ran from 1820 to the beginning of the First World War, and the second from 1950 to today. The period between 1913 and 1950 was a time of global retreat. Characteristics of the first globalisation boom included decreasing transportation costs, massive international migration and the liberal dismantling of mercantilism. Williamson notes that during this first global century capital chased after abundant natural resources, youthful populations, and human-capital abundance. It did not chase after cheap labour. International capital flows were an anti-convergence force. They drifted towards rich, not poor, countries; they raised wages and labour productivity in the labour-scarce and resource-abundant New World, not the labour-abundant Third World. And what was true of the first global century has also been true of the second. But this does not imply that the Third World has been losing capital by export.
Rather, it implies that there has always been a churning of capital among richer countries outside of Asia and Africa (Williamson, 2002:27).

Figure 3. Gross Nominal Value of Capital Invested Abroad in 1914 as a Percentage of Total (at current exchange rates)

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<th></th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Western Offshoots (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<td>24.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Other’ includes Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Japan
(adapted from Maddison, 2001:99 table 2-26a)

This is confirmed by Maddison (2001) (see Figure 3 above). In terms of European foreign investment at the end of the first wave of globalisation, we can see from figure 3 that 56% was invested within Europe and the ‘Western offshoots’, with the rest distributed between Latin America, Asia and Africa, suggesting a “churning of capital among richer countries outside of Asia and Africa” (Williamson, 2002:27). Harvey, writing within a different body of literature, also makes this point with reference to the process of accumulation by dispossession in the 19th century. He argues that surpluses of British capital and labour generated in the nineteenth century were invested in the United States, and the settler colonies of South Africa, Australia, and Canada, creating new and dynamic centres of accumulation in these territories which generated a demand for goods from Britain (Harvey, 2003:119). Furthermore, in making the case that a territorial logic sometimes inhibits the capitalist logic, Harvey argues that fear of emulation led Britain to prevent India from developing a ‘vigorou capitalist dynamic’ and as such the Atlantic economy did far more for Britain than India, which never functioned as a major field of British surplus capital (Harvey, 2003:140).

It is the assumption of capitalism’s geographic expansion, particularly in the 19th century, that leads Hoogvelt to argue that it has reached a new contracting phase (Hoogvelt, 2001:14). However, for Williamson and Maddison, the concentration of trade and capital amongst the richer countries of the North, to the exclusion of the South, is not a new phenomenon but a historical trend. Similarly, O’Brian indicates that
economic interaction between North and South has always been relatively low. He argues that

> [e]ven for maritime powers like Britain, closely engaged with Asia, Africa and Latin America, profits from that commerce probably financed less that 15% of gross investment between 1750 and 1850 ... If the British economy had been excluded from trade with the periphery, gross annual investment expenditures would have fallen by no more than 7% (O'Brien, 1982:17).

He concludes that "for the economic growth of the core, the periphery was peripheral" (ibid:18). As such the ‘new history of development’, as he terms theories of the world-system genre, grossly overestimates the economic interaction between the core and periphery in the 18th and 19th centuries. In suggesting that the periphery may never have been significantly integrated in the world economy, this evidence implies that the relative exclusion of the South from formal economic networks does not indicate a new phase of capitalist contraction.

Baldwin and Martin (1999) note that Southern exclusion was actually more prevalent in the first wave of globalisation than it is in the second. In the first wave, as the North began its industrial revolution, Southern industry rapidly disappeared in the face of competition from Northern exports: whilst the North is industrialised, the South is de-industrialised. In 1750, for example, the Third World accounted for 73% of the world manufacturing output and it continued to account for over half even as late as 1830(ibid:4). Maddison agrees and argues that

> Moghul India had a bigger industry than any other country which became a European colony and was unique in being an industrial exporter in pre-colonial times. A large part of this industry was destroyed as a consequence of British rule (Maddison, 2001:115).

The second wave of globalisation, on the other hand, has led to the reverse, with the industrialisation of, for instance, East Asia. This challenges Hoogvelt’s assertion that “the nineteenth century ... stands out as the prime time for the development of an international division of labour ... in those days ... ‘the Third World’ participated fully, if not on equal terms, in this international market” (Hoogvelt, 2001:14 italics added). Furthermore, in comparison with Baldwin and Martin, Hoogvelt observes that “[i]n 1913, the Third World captured about 50% of world trade compared with 29% today” (ibid:14). Her source for these figures is unclear and it is therefore difficult to compare the data used by Baldwin and Martin, with that used by Hoogvelt. However, it can be
concluded that Baldwin and Martin's data suggests that from 1830 to 1913 the South's share of manufacturing output decreased, and that Hoogvelt's data suggests that from 1913 to 1996, the share of the South's commodity world trade decreased. Both may indicate a historical trend of Southern exclusion, beginning some time before 1830 and continuing today, rather than a recent phenomenon with its origins in the 1970s. Maddison’s estimates of world exports (Figure 4) also testify to the historic relative exclusion of Latin America and particularly Africa.

**Figure 4. Value of World Exports by Region at Constant (1990) Prices as Percentage of Total, 1870-1998**

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<tbody>
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<td>64.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Former USSR</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Maddison, 2001:362 figure f-3)

Conversely, evidence can be found to support certain aspects of Hoogvelt’s involution thesis. Niall Ferguson, for example, observes that:

An important difference between the world of 1901 and the world of 2001 is that a much higher proportion of commodity trade and capital flows goes on within the developed countries, to the exclusion of the rest of the world. Around 63% of foreign direct investment in 1913 went to developing countries, whereas in 1996 the proportion was just 28% (Ferguson, 2003:557).

This analysis gives credence to the view that the trend is towards the consolidation of trade and investment within the core regions of the global economy. Furthermore, if we examine the trend within the second wave of globalisation (1950-present), there is some agreement that the periphery is less integrated into the world economy than it was in the 1950s, as demonstrated with regard to Africa’s and Latin America’s share of world exports in Figure 4 (Maddison, 2001). The former saw its exports decrease from 9.9% in 1950 to 2.7% in 1998, and the latter from 8.5 to 4.9. Kiely also highlights that the share of world exports as a proportion of GDP from Latin America and Africa has significantly decreased since the 1950s; from 12.4% in 1950 to 3.9% in 1990 in the
case of Latin America, and from 5.2% in 1950 to 1.9% in 1990 for Africa (Kiely, 1998: 50).

The evidence presented by Williamson (2002), Maddison (2001), Baldwin and Martin (1999) and O’Brian (1982) suggests that historically, economic ties between the core economic regions of the world have been stronger than ties between developed and underdeveloped regions, and that the South has never “participated fully ... in this international market”, as Hoogvelt maintains (2001:14). This evidence calls into question the proposition that from 1800 to 1950 the periphery was

incorporated in a vigorous geographical extension of capitalism that was quite the opposite of the ‘imploding globalisation’ that we are witnessing at the start of the twenty first century, and from which most of the Third World are excluded (ibid:19).

Ferguson (2003), Maddison (2001) and Kiely (1998) present evidence to suggest that the South is even less integrated into the world economy today than it was in the 1950s. If Hoogvelt is comparing current trends to the 1950-1970 period (or even the 1913 to 1970 period which includes the time of ‘global retreat’), then contemporary global capitalism could be construed as a new ‘phase’ of exclusionary capitalism. However the evidence presented by Williamson, Baldwin and Martin and O’Brian implies that comparisons with ‘the first global century’ (1820-1913), are more ambiguous, and could suggest that the structural exclusion of the South is a historical structural imperative of global capitalism. The claim that current exclusion marks a new phase of capitalism, therefore, needs to be qualified.

Exclusion: The Measuring Debate

The limitations of the data used by Hoogvelt to demonstrate the increasing contemporary exclusion of the South can also be examined. Hoogvelt’s thesis rests on the use of relative data – FDI and Trade as a proportion of the total world amount. However, if we look at these indicators as a percentage of GDP, or in absolute terms, and also use more recent data for the relative figures, the picture is more ambiguous than suggested by Hoogvelt.

Dealing first with investment, if we look at FDI inflows or stocks as a percentage of GDP, and use more recent data, the evidence does not point so dramatically towards economic involution.
Hoogvelt’s data range finished in the mid-1990s and demonstrates a dramatic decrease in FDI to the South in relation to the core. Figure 5, however, indicates that following a considerable dip in the 1980s, 1990 levels of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, are comparable with the 1970s. This is followed by an increase in the late 1990 and early 2000s. Whilst this has decreased slightly over the last 10 years, FDI flows have consistently stayed stronger than the 70s, 80s and early 90s. FDI flows to Africa as a whole and to Sub-Saharan Africa have also continued to increase over the last decade. For the former FDI increased from 1.65% in 2000 to 4.08% in 2009 and for the latter from 1.97% to 4.72% over the same period. In contrast FDI flows to the Caribbean and Latin America decreased by nearly 3% in the 2000-2009 period. Analysing the South as a whole masks these wide discrepancies in economic performance between regions.

Figure 6. Inward FDI stock as percentage of GDP

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>14.60</td>
<td>13.26</td>
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<td>24.78</td>
<td>25.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developed economies</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>23.09</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>12.11</td>
<td>16.89</td>
<td>25.90</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>35.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>23.63</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>30.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>15.55</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>25.18</td>
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<td>1.96</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>11.82</td>
<td>10.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat)

Inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP indicates an upward trend since the 1980s, especially in the last decade for developing countries as a whole (Figure 6). And this
holds true for the Americas as well as for Africa, whilst inward FDI stock for Asia has remained relatively stable since 2000.

Glenn has identified two caveats to the use of measuring FDI as a percentage of GDP. Firstly, if a country has a low level of GDP then inward FDI stock may appear relatively large compared with other recipients, when in absolute terms the amount may be relatively smaller. And secondly, if during the same period GDP has not grown as strongly than other regions, then paradoxically it will appear that those regions with slower growth are attracting relatively greater and greater levels of inward stock (Glenn, 2008:85). Thus the stability of Asia’s FDI flows in comparison to increases in Africa and the Americas is likely to be a result of its much greater GDP growth in the last decade.

Hoogvelt examined FDI as a percentage of the world total. If we use this same measurement, but more recent data, the figures do not point to a dramatic withdrawal of economic links from the periphery (Figure 7).

**Figure 7. Inward FDI flows (percentage of world)**

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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9.49</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>5.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>10.46</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.40</td>
<td>19.82</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9.67</td>
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<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>10.95</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>8.53</td>
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(Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat) (.. not available)

The figures from 2000 to 2009 indicate an increase of FDI to developing countries, even for sub-Saharan Africa, whose share increased from 0.49 in 2000 to 3.89 in 2009. Africa’s share in 2009 was 5.26 the highest since the 1970s. For the America’s this figure was 10.46, as opposed to the low of 4.30 following structural adjustment in the 1980s. Again, however caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions from these figures. Firstly, high levels of mergers and acquisitions within the core may account for lower relative FDI inflows for developing economies in 2000 (Kiely, 2007:151). Secondly, large inflows of FDI to the South in the early to mid 2000s reflected a global economic upturn and China’s large requirement for primary resources (Glenn, 2008:83). However, whilst the 1980s appear to represent an
extremely low point in FDI inflows, the upward trend in FDI to developing countries continued to the end of the previous decade (2009).

Figure 8. Values and shares of merchandise exports (percentage of total world)

<table>
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<td>70.35</td>
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<td>25.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5.53</td>
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<td>4.98</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>4.27</td>
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<td>5.53</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
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<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat)

Relative trade figures for the developing world may give more credence to the exclusion thesis (Figure 8). From around 5% in the 1960s and 70s, Africa’s merchandise exports decreased after 1980 and reached lows of 2.2% in the mid-90s. This has since increased slightly to 3% in 2009, comparable with the late-1980s. The developing countries of the Caribbean and Central and South America have seen their share in world exports decrease by 2% since 1960s, but remain fairly steady since 1970. According to Glenn, as a result of its membership of NAFTA, Mexico is responsible for the greatest share of Americas’ exports. If Mexico is excluded then Latin America and the Caribbean’s share of merchandise exports has halved in the last 40 years and is a third of its 1953 figure (Glenn, 2009:88-89).

Asia, as widely acknowledged, has seen its share of exports increase, as East Asia has successfully integrated itself into the formal economic networks of the core. However, Glenn points out that Hoogvelt’s assertion that ‘all the gains, and more, may be attributed to just four Asian Tiger economies in East Asia, namely, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore”, fails to recognise the increase in trade in several other Asian developing countries since 1960: Thailand’s share of world merchandise trade has increased from one third of a per cent to 1.1 per cent; Malaysia from 0.63% to 1.28%; and Mexico from 0.74% to 2.37 %. Each of these countries’ share in world exports of manufactures also increased in the 1980-2004 period: Thailand increased its share from 0.1% to 1.1%; Malaysia from 0.2% to 1.5%; and Mexico from 0.4% to 2.4% (Glen, 2008:89-90).

Using different measurements of economic integration, as well as more recent data, and taking into account regional and country differences gives us a more ambiguous picture than suggested by Hoogvelt’s thesis of involution, which is subsequently utilised by Duffield. Whilst the data indicates that Africa, the Americas and parts of
Asia are not integrated into the global economy to the same degree or in the same way as the core regions, neither does it clearly point towards an increasing exclusion of these areas.

Conclusions

The central purpose of this chapter was to assess the extent to which the idea of structural exclusion is conceptually sound and consistent with the wider securitization of development thesis, and to assess its empirical base. This discussion initially assessed the concepts used to articulate the idea of structural exclusion; specifically, the use of the binary categories of formal economy/parallel economy, exclusion/inclusion and North/South. These categorisations are related, but all are also fluid and rely to some extent on arbitrary distinctions. In relation to the parallel economy, there are problems with definition and estimations of its size. Meagher (2003) points to the very different activities which Duffield groups together as parallel economic activity and Nordstrom (2001) demonstrates that the distinction between the formal and parallel economy cannot be transposed onto North/South geographical areas. In addition, Meagher, in contrast to Duffield (2001a:5) and Bhattacharyya (2005:32), argues that in relation to Africa, informal transborder economic networks cannot overcome marginalisation.

However, both Duffield and Castells give an account of how the social relations of the parallel economy are constructed and place the parallel economy in the wider context of global capitalism, understanding it as a fundamental part of the global economy and a creative means of survival (Duffield, 2001a: 136-160, 2002a: 1056; Castells, 1998). This contrasts with the orthodox understanding which criminalises the parallel economy and views it as an aberration (USAID, 2002a:101). By incorporating parallel economic activity into a theory of global capitalism, a more holistic and dialectical framework to the study of global governance is offered, within which the persistence and increase of parallel economic activity can be investigated.

This discussion further argued that as well as parallel economic networks, the process of accumulation by dispossession should be central to the idea of an excluded South. Accumulation by dispossession implies an unequal power relationship between the core areas of the capitalist economy and the South, in which the logic of international capital can operate on vulnerable populations for accumulation purposes. We shall return to this conceptualisation of power in chapter seven.
The terms North and South are also problematic. Both Duffield and Hoogvelt argue that these are social as well as geographical categories, but it is the geographical categories which are reinforced throughout their work. Castells addresses this through his analysis of excluded populations in the geographical North, but fails to incorporate the process of accumulation by dispossession which is taking place within these marginalised areas (Castells, 1998).

This chapter subsequently argued that the literature is lacking a systematic discussion regarding the relationship between structural adjustment and structural changes to global capitalism in the 1970s. This is symptomatic of the under theorisation of global capitalism in Duffield’s work. And, whilst Hoogvelt does provide a more robust account of the changing nature of global capitalism, she does not explicitly connect structural adjustment to capitalist crisis. Harvey’s supposition that structural adjustment programmes were a response to the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s, gives clarity to this relationship (Harvey, 2003). Such programmes, according to Harvey, are in part attempts to “orchestrate devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession without sparking general collapse” (ibid:151).

The final criticism of the concept of structural exclusion was the tension between exclusion and the process of liberal societal transformation, which Duffield argues is a central purpose of global governance. Market reform leading to greater global economic integration as an aspect of liberal transformation is at odds with what Duffield perceives as the reality of structural exclusion. This tension can be more fully understood using Harvey’s concept of capitalist imperialism, where a territorial logic requires economic integration for security reasons, and a capitalist logic requires areas of exclusion where accumulation by dispossession can mitigate capitalist crisis. Both logics may appear discordant, but are also working in balance when we consider Duffield’s idea of ‘surplus life’, which is created by capitalism (capitalist logic) and managed by global governance (in large part, territorial logic). Whilst there are limitations to the concept of territorial logic, the idea of two logics of power may be instrumental in understanding the rationale of global governance. Chapter seven returns to this conjecture.

This chapter subsequently examined the empirical evidence for structural exclusion, initially addressing whether structural exclusion is a new phenomena. A substantial body of economic research suggests that the South was always peripheral in terms of the formal networks of the global capitalist economy and proposes that trade between the metropoles has historically been far greater than trade between rich and poor countries (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; O’Brian, 1982; Williamson, 2002). The argument
that capitalism has entered a new exclusionary phase needs qualification. If we compare current trends to the 1950-1970 period, then contemporary global capitalism could be construed as a new ‘phase’ of exclusionary capitalism (Kiely, 1998). However, there is evidence to suggest that earlier periods of global capitalism were just as uneven, such that the structural exclusion of the South is a historical outcome of capitalism’s development.

In analysing the contemporary empirical evidence utilised by Hoogvelt this discussion noted that; firstly, using economic indicators for the South as a whole masks huge regional disparities, whilst regional data can mask differences between state economies. Secondly, using a number of different economic indicators provides a more nuanced picture of the extent and depth of Southern exclusion. For example, FDI as a percentage of GDP has shown an upward trend for Africa since 1980. Thirdly, more recent data than was available to Hoogvelt also provides a less stark picture of Southern economic exclusion, with the last decade providing some indication of increasing FDI and stable (rather than decreasing) flows of trade throughout the South. However, caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions from this data. For example, decreasing FDI as a percentage of GDP may reflect high GDP growth, rather than an absolute increase in investment.

The picture of Southern exclusion is less clear cut than implied by Hoogvelt or Duffield, and the argument that we are witnessing a new phase of increasing capitalist contraction from the South as a whole is difficult to sustain. This is especially the case given the other economic interactions discussed above which are not represented by trade and investment figures (e.g. currency speculation). The complexities of this are not fully explored in Hoogvelt’s or Duffield’s account and a number of processes need to be balanced when constructing a model of contemporary global capitalism. There are areas which are not fully included in the networks of global capitalism as the trade and investment figures demonstrate, but this appears to be an historical trend and contemporary data does not point clearly towards increasing exclusion either. Furthermore, the way in which the assets and resources of ‘excluded’ areas are utilised to mitigate crisis needs greater exploration. Harvey’s explication of accumulation by dispossession as a way of mitigating capitalist crisis in the short-term, can provide a fuller understanding of global capitalism and its relationship to global governance.

The critique put forward in this chapter has implications for the supposition that in the face of increasing exclusion, new methods of wealth creation through shadow economies have emerged to reintegrate the South into global economic networks (Bhattacharyya, 2005; Castells, 1998:75; Duffield, 2002a). This is envisaged as a
parallel process to capitalist retraction, being in large part driven by the resulting exclusion (Duffield, 2002a:1056). Qualifications regarding the historical trend and current strength of exclusion suggest that the reintegration argument needs modification. For example, what is driving increased parallel economic activity in the South if not the withdrawal of formal economic links to the global economy?

The analysis put forward by Hoogvelt, Duffield and Castells does retain merit in its recognition of the unequal power relations between North and South, as well as the importance and prevalence of parallel economic activity. Finally, this understanding of structural exclusion provides the context in which global governance conceptualises the South. This is the concern of chapter four.
Chapter Four

The Security-Development Nexus

Introduction

As part of this critical evaluation of the securitization of development debate, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which global development policy and practice reflect the logic of the security-development nexus. In the context of global capitalism as a structurally exclusive system, it is argued that an emerging system of global governance is guided by the logic of a security-development nexus. According to this debate, global governance institutions conceive underdevelopment and conflict in the South as mutually reinforcing, and perceive the South as a serious threat to the liberal world (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2010:56, 2002a; 2001a; Thomas, 2001; Woods, 2005). The security-development nexus, it is argued, unifies the disparate actors of global governance and is fundamental to how these actors construct the South (Duffield, 2007; 2001a; Wilkin, 2002). Along with this discursive dimension, the security-development nexus is perceived to have material affects upon the distribution of development resources. For instance, Duffield argues that as a consequence of the security-development discourse, conflict prevention and resolution activities have been incorporated into development programmes (Duffield, 2001a:38), and that security considerations “are increasingly evident in pressure to increase the amount of development resources directed to measures, regions and sub-populations deemed critical in relation to the dangers of radical global interdependence” (Duffield, 2007:126). Likewise, Woods raises the concern that “[d]onors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than those which would help the poorest” (2005:393). She maintains that new security concerns, such as terrorism, are spilling over into aid policy and that aid is being diverted by these new security imperatives that often run counter to the pursuit of human security (ibid). Beall at al raise similar concerns (2006:55).

Section one of this chapter examines the discursive dimension through a review of development policy discourse, and section two examines development practice through a statistical analysis of the geographical distribution of development aid. The institutions whose global development policy discourse and aid distribution is analysed for the purpose of investigating the security-development nexus include: the OECD, the UNDP, the EC, the World Bank and the development agencies of the US, UK, Swedish and Danish governments. The focus on the key actors identified by Duffield and others...
within the critical global governance literature, is thus maintained (Duffield, 2001a; Overbeek, 2005).

The evidence presented in section 4.1 indicates a strong discourse linking underdevelopment and conflict in the South. Furthermore, underdevelopment and conflict are identified as a source of international instability by most of the organisations reviewed. The Danish government, for example, has justified the use of development resources to protect national security (Danida 2005a; 2004). The evidence for a security-development nexus as presented by the authors cited above is persuasive. However, this discussion also establishes a tendency within the UNDP and Swedish development policy discourse to overlook the impact of underdevelopment on international security, in favour of a human security or human rights perspective, which may provide an alternative to the international security-development logic. This discussion goes on to demonstrate that all development agencies have adopted conflict prevention and reconstruction into their development agenda. Again, however, the UNDP and Sweden offer an alternative analysis to this aspect of the security-development nexus. This chapter concludes that there are multiple security-development narratives, and that this is not adequately acknowledged by the key protagonists of the securitization of development thesis.

Evidence that the security-development nexus has had an effect on development practice is much weaker. Section 4.2 demonstrates that countries which have experienced conflict and therefore may be perceived as having implications for wider security, do not receive substantially more development aid from the majority of donors assessed, than ‘stable’ states. Only the US appears to be practically pursuing its development policy discourse, awarding more aid to conflict ridden states.

4.1 The Security-Development Nexus within Global Development Policy Discourse

The methodological approach of this investigation is set out in full in the thesis introduction. To recap briefly, in line with Schmidt’s definition of policy discourse as “whatever policy makers say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy programme” (Schmidt, 2002:210), policy documents and interviews with staff of global governance institutions, are drawn on here as a source of evidence. The primary documents used, consist of research papers, policy guidelines, policy papers, conference reports, speeches and policy reviews published by global governance institutions. In addition, thirty semi-structured interviews were
carried out with high ranking staff working for global governance institutions (for a full list of interviewees see appendix one).

**Linking Underdevelopment and Conflict in the South**

Within the global development policy discourse, weak integration with the global economy is linked with declining or stagnant economic growth in Southern states, which in turn is understood as a primary cause of domestic armed-conflict, crime and support for terrorism (DFID et al., 2001; USAID, 2002a). DFID, for example, argue that “lower levels of GDP per capita are associated with a higher risk of violent and more prolonged conflict” (DFID, 2005a:8; see also Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). As a result of economic decline, it is argued, governments find themselves unable to fulfil promises of more jobs, better wages and improved public services. Consequently, important sections of the population - particularly young men - become disillusioned, marginalised and frustrated (DFID et al., 2001:14). This logic holds that in the context of economic decline, inequality and the lack of access to basic services contribute to perceptions of injustice that can motivate people to violence (DFID, 2005a:8). Thus according to the World Bank, “low-income countries that have failed to sustain the policies, governance and institutions that would allow them to sustain growth and diversify out of a dependency on primary commodities”, have a high risk of conflict (Social Development Department World Bank, 2004:17). Similarly, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), DFID and US Agency for International Development (USAID) agree that conflict and state breakdown result from a lack of political, social and, especially, economic development (Danida, 2005:17; DFID et al., 2001:14; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; USAID, 2002a:100). Weak economic integration into the global economy is also linked to a rise in parallel economic activity, which, it is argued, feeds into and sustains conflict, as groups compete over valuable commodities or try to capture income from illegal business or corruption (USAID, 2002a:101).

Weak state institutions, ‘bad’ governance and undemocratic regimes are also conceived as contributing factors to domestic violence and conflict (Danida, 2004:17; DFID, 2005a:5; 2005b; DFID et al., 2001:11; DG Development, 2004b:1; UNDP, 2005a; 2005b:14-15). For example, according to USAID, “[t]he more inept, lawless, corrupt and predatory governance is, the more likely it is to descend into...violent conflict” (USAID, 2002a:103). And DFID argue that

[t]he weakening and collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflict ... unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to
maintain popular support, governments begin to operate through coercion, corruption and the cult of the ‘strong’ leader, to secure political power and control of economic resources (DFID et al., 2001:14).

According to this discourse, then, economic decline or stagnation, inequality and weak, undemocratic state institutions create fertile conditions for violent conflict (DFID, 2005b:3; USAID 2002a:103). At the same time, conflict is conceived by all the institutions reviewed, as a barrier to poverty reduction and development, reversing the process of change and eroding hard-won development gains (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 2009; DFID, 2010; DFID et al, 2001:11; DG Development, 2004b:1; UNDP, 2005a; 2005b:14-15): “wars kill development as well as people” (DFID, 2005a:3). As such it is argued that “many of the world's poorest countries are locked in a tragic vicious circle where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty” (World Bank, 2007b). Conflict is conceived to exacerbate many of the problems associated with poverty and underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment and Conflict as a Source of International Insecurity

As part of this logic, the OECD and EC, and the UK, US and Danish governments emphasise that underdevelopment in the South and the conflict it exacerbates exist as a threat to international security. Conflict, it is argued, creates regions beyond government control. Such areas are perceived as fertile environments for international crime, terrorism and illicit arms trafficking, activities that can affect security elsewhere (DFID et al, 2001, USAID, 2002a). Danida is particularly concerned with underdevelopment as a cause of fundamentalism in the Middle East (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). According to this organisation, widespread poverty and a lack of education, jobs and democracy can lead to alienation and internal unrest, creating fertile soil for extremism and terrorism (Danida, 2004:9). USAID also links underdevelopment - including poverty, stunted economic growth, and corrupt or predatory governments - with insurgency or terrorism "towards the world’s successful countries" (USAID, 2002a:1-2). The OECD, whilst making it clear that poverty in itself is never a cause of terrorist activity, recognise that terrorist groups can “exploit insecurity factors and profess the cause of the frustrated, the poor, and the politically and economically excluded (real or perceived) in order to gain recruits for their causes” (OECD, 2003:15).

The belief that underdevelopment and insecurity in one state can affect global security is justified by appeals to the phenomena of globalisation. The EC’s development policy
assents that, "[p]overty, conflict, and instability, wherever they are in the world, affect us all. In the context of globalisation, it is in our common European interest, to address these issues" (DG Development, 2004a; see also European Commission, 2003:3). Similarly, the former UK Secretary of State for International Development emphasised whilst in office that within an interdependent world, conflict, crime and environmental pollution cross borders, and as such, no country "can remain aloof from the effects of insecurity elsewhere" (DFID, 2005a:3-5). Security and development in the South are therefore linked directly to international security:

When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil war, organised crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking ... cascade across the borders of weak states more destructively than they have ever before ... these unconventional threats may pose the greatest challenge to national interest in coming decades (USAID, 2002a:1).

Globalisation, in effect, is perceived as having significant security implications for the West. Within this context ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states are particularly likely to be conceived as a threat (Danida, 2005:9; DFID, 2005b:5; OECD DAC, 2004:2). Fragile states, it is argued, are susceptible to criminal and terrorist networks, creating instability which impacts regionally and globally (DFID, 2005b:10; USAID, 2005b:v).

Embedded within the dominant global development policy discourse, therefore, is a strong assumption that through terrorism, international crime and refugee flows, insecurity and underdevelopment in the South erodes Western security. This is in line with the conceptualisation of the security-development nexus within the securitization of development debate (Beall et al, 2005; Duffield, 2007:1; 2004a:3; 2001a; Thomas, 2001; Wilkin, 2002; Woods, 2005). This logic does not, however, form part of UNDP or Swedish global development policy discourse. Whilst the belief that development is necessary for local security and vice versa, is central to the UNDP’s policy discourse, the key problems identified by the UNDP are poverty and the human security of the poor, rather than international security or the security of Western nations. When questioned on this issue, the Director of Capacity Development at the UNDP argued that a much deeper analysis is required before any link can be assumed (Jones, 2005).

The central theme of the UN 1994 Human Development Report was human security, which stressed the importance of the environment and poverty reduction. The report

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2 Terence Jones, Director of Capacity Development, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, interview with author, February 2005.
emphasised the need for a new development paradigm that “puts people at the centre of development” and “respects the natural systems on which all life depends” (UNDP, 1994: 4). The report defined human security as having two central aspects: safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of daily life. It means that people can exercise their choices “safely and freely, and with some confidence that today’s opportunities will not be totally lost tomorrow” (UNDP, 1994:23). The 2010 Human Development report reiterates the importance of human security as an approach to global development:

The new human security paradigm shifts the unit of analysis from territories to the people dwelling in them and looks at the multiple threats that could undermine their security, dignity and livelihoods (UNDP, 2010:17).

The human security approach of the UNDP draws attention to poverty reduction, equality, inclusion and sustainability (UNDP, 2007:12-13), emphasising, for example, that “economic and political disparities, as well as other forms of exclusion based on factors such as gender, often determine who is most vulnerable” (ibid:28). Whilst similar ideas regarding inequality and human security are evident within the OECD’s, EC’s, DFID’s and USAID’s global development policy discourse, these agencies emphasise the link between conflict in the South and international security, whereas this connection is not stressed within the UNDP discourse. One possible reason for this is a division of labour within the UN, where development is the priority of the UNDP and security issues are dealt with by other UN agencies and the Security Council. For example, in 2006, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by member states in which prolonged unresolved conflicts were perceived to “create conditions conducive to exploitation by terrorists” (United Nations General Assembly, 2006:6). As such the strategy urged the UNDP to scale up good governance assistance “to support economic and social development, with a view to integrating concerns about terrorism into democratic governance programming” (ibid:7).

In line with the UNDP, Sweden recognises that whilst development may benefit international security, this is a positive by-product, with the central purpose of development assistance being to enhance human security (Persson and Karlson, 2003; Soder, 2005; Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b). This contrasts with USAID and Danida who maintain that development policy is central to national security strategies (Bureau for Policy Programme Coordination USAID, 2004: Danida, 2004).

3 Annika Soder, Swedish State Secretary for Development, interview with author, December 2005
Swedish discourse emphasises that global development is a worthy aim in itself: “[t]he elimination of poverty ... needless to say, remain first-order goals per se, not requiring further grounds for policy action” (Ohlsson, 2000: 1). On this basis, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) justifies two novel development approaches: a) a human rights perspective based on the will that people themselves have to develop and b) the perspective of the poor – their needs, interests and conditions (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2010). According to the Swedish government, the rights perspective draws attention to discrimination, excluded and marginalised individuals and groups, and gender equality, whilst applying the perspective of the poor to development means that the needs, circumstances, experiences and rights of poor people, groups and countries are the point of departure (Persson and Jamtin, 2004:4).

Within the Swedish and UNDP global development discourse, then, human security and human rights are emphasised over international security – which appears to have become a key justification for global development within the OECD and EC, and the UK, US and Danish governments.

Development Resources to enhance Security

As a response to the discourse which links underdevelopment and conflict in the South, the use of development aid to enhance local security is justified by all the global governance institutions reviewed here (Commission of the European Communities, 2005:8; DFID, 2010). Poul Nielson, speaking in his capacity as Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Development at the EC, explained to the European Parliament that

... it is a concrete result of our recognition that without peace, there is no prospect for development, and that we therefore can and should use [development] resources for peace building purposes (Nielson, 2004:5).

According to the OECD, conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development, with development agencies having accepted the need to work in and on conflicts rather than around them (OECD DAC, 2001a:17). Security is thus perceived as a necessary precondition for development, and vice versa (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 2003:1; OECD, 2007:2).
The discourse reasons that development aid can mitigate domestic conflict in the South through, firstly, explicit conflict prevention measures which work on resolving conflict and secondly, tackling some of the underlying problems which can cause or exacerbate conflict. Measures working specifically on conflict prevention include the disarmament of civilians, security sector reform\(^4\) or the establishment of conflict resolution strategies before tensions over land, resources or political transition become violent. Such conflict prevention work has become a fundamental aspect of global development policy, pursued by all major development institutions (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery UNDP, 2003; DFID, 2003; OECD DAC, 1997; 2001a).

Foreign assistance is also understood to mitigate conflict through tackling the underlying problems which exacerbate it. Measures include generating youth employment, supporting curriculum reform and civic education programmes that promote tolerance and critical thinking, and training journalists to report on issues in non-inflamatory ways (USAID, 2002a:106). Such measures, according to USAID, "may be among the most important contributions that foreign assistance can make to conflict management and mitigation" (ibid:106). Similarly, within fragile states, it is argued, addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding should be central to international development intervention (OECD, 2007:2). Strengthening democracy is conceived as a key method of avoiding future conflict.

The EC, OECD, DFID, USAID and Danida also justify the use of development resources to strengthen international (or national) security. The view at the EC’s development department, for example, is that development needs to be the first priority to tackle terrorism (Paniagua, 2004)\(^5\), whilst Danida emphasises that

\[\text{[t]he most important contribution to the fight against terrorism which development policy can make is to fight the underdevelopment and hopelessness that create an ideal breeding ground for religious fundamentalism and political radicalism (Danida, 2003:2).}\]

Similarly, USAID argue that development in the South

\(^4\) Security sector reform involves “help developing and transitional countries manage their security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient, and effective way by initiating and supporting reform and providing appropriate education and training” (Bell, 2003:30).

creates zones of order and peace where Americans can travel, study, exchange, and do business safely. And it produces allies – countries that share U.S. commitments to economic openness, political freedom and the rule of law (USAID, 2002a:2).

As such the US has elevated development to be the “third pillar” of foreign policy, on a par with defence and diplomacy (USAID, 2002a:iv).

Global poverty reduction is perceived to enhance security both locally and globally. According to DFID, poverty reduction benefits global security by decreasing the structural factors, such as the unmet political and economic aspirations or lack of jobs for skilled labour, which increase the risk of terrorism (DFID, 2005a:11). Danida agree: “[r]educing poverty will benefit peace and stability – not only in Africa, but also the whole world” (Danida, 2005:9). As does the OECD, who argue that “[c]ombating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world (OECD, 2007). Furthermore, terrorist leaders are perceived to exploit the issue of poverty as a means of mobilising support and legitimising their actions (DFID, 2005a). Poverty reduction is therefore constructed as central to the fight against conflict and terrorism. Indeed since September 11th 2001 the World Bank has stressed that the mission of poverty reduction is more important than ever (Bannon, 2005). This discourse, therefore, emphasises that development - including poverty reduction, educational reform and the creation of strong democratic institutions - can reduce the risk of insecurity and conflict. Domestic economic, political and social change is needed to ensure peace and stability in the South, thus enhancing international security.

Whilst agreeing that conflict undermines development, and considering conflict prevention and reconstruction in its development programming, the UNDP argue that

[c]onflict prevention remains experimental and inconclusive. It is too soon to know what prevents violent conflict and why ... it is also important to understand that knowing the causes and conditions that lead to violent conflict does not necessarily indicate the solution to resolve them (Ebata, 2003:5)

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6 Ian Bannon, Manager, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank, interview with author, February 2005.
Furthermore, in a statement to the International Peace Academy Conference, the then UNDP Administrator stated:

I have been very worried about the basic statement that conflict is created by poverty, therefore solve poverty and you solve conflict. I am also very cautious about accepting that broad-based economic development strategies were in themselves a sensible, realistic, time-bound way to avert conflict (Malloch-Brown, 2003:1).

He goes on to argue that economic assistance to the South is insufficient to overcome deep-rooted ethnic, social and religious tensions (ibid:2). Malloch-Brown makes the case that whilst conflict undermines development, underdevelopment is not necessarily a cause of conflict, and even when it is, development programmes will not inevitably reduce the risk of conflict. This caution is not a prominent element of the dominant global development policy discourse discussed. The dominant ideas within this discourse appear to be firstly, that underdevelopment and insecurity are mutually sustaining and secondly, that the insecurity of people in one state or the instability of a state can have global repercussions. These ideas demonstrate why it is necessary for development policy to take into account both development and security issues and why it is legitimate to use development aid to enhance security.

This section indicates that the global development policy discourse of the OECD, EC and World Bank, and that of the US, UK and Danish governments reflects the logic of the security-development nexus. However, it also identifies a tendency within the UNDP and SIDA’s global development policy discourse to provide a different perspective on the impact of underdevelopment on international security. The axiom that security is a necessary precondition for development and vice versa, means that all the institutions investigated here have adopted conflict prevention and reconstruction into their global development agendas and justify the use of development aid in the interests of local security. There is also evidence that the Danish, US and UK governments justify the use of development resources to protect national security. However, whilst fully supporting the idea that there can be no development without security, the UNDP and Sweden offer a more nuanced assessment of the links between underdevelopment and conflict than the other organisations discussed. Having reviewed the discourse, this chapter now examines the extent to which the security-development nexus is reflected in development practice.
4.2 The Security-Development Nexus within Development Practice

In order to examine the material dimension of the security-development nexus, this section investigates development practice through the distribution of ODA, or aid. It brings together a wide range of studies that explore the geographical distribution of ODA, supplemented by an original statistical analysis (see appendix 2). This analysis models the relationship between aid disbursements and conflict, over a 12 year period (1991-2002). The ODA distribution from the same global governance institutions discussed above, with the exception of the OECD (which does not give ODA as an organisation) is used. The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank is the organisation that allocates the World Bank’s ODA, so is used here.

Whilst most analyses of ODA allocation take the total or average ODA from approximately a 10 year period, this study examined individual years from 1991-2002, so that any trends could be observed. See appendix two for the full research design of this statistical project. The results of the project are illustrated in the tables throughout this section. The ‘coefficient b’ indicates the increase of ODA (in $millions) that is likely for every increase in conflict intensity level. Importantly, bold type in a column indicates a statistically significant result at the 5 percent level, meaning that the result was unlikely to have occurred by chance.

The purpose of this section is to contribute to an evaluation of the claim that underdevelopment and conflict in the South are understood as mutually reinforcing and that underdevelopment is conceived as a threat to the liberal world system. If this is so, we might expect donors to give a greater proportion of aid to conflict ridden countries (for conflict prevention and reconstruction, in order to avoid future conflict). Similarly, if conflict in the South is conceived as a threat to international security, one might expect donors to focus more development aid on states which had recently experienced conflict: “When underdevelopment becomes a threat to international security, development accordingly becomes the solution” (Bradbury, 2002:10). Whilst such an analysis cannot validate these claims, together with the analysis of discourse, it can contribute towards an evaluation of them.
**Sum of Multilateral ODA**

Figure 9 shows results for the sum of ODA given by the UNDP, IDA and EC.

**Figure 9. Relationship between Sum of Multilateral ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient**

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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>.290</td>
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When taken in sum, multilateral ODA suggests that conflict intensity level does not have a consistent affect on the allocation of multilateral ODA. Only in 1998 does conflict appear to have an effect upon total multilateral aid, suggesting that in this year states experiencing a higher level of conflict received more aid. Therefore, whilst conflict may loom large in the global development policy discourse, this regression analysis provides little evidence to suggest that it affects how these agencies choose to distribute their development resources.

**The International Development Agency**

The World Bank’s involvement in conflict prevention and reconstruction has been growing for approximately a decade and conflict is now a central research issue at the Bank (Social Development Department World Bank, 2004:17-19). This unit is based on the understanding that there can be no development without peace (World Bank, 2007b). However, for the IDA, the intensity of conflict in a country does not appear to influence ODA distribution in any of the years examined (figure 10).

**Figure 10. Relationship between IDA ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient**

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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.288</td>
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<td>.033</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>-.276</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.210</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.890</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>.360</td>
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This is surprising considering the institutional expansion, including new departments, research and expertise, in the area of conflict prevention and reconstruction at the Bank (World Bank, 2007b). Furthermore, countries eligible for ‘exceptional IDA allocations’ - the first step for post-conflict countries in receiving ODA - are expected
to receive more than their Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating would allow:

It is expected that most eligible countries will need an allocation that exceeds what they would qualify for based on their regular IDA performance rating. Based on previous experience it is expected that allocations will in most cases range from $10 to $15 per capita per year. By comparison, the average per capita per annum to all IDA-only countries is approximately $7.5 (World Bank, 2004b:3).

The World Bank is, however, primarily concerned with economic development. Hard aid allocation decisions may still be made by the financial sector of the Bank, rather than those in the Social Development Department, which includes the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, as suggested by Fort (2005). Indeed, Frey and Schneider examined World Bank loans and commitments by the IDA in the period 1972-1981, and found that economic factors such as recipient’s per capita income, inflation and balance of payments deficit, as well as factors such as a ‘capitalist’ climate, best explained lending activity (Frey and Schneider, 1986). In other words, rather than conflict vulnerability or weak state capacity, aid appears to have been allocated on the basis of a ‘strong’ economic record and recipient need.

The European Commission

In 2004 the EC set up a Peace Facility for Africa worth Euro250 million to fund peace keeping operations led by the African Union (DG Development, 2004b). The money comes from the European Development Fund and primarily funds: soldier’s allowances, communication equipment, medical facilities, and transport and logistics. Ammunition and arms are excluded from receiving funds from the Facility. In justifying its use of funds, DG Development states that the most important aim of the peace facility is to “create the necessary conditions for development ... the decision to extend the use of development funds to peace and security issues was therefore a deliberate one” (DG Development, 2004b:4). However, whilst donations to the African Peace Facility are counted as ODA by individual donors, the Facility actually falls outside of the OECD

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7 The World Bank’s CPIA, scores states according to various criteria including economic management, structural policies and social inclusion. These scores then inform the Bank’s decisions on how to allocate lending resources.
8 Lucia Fort, Senior Gender Specialist, Gender and Development Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, World Bank, interview with author, February 2005
definition of ODA (Scott, 2005)*, and therefore would not be represented in a similar analysis of ODA post-2002. Nevertheless, the African Peace Facility does demonstrate the centrality of conflict prevention within the development work of the EC. This is also reflected within policy discourse, which emphasises the links between conflict and development, suggesting that the Commission is committed to spending a greater proportion of its ODA on peace building and reconstruction (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). Actual ODA allocation from 1991-2002 does not seem to uphold this proposition. As figure 11 shows, the EC renders statistically insignificant results for all years except 1997. In this year, states with higher conflict intensity levels were given higher levels of ODA.

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<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.176</td>
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Previous research also suggests that the EC has a tendency not to allocate aid to security sensitive countries. In an analysis of aid to 62 Least Developed Countries in the 1975-80 period, Tsoutsopilides (1991) found that the relationship between EC aid allocation and security interest was negative, indicating that the EC tended to give less aid to those Least Developed Countries where its security interests were more pronounced. Tsoutsopilides' study concluded that EC aid to Least Developed Countries was motivated more by the needs of the recipient in terms of their current account balance of payments, and basic human needs. Neumayer also found that those countries with low military expenditure received more ODA from the EC during the period from 1991 to 2000, suggesting that the EC favoured governments which were not experiencing conflict (Neumayer, 2003d).

The United Nations Development Programme

The UNDP has for the past 20 years been involved with peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. However, as noted above, this organisation takes a more cautious approach than the other agencies examined, with regard to the idea that development has the capacity to resolve or prevent conflict (Ebata, 2003; Malloch-Brown, 2003). Figure 12 shows that only the years 1993 and 1999 give statistically

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* Simon Scott, Principle Administrator, Statistics and Monitoring Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD, interview with author, November 2005
significant results. In both years there is a positive relationship between conflict intensity level and ODA, suggesting that the higher the level of conflict the more ODA a country receives.

**Figure 12. Relationship between UNDP ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td><strong>.298</strong></td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td><strong>.214</strong></td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.088</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td><strong>.022</strong></td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>.328</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td><strong>.036</strong></td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>.469</td>
<td>.254</td>
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Neumayer (2003a) found that during the 1980s and 90s the UNDP gave more aid to countries with higher arms imports. It would be sensible to assume that countries with high conflict intensity levels would import more arms. Therefore Neumayer’s research may provide a stronger indication that during that period, countries which had recently experienced conflict were likely to receive more aid than those which had not experienced such conflict.

*Sum of Bilateral ODA*

With regard to the total aid allocated by the US, UK, Sweden and Denmark, figure 13 demonstrates that the US gives such a large volume of ODA that when we take this bilateral aid together, US aid dominates the results.

**Figure 13. Relationship between Sum of Bilateral ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.545</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.891</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.015</td>
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</table>
The United States

The results for the US are shown in figure 14. Most years generate statistically significant results and high coefficients, which suggests that conflict intensity level did have a strong influence on the allocation of US economic aid throughout the 1990s and in 2002; the higher the level of conflict, the more ODA a country can expect.

Figure 14. Relationship between US ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.525</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.606</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.010</td>
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Since Israel is a large recipient of US aid and throughout all years had a conflict intensity level of 2, on a scale of 0-3, with 0 being no conflict and 3 being war, the same regression was carried out excluding Israel. The results, in figure 15, show a marked decrease in the expected increase of aid a country would receive if it has recently experienced conflict. However, these results still show conflict to be a significant determinant in the allocation of US ODA. Conflict as a determinant of US aid therefore fits into the wider logic of development aid as a tool of national security (USAID, 2002a). The higher figure in 1998 is in part a result of high levels of aid to Russia and Sudan, both of which were experiencing high levels of conflict in 1996 (there is a two year time lag between the conflict intensity level and ODA variable).

Figure 15. Relationship between US ODA Excluding Israel and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.390</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.883</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.551</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.720</td>
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</table>
The United Kingdom

Regression analysis for the UK’s ODA in the years 1991-2002 did not produce any statistically significant results (figure 16). This suggests that the level of conflict in a country does not have a bearing on the amount of ODA it receives from the UK.

Figure 16. Relationship between UK ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient

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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>.489</td>
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</table>

The UK’s development policy discourse which emphasises the links between conflict, poverty and security, is not reflected in these results (DFID, 2005a). The regression analysis covering ODA in the years 1991 to 2002 finds no evidence to support the argument that the UK government is using development resources for conflict prevention and reconstruction. However, in 2001 the UK set up two Conflict Prevention Pools following a series of reviews to improve the UK government's approach to conflict prevention (Bell, 2003). As with the EC’s African Peace Facility, resources used by these Pools cannot be declared as ODA under current DAC classifications (Scott, 2005)\(^\text{10}\), but could result in DFID funds being used to supply military equipment and support military efforts to stabilise a conflict situation (Bell, 2003:5).

Sweden

There is a lack of continuity in the results for Sweden, shown in figure 17. Years 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2002 generate significant, positive coefficients. This indicates that in these years, states with a higher conflict intensity level could expect to receive a higher proportion of ODA than states with no or low conflict.

Figure 17. Relationship between Swedish ODA and Conflict Intensity Level of Recipient

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>.542</td>
<td>.498</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.045</td>
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\(^{10}\) Simon Scott, Principle Administrator, Statistics and Monitoring Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD, interview with author, November, 2005
Sweden has a strong history of conflict prevention work (Narman, 1999), and these results may provide some evidence that the conflict intensity level of a recipient state impacts the amount of aid it is likely to receive from Sweden.

**Denmark**

Although Danish development policy discourse supports conflict prevention and peace building measures, figure 18 shows that until 2002 Danish ODA distribution does not appear to take into account the level of conflict the recipient country has experienced.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>-.213</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>-.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.688</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.829</td>
<td>.676</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>.725</td>
</tr>
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Since 2002 Denmark has identified Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan as potential ‘safe havens’ for terrorists and pledged to direct resources towards humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, long-term development, refugees and internally displaced people in these conflict locations (Danida, 2004). In doing so, it is hoped that these three states will become regional examples of how failed states can become accountable and democratic actors in the international community.

To summarise, with the exception of the US (and possibly Sweden), the discourse linking security, conflict and underdevelopment does not appear to be strongly reflected in distribution of ODA to the South within the period studies.

**Conclusions**

In order to assess in what ways the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, the purpose of this chapter was to investigate the extent to which global development policy and practice reflect the logic of the security-development nexus. Through an investigation of global development policy discourse in section one and the geographical distribution of aid in section two, it has sought to shed light on the validity of the discursive and material claims made within the literature regarding the security-development nexus.
To what extent, then, does global development policy discourse validate the ideational claims regarding the security-development nexus? In the context of global capitalism as an exclusionary system, it is argued that the logic of the security-development nexus provides the framework for North-South relations. According to this theory, the perception that underdevelopment and conflict are mutually reinforcing is fundamental to development policy today (Beall et al, 2006; Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2007; 2001a):

Within present discourse, not only are poverty and underdevelopment associated with conflict, but conflict itself, because it destroys development assets and social capital, is regarded as complicating poverty and deepening underdevelopment (Duffield, 2001a:37).

The global development policy discourse provides strong evidence to support this claim, and demonstrates the compatibility of the two discourses of development and security (Wilkin, 2002:638). Weak integration with the global economy is linked with declining or stagnant economic growth in the South, which in turn is understood as a cause of violent conflict (DFID et al., 2001; USAID, 2002a). Duffield’s claim that global policy makers causally link structural exclusion to “growing resource competition, breakdown, criminalisation and chaos”, is borne out (Duffield, 2001a:6). The proposition that underdevelopment is currently perceived as a major threat to world stability (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a), is also substantiated by the global development policy discourse of most of the agencies examined above. Bradbury (2003) argues that this perception has strengthened since September 11th 2001 and that the phenomena of ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states in the South are increasingly considered as potential threats to international security. This is demonstrated, for example, by Danida, who argue that “[w]eak states are particularly vulnerable as shelters and targets of terrorism, which has serious effects both on the society affected and international security” (Danida, 2005:9).

The tendency within the UNDP’s and SIDA’s global development policy discourse to overlook the impact of underdevelopment on international security may provide an alternative to the security-development nexus as conceived by the key contributors to the securitization of development debate. These agencies have not re-conceptualised underdevelopment as an international security threat, but emphasise human rights and human security as the justification for development policy. As discussed in chapter two, Hampson (2004) and Duffield (2001a) suggest that the motivation for tackling human insecurity comes from the idea that the security and development of the individual is essential for international security. This reasoning is not apparent within the UNDP discourse, and SIDA insist that democratic development and increased
respect for human rights are worthy development goals in themselves, not requiring further justification (Ohlsson, 2000; Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). In contrast to the other institutions discussed above, there is no established policy discourse linking international security with underdevelopment within the UNDP or SIDA.

More recent contributions to the securitization of development debate have begun to explore the possibility of multiple security-development discourses. Hettne distinguishes between the pre-September 11th 2001 development discourse concerned with ‘human security’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’, and a post-September 11th discourse prioritising a ‘war against terror’ or ‘pre-emptive intervention’ (Hettne, 2010:45). He concludes that the nexus between development and security is not static or one dimensional. The UNDP/Swedish discourse still resonates with this pre-September 11th discourse, whilst the majority of agencies reviewed have moved towards placing development within a ‘war against terror’ logic; “order rather than justice” has become the predominant concern (ibid:50). Furthermore, Stern and Öjendal identify overlapping security-development nexus ‘narratives’ which can also be used to ‘map’ the different discourses identified in the policy texts reviewed in this chapter (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). The dominant security-development nexus discourse identified here fits into what Stern and Öjendal term “the security-development nexus as modern (teleological) narrative” (ibid:17). This narrative holds that security depends upon a successful march towards progress and modernity, and that the conditions of and for security mutually reinforce those for development and progress. The UNDP/Swedish discourse, however, draws upon the “deepened, broadened, humanized” narrative, which is “best illustrated as the merging of human development and human security – as intricate and complex ambitions in idealist and normative combinations” (ibid:19).

The development policy discourse of Sweden and the UNDP is still very much a liberal one, based on individual rights, democracy and gender equality, and underpinned by the idea that Southern populations are “somehow incomplete and requiring external development” (Duffield, 2007:234), substantiating the claim that global governance can be described as liberal global governance. However, on the specific issue of linking security with development, this discourse contains different ideas and assumptions than those identified previously (Beall et al, 2006; Duffield, 2001a; 2007; Wilkin, 2002; Woods 2005), and may represent a potential alternative within the global governance system.
A key aspect of the security-development nexus, it is argued, is that development is seen as having the capacity to resolve and prevent conflict (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a). This is also strongly validated by this analysis of global development policy discourse; all the global governance agencies investigated believe that conflict prevention and reconstruction should be incorporated into the development agenda (OECD DAC, 2001a). According to this discourse, strengthening democracy, reducing poverty and educational and employment reform can all play a part in reducing the risk of conflict and sustaining peace (Danida, 2005a; DFID, 2005b; USAID, 2002a). There is some evidence that the UNDP are more cautious about development having the capacity to resolve and prevent conflict (Ebata, 2003; Malloch-Brown, 2003), but they are fully in agreement that development must work in and on, rather than around, conflict.

The security-development nexus, according to Duffield (2001a:28) and Wilkin (2002), situates the causes of conflict and underdevelopment firmly within the domestic sphere. Thus the main burden of responsibility for solving these problems has been placed on Southern actors. This review of the discourse has provided a number of examples to substantiate this. Economic decline, poverty reduction, as well as weak and undemocratic state institutions, are linked to conflict in developing states (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Danida, 2005a; DFID et al., 2001). As such, domestic political, economic and social change is advocated in order to avert future conflict and ensure international security. This is in line with Duffield’s assertion that

\[\text{[i]n redefining underdevelopment as dangerous, from its position of dominance, liberal discourse has suppressed those aspects of Third Worldism and international socialism that argued \ldots that the way in which wealth is created has a direct bearing on the extent and nature of poverty (Duffield, 2001a:28)}\]

This is further supported by the lack of discussion regarding how the structural imperatives of the global economy may be connected to poverty and underdevelopment. Whilst a UNDP interviewee emphasised these imperatives as a causal factor in underdevelopment (Anon, 2005)\(^{11}\), this issue, it can be argued, has been 'suppressed' within the wider global development policy discourse.

Whilst the foundational beliefs and assumptions of the global development policy discourse provide some strong evidence to substantiate the proposition that global

\(^{11}\) Anon, Employment for Poverty Reduction Advisor, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, interview with author, February 2005
governance is guided by the logic of the security-development nexus, the affect of this logic upon development practice is ambiguous. US and Swedish disbursements offer some evidence that development practice is guided by the logic of the security-development nexus. Overall, however, ODA distribution cannot be explained through the logic of the security-development nexus, and this examination suggests that determinants other than conflict and security are of equal or greater importance in the allocation of development aid. These might include donor interest measured by geography, colonial history and trade (Alesina and Dollar, 2002; Neumayer, 2003b), or recipient need (Neumayer, 2003d). This disjunction between discourse and practice may in part be explained by Chandler’s assertion that rich nations “simultaneously disengage from serious policy making” (Chandler, 2007:363). And that the security-development nexus discourse is in part political rhetoric played out on an international stage for a primarily domestic audience (Reid-Henry, 2011:100). This was implied by Scott (2005)\textsuperscript{12}, who perceived the securitization of aid as one issue in a long line of issues that concern donors which “flair-up and then drop to nothing”.

Considering the evidence presented here, how does the logic of the security-development nexus, as conceptualised within the securitization of development debate, aid our understanding of contemporary global governance? Firstly, it facilitates an understanding of global development policy, in part, as a response to the conceptualisation of the South as a serious threat to the liberal capitalist system of the North. The discursive centrality of a security-development nexus within the networks of global governance is correctly identified (Bradbury, 2003; Duffield, 2001a; 2007; Wilkin, 2002). However, whilst the security-development nexus may be a strong discursive concept, its affect upon development practice is less certain. This weakens the empirical base of the securitization of development literature, thus limiting the extent to which it aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. Furthermore, the discourse emphasising human rights and human security may emerge as an alternative to the emphasis on international security. The accounts given by Duffield and others tend to overemphasise the consensual aspect of global governance, whilst missing the complexity and diversity of ‘narratives’, which pervade these networks. Furthermore, potential forces for change within these networks may be missed. The UNDP and Sweden do not hold the power, especially in terms of development resources, of the World Bank or USAID, but they do have some authority. The UNDP has authority as a UN agency, and Sweden, as a traditional ‘like-minded’ state, and together may offer a coherent alternative to the dominant discourse.

\textsuperscript{12} Simon Scott, Principle Administrator, Statistics and Monitoring Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, OECD, interview with author, November 2005
Chapter Five

Liberal Consensus and Policy Coordination

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the third proposition put forward by the securitization of development debate, which holds that the structures and politics of global governance are permeated by a liberal consensus fostering policy coordination (Duffield, 2001a; Thomas, 2004b). According to this view, the emerging global governance complex is a fragmented system of rule principally unified through a liberal consensus, providing the normative and discursive structure through which its activities are legitimised and coordinated (Overbeek, 2005:42). Duffield (2001a) argues that this consensus upholds core liberal values including the sanctity and autonomy of the individual and liberal democracy as the most desirable form of governance. Embedded within the liberal discourse is an idea of moral trusteeship over those populations considered ‘underdeveloped’ (Duffield, 2007:8). The networks of state and non-state actors communicate this liberal ontology through the common language of global development policy discourse, which has a role in constructing, consolidating and articulating liberal consensus:

Within global governance networks, shared policy assumptions are an important way in which different actors can communicate and coordinate their various activities. Without some degree of shared understanding as to what the nature of the problem is and how it should be tackled, governance networks would find it difficult, if not impossible, to operate. As a means of mobilising strategic complexes, policy now plays the role of politics within global governance (Duffield, 2001a:72).

This chapter is thus directed towards answering the following research question: To what extent does global development policy discourse reflect a liberal consensus, and coordination around this consensus?

Chapter two suggested that two understandings of liberalism are invoked within the securitization of development debate; as a political philosophy containing a coherent set of ideas, and as a particular form of governance which encourages self-reliance and self-realisation (Dillon and Reid, 2001:45-47; Duffield, 2010:57, 61; 2007: 4-8; 2001a: 7-8, 11, 44-45). In the context of global development, the latter implies a type of governance that “allows the power of freedom to be safely learned and applied”
Both liberalism as political philosophy and as a mechanism of governance can be identified in the global development policy discourse. There is strong evidence to suggest that global development policy is not politically neutral or pluralist but confined within a liberal discourse. That is, not only does global governance promote a set of liberal economic policies but it also seeks to promote a polity model that mirrors that of its dominant member states. Following criticism of the Washington consensus in the 1990s, technical good governance was embraced by IFIs. Subsequently, the more explicit political tenets of liberal democracy, including the rule of law and human rights, have become key touchstones in the formulation and justification of global development policy. This is further supplemented by a focus on governance through national ownership, civil society participation and community and individual empowerment and responsibility. These processes resonate with the concept of liberalism as a technology of government (Foucault, 2010). This discussion initially provides evidence of these developments, arguing that global development policy does to a large extent reflect a liberal discourse (section 5.1).

There are however tensions within this discourse which are highlighted in section 5.2. These limit the extent to which we can point to a consensus. Opposition to the orthodoxy clearly exist within the networks of global governance regarding neo-liberal economic prescriptions and the practice of dispensing aid selectively to reward reforms that a government has begun to implement. Despite these tensions global governance institutions attempt to coordinate their global development policies to facilitate a liberal vision of development. This is documented in section 5.3.

5.1 The Liberal Discourse of Global Governance

As is well documented there existed a period of neo-liberal policy orthodoxy often referred to as the Washington consensus (1980-1994) (Pender, 2001). In line with neo-liberal economics, the Washington consensus prescribed both a minimal role for the state in regulating the national economy and the opening up of Third World economies to global markets. Through international integration, it was argued, developing countries would realise economic growth, which was synonymous with development. During the Washington consensus period the “unambiguous objective of rapid and sustained economic growth was repeatedly articulated” by international development institutions, particularly the World Bank and IMF (Pender, 2001:398). Structural adjustment programmes were regarded as critical to enable economic growth and development. These programmes prescribed public spending cuts, a reduction of government debt, the contraction of the state and the unleashing of the private sector
This was to be followed by a programme of export led growth, which involved encouraging the state to remove trade barriers, and the private sector to sell in foreign markets (ibid:110). This model of development was promoted by the World Bank and IMF through conditionality attached to development aid; in order to receive development aid, loans and debt rescheduling, developing states had to commit to structural adjustment policies (Pender, 2001; Thomas, 2004a).

Throughout the 1990s, opposition to the Washington consensus on moral, social, environmental and economic grounds, grew (Thomas, 2004a). The World Bank and the IMF became the target of sustained criticism from NGOs, academics and from within official development policy circles (Stiglitz, 1998c; Wade, 1996). The failure of structural adjustment to provide sustained levels of economic growth in many of the least developed countries called into question the fundamental tenets of the consensus. Rapid liberalisation and privatisation was also challenged by the growth and subsequent decline of the East Asian economies. Contrary to strict neo-liberal principles, these economies had utilised state planning and regulation to build up domestic industry (Jayasuriya and Rossier, 2001; World Bank, 1993). Notwithstanding, throughout the 1980s East Asia was used to demonstrate the success of the Washington consensus by its advocates, and was vital in legitimising its application in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jayasuriya and Rossier, 2001:383; Wade, 1996:20).

Thus, the subsequent East Asian economic crisis in 1997 further destabilised the development orthodoxy (ibid). In explaining the East Asian crisis, doubts were raised over the presumed benefits of neo-liberal economic development orthodoxy. According to Jayasuriya and Rossier (2001), some commentators concluded that high levels of state intervention were a factor contributing to the crisis of East Asian economies (Black and Black, 1999; Wolf, 1998), whilst others, in contrast, deduced that neo-liberal policies, particularly hasty financial liberalisation, contributed to it (Sachs, 1998). The former implied that stringent free-market policies were not the reason behind the previous high levels of growth leading up to the crisis. The latter challenged the wisdom of neo-liberal economics. Neither analysis, therefore, supported the Washington consensus on development.

The extent to which the East Asian model legitimised the pursuit of economic openness through the reduction of trade barriers, as the Washington consensus prescribed, is therefore debatable. Glenn (2007) distinguishes between economic integration and economic openness. Economic integration of trade and financial markets does not necessitate economic openness. East Asian states benefited from integrating their markets prior to liberalising them through reducing trade tariffs and
controls of capital movements (ibid:106-107). During the 1980s, for example, both India and China had relatively high tariff barriers and could not be described as open economies, but sustained impressive GDP growth with outward-orientated economies. This was followed, in India, by a period of economic openness in the 1990s which saw a liberalization of foreign investment restrictions and a reduction of trade tariffs (ibid 198-109).

The subsequent reorientation of global development policy began with a concern for technical ‘good governance’, and gradually expanded the remit of development to include political, institutional and social factors. This has been labelled the ‘post-Washington consensus’ (Jayasuriya and Rossier, 2001; Stiglitz, 1998a). Whilst the central tenets of neo-liberalism remain, contemporary global development policy discourse conceives the ultimate aim of development as the establishment of liberal democracies with globally integrated market economies (Thomas, 2004a). It has moved away from prioritising economic growth and calls instead for the “transformation of society” (Stiglitz, 1998c). This new vision is in turn understood to contribute to global peace and stability, as discussed in chapter three (USAID, 2002a). Whilst some institutions are reticent to use the term liberal democracy because it has Western political connotations, the popular term ‘good governance’ is now supplemented within the discourse with principles central to liberal democracy including the rule of law, strengthening civil society, accountability, legitimacy, human rights, and the creation of socially inclusive societies (USAID, 2002a:2, UNDP, 2007:20). The promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance, for example, are integral to EU global development policy (Council of the European Union, 2005:5-6; European Commission, 2000:1). And the ‘fundamental values’ of Sweden’s global development policy are democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and gender equality (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003b; Persson and Jamtin, 2004:19-20). Similarly USAID argues that lawful, accountable, participatory government fosters development and political freedom (USAID, 2002a:2.). Danida, the OECD and DFID similarly place democracy and good governance at the centre of their global development policy discourse (Danida, 2003; DFID at al,. 2005; OECD, 2007).

According to this discourse good governance/democracy and development depend on and reinforce each other. Without good governance, urged the previous UN secretary, “the path to prosperity is likely to be more difficult, and gains could remain fragile and reversible” (Annan, 2006). And according to the US global development agency “almost all countries with high levels of economic and social development are democracies” (USAID, 2002a:2). Democratic governance, argues the UNDP, protects human rights
and expands people’s choices allowing them to control their own destinies (UNDP, 2007:20).

USAID are explicit that democracy must be liberal. Where democracy is less liberal, they argue, “governance is poorer – more corrupt, wasteful, incompetent and unresponsive” (USAID, 2002a:38-39). This, it is argued, entrenches poverty, obstructs economic development and prevents poor countries from using international assistance effectively. Liberal democracy, on the other hand involves free and fair elections; a strong rule of law; an independent judiciary and other institutions of accountability that check the abuse of power (ibid).

The universal applicability of human rights provides a further validation of global development policy. This idea is particularly strong in the case of the Swedish government, which promotes human rights as a foreign policy priority (Persson and Jamtin, 2004:19-20) arguing that

[countries that violate human rights have sometimes defended themselves by referring to local traditions, religion or low levels of education. No arguments of this kind are valid. Human rights apply to all human beings in the whole world without distinction and are a precondition for development (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003b:2).

There are two key moments that demonstrate the multilateral nature of these ideas: the adoption of the United Nation Millennium Declaration in 2000, and the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 (and subsequent Monterrey Consensus). The United Nations Millennium Declaration, supported by all UN members, demonstrated a strong agreement on the importance of facilitating the development of democracy and good governance in the South. The declaration commits to “spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law” and to “respect all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations General Assembly, 2000:6).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which flow from the UN Millennium Declaration, ensure that poverty reduction is, for most global governance agencies, a key touchstone around which to unify and collaborate. Through the MDGs poverty reduction has been embedded as a central social element of a common vision and is perceived to flow from good governance and economic integration and, as discussed in chapter four, is also perceived as a way of mitigating the threat of conflict (Alexander, 2007; Danida, 2006; DFID, 2000; 2006). The MDGs are presented by Denmark, the UK
and the EC as central to their development policy. The overriding objective of Danish Development Assistance, for example, is “targeted poverty reduction with a view to contributing to the achievement of the ...[MDGs]” (Danida, 2004:23). The “primary and overarching objective of the EU development cooperation”, likewise, is “the eradication of poverty ... including pursuit of the ... [MDGs]” (Council of the European Union, 2005:4). These goals are further emphasised in OECD and USAID discourse, which specifically links them to the security-development nexus (OECD DAC, 2008; USAID, 2008:1). DAC’s work, for example, includes a specific focus on “examining the link between conflict prevention and peace-building and the MDGs” (OECD DAC, 2008). Addressing violent conflict, argues the DAC, can help the realisation of the MDGs, because “experience shows that there is a causal link between enduring poverty and the prevalence of violent conflict in developing countries” (ibid). Thus, “security from violence and fear is fundamental to reducing poverty, protecting human rights and achieving the MDGs” (ibid).

This common vision of good governance, democracy and security was used to galvanise global governance agencies further at Monterrey in 2002. The Monterrey Consensus was signed by over 150 governments, including the UK, US, Sweden and Denmark. It demonstrates a shared assumption that global peace and development rests on the pursuit and implementation of good governance and a commitment to ‘sound’ principles of market economics (United Nations, 2002:3), connecting the vision of liberal democracy with the security-development nexus. This logic incorporates the concepts of ‘good governance’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘human rights’, all of which are understood as mutually reinforcing (Persson and Jamtin, 2004; United Nations, 2002). This argument has been fortified at subsequent international development conferences, such as the World Bank’s Conference on Fragile States in 2007, where the DFID’s Director of Policy and Research argued that “good governance and state-building need to be at the centre of our work in fragile states” (Steer, 2007:2).

This discourse clearly demonstrates a common language and a common vision to facilitate good governance and democratic institutions in the South, in order to sustain peace and poverty reduction. The underlying principles are that conflict and underdevelopment can be mutually reinforcing and that the sources of peace and development are primarily to be found within the domestic sphere, requiring the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law. This discourse points towards a liberal political philosophy containing contemporary tenets used to organise Western societies.
As well as this common vision for development, there exists a strong consensus on the most appropriate processes through which development policies must be constructed and implemented. The ideas of participation, ownership and empowerment entered the development orthodoxy following the reorientation of development at the World Bank in the late 1990s (Pender, 2001, Stiglitz, 1998c). Whilst the implementation of these processes is limited, their inclusion in the development discourse marks a shift in the language used to formulate and justify global development policy. Their inclusion in this new orthodoxy reflected firstly, pressure from civil society to put Southern government and societies in charge of their own development (Whaites, 2002) and secondly, a growing acceptance that governments have a key role to play in national development, whilst civil society has a stake in ensuring that governments deliver services to the poor (World Bank, 2000).

In *A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework*, which was published in 1999 and set out the 'post-Washington consensus', the then World Bank President stated that "I am convinced of the importance of consultation and participation" (Wolfensohn, 1999:1) and that “the governments and people of the countries we serve ... must own the programmes, not us" (ibid:13). The ensuing Comprehensive Development Framework was based upon: "a relationship of partnership between [the World Bank] playing the repositioned institutional role of ‘knowledge bank’, and the borrowing government, which has full ‘ownership’ of policies it chooses to pursue" (Pender, 2001:397). Following the World Bank’s adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the principles of participation and ownership are now evoked by many key bilateral and multilateral development institutions (Bureau for Crisis prevention and Recovery UNDP, 2002:15). The Swedish government, for example, maintains that

The main responsibility for the situation in developing countries rests with the countries themselves. Each country’s own inhabitants and their resources, as well as its own policies and actions to reduce poverty and promote development, are what counts most (Persson and Jamtin, 2004:5).

Likewise, the OECD argues that “reform will not succeed without commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms” (OECD, 2004:2). The principles of ownership and participation are based on the notion that “all development is generated by people within their own societies. In can never come from outside” (Swedish ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b:1). These principles have been embedded in the World Bank/IMF led Poverty Reduction Strategy initiative, which is perceived by the wider development community to be the best way forward for coordinated and
effective global development policy (World Bank and IMF, 2005:3). This is discussed in greater detail below with reference to policy coordination.

The language of ownership and participation appeals to liberal ideas about the intrinsic rationality and rights of individuals, presenting current development policy as more appropriate than the old-style conditionality of the Washington consensus (DFID, 1997:37). DFID take the currently popular view that “genuine partnerships” between poorer countries and the donor community are needed if poverty is to be addressed effectively. The establishment of such partnerships, it argues, moves beyond the old conditionalities of development assistance and requires political commitment to poverty elimination on both sides, whilst onus is put on developing countries to formulate strategy and communicate it to wider civil society (DFID, 1997:37).

Without national ownership and widespread civic consultation and participation, development policy, it is widely agreed, will fail (Cliffe et al., 2003; Council of European Union, 2005:7-8; Danida, 2004:11; DFID et al, 2005:iii; European Commission, 2000:2). If international development engagement “simply requires a government to sign off on a package of dictated reforms, as has often been the case with assistance from the international financial institutions” it will be unsuccessful (USAID, 2002a:48). Without a commitment from a nation’s leaders to control corruption, open the economy, enhance the rule of law and respect basic civil and political rights, “foreign assistance will fail to ignite sustainable development” (ibid:47). The goal of development assistance, it is argued, must therefore be more procedurally democratic and seek to “generate public awareness and debate and to induce government leaders to sit down with opposition and social forces to fashion a package of reforms unique to, and owned by, the country” (ibid:48). Civil society participation, as well as government ownership, are required if development assistance is to succeed in its aims.

The mechanism of participation connects with the idea that development must be a bottom-up process. There is an expectation that pressure from the bottom can facilitate modernisation at the macro-level. For example, according to USAID, the establishment of durable democratic institutions in developing countries can be driven by broad based society movements rather than reforms introduced from above (USAID, 2005a:8). Thus, through their engagement with developing societies, World Bank staff are expected to instil accountability and participation at the community level in order for parliamentary democracy to take root (Bannon, 2005)\textsuperscript{13}. The ‘empowerment’ of civil

\textsuperscript{13}Ian Bannon, Manager, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank, interview with author, February, 2005
society is therefore another key process justified by the discourse. Empowerment involves “increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes” (World Bank, 2007f). It entails poor people being able to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives (ibid). The discourse of empowerment holds that, supported by donors, communities and individuals can ensure the accountability and transparency of their national governments (Ferreyra et al., 2006:88).

The principles of ownership and participation were embedded at the International Conference for the Financing for Development in 2002, at which the World Bank President proclaimed that:

A new generation of leaders is taking responsibility in developing countries. Many of those leaders are tackling corruption, putting in place good governance, giving priority to investing in their people, and establishing an investment climate to attract private capital ... They are doing this not because they have been told to but because they know it is right (Wolfensohn, 2002:84).

The Monterrey Consensus confirmed that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development” (United Nations, 2002:2). Development frameworks must be “owned and driven by developing countries” (ibid:10), which must “first and foremost pursue sensible policies” to ensure economic growth, the expansion of the private sector and the establishment of democracy (Danida, 2003:7). The emphasis on responsibility, empowerment, participation and ownership resonates with liberalism as a form of governance directed towards self-reliance and self-realisation and points towards an ethos of government that attempts to govern life through its freedom (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2007:7-8).

There is evidence therefore of a coherent policy position centred around the primacy of liberal democracy and the appropriateness of the governance mechanisms of ownership and participation. There is a strong shared vision regarding the outcome of global development and agreement over the processes required to achieve this. The sources of development, peace and security are perceived to be largely internal to developing states. To have arrived at this common vision is celebrated by global governance agencies, who advocate the pursuit of coordinated development efforts and argue for greater collaboration between states and inter-governmental organisations such as the UN and OECD (Commission of the European Communities, 2005:2; Persson and Jamtin, 2004:4; United Nations, 2005:Goal 8). Policy coordination
Chapter Five

is the subject of section 5.3, but first we will look at areas of divergence within this liberal discourse.

5.2 Points of Tension within a Liberal Discourse

The liberal development discourse is not entirely homogenous. Points of tension are evident concerning the primacy of neo-liberal economics and the selective inclusion of developing states into aid networks. Whilst there is broad discursive agreement that economic integration is required for economic growth, which is essential for poverty reduction and development, there is tension regarding the pace of integration and the type of economic growth. The World Bank and USAID emphasise the importance of economic integration, whilst the UNDP and SIDA argue that the pace of integration must be appropriate for each specific economy, and whilst USAID encourages the pursuit of economic growth without qualification, the UNDP, SIDA and the UK emphasise that growth must decrease inequality. Furthermore, USAID, Danida and the World Bank advocate channelling aid to states which have demonstrated their commitment to ‘sound’ policies, whereas UNDP and SIDA prefer a universally inclusive approach to the distribution of development assistance.

Despite criticism of the Washington consensus, the global development policy discourse of the World Bank and US continues to advocate neo-liberal economic principles (Thomas, 2004a, Stiglitz, 1998c, Wade 1996). The 2005 World Development Report, published by the World Bank, puts the onus on developing country governments to create a favourable investment climate through ensuring private property rights, removing barriers to competition and ‘inappropriate’ burdens on the private sector. The report warns against government intervention through state ownership or through selective interventions such as market restrictions, but implies that the state’s role is to establish and enforce the rules of the economic game (World Bank, 2004e). The United States agrees, arguing that “[s]uccess in the global economy comes to countries that maintain fiscal discipline, open their borders to trade, privatise inefficient state enterprises [and] deregulate their domestic markets” (USAID, 2002a:11). This discourse holds that globalisation benefits countries by lowering income gaps and improving equality. States which are ‘resistant’ to globalisation, it is argued, have not fared as well as those which have embraced it (ibid:13). Economic growth and economic integration are therefore intrinsically linked by this discourse, and both remain key pillars of US development policy. Furthermore, it is argued that whilst there is scope for implementing pro-poor growth policies, most developing countries have trouble achieving any type of economic growth and therefore poverty
reduction strategies should focus on market-driven economic growth *per se*, rather than pro-poor growth (ibid:54). This logic holds that "an increase in inequality [of income distribution] is not necessarily undesirable", because this often signals that poor people’s income is rising more slowly than rich people, rather than that the poor are getting poorer and the rich getting richer (ibid:58).

UNDP staff, on the other hand, are critical of this approach, arguing that "the assumption that more growth and trade will automatically translate into less poverty is...incorrect" (Vandermoortele et al., 2003:1). As noted by Therien (2005:231), liberalisation of trade can deprive national governments of their capacity to intervene in social matters. The way in which neo-liberal economics is embedded by the World Bank and IMF within the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of developing states, is also criticised (McKinley, 2004:9). Furthermore, the UNDP argues that the integration of developing countries into the global economy is positive only when it produces opportunities and capacities for people, creates jobs, and enhances the social cohesiveness and social capital that in turn reduce poverty and raise human development indices. Conversely, liberalization has often been an important factor in social disintegration (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2005). The UNDP has therefore indicated that it supports temporary import protection for home producers and government interventions in the market where appropriate (Rodrik, 2001). Similarly, SIDA argues that developing countries should "retain some form of tariff protection against the industrial countries" and "be allowed to gradually open their markets in order to safeguard their own production as it evolves" (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003b:5). Integration into the global economy is still perceived as fundamental to development and poverty reduction, but in supporting the maintenance of tariff protection, the UNDP and Sweden focus on enabling Southern governments to selectively and strategically participate in the global economy.

Furthermore, Swedish policy discourse emphasises that growth must be equitable as "income disparities are an obstacle to rapid and effective poverty reduction in many poor countries". According to this argument there must be a system for redistributing resources, and consequently power, if growth is to benefit everybody, and conflict avoided (Persson and Karlsson, 2003:27). In agreement, the UK argues that even when the economy is growing fast, the poor can still be left behind. Inequality, argues DFID, causes social tensions. "Growing now and redistributing the benefits later", it argues, "does not work. Governments need to increase economic opportunities for all from the start" (DFID, 2006:47).
Division between institutions may be indicative of the wider tension between the theoretical underpinnings of neo-liberalism, which characterise the Washington and also the post-Washington consensus, and the liberal political consensus that upholds the supremacy of democratic forms of governance and liberal governance mechanisms. The primacy of the market and the role of government only as an arbitrator can be set against the liberal tendencies of participation and empowerment. Minimal government, whose role is only to set a level playing field, is not conducive to widespread participation in decisions over political and economic policy choices (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; Wilks and Lefrancios, 2002).

This tension has also fuelled competing discourses within global governance agencies. Wade (2002) has suggested that there is conflict within the World Bank between the ‘finance ministry’ agenda (e.g. financial liberalism, opening up economies to free trade and investment) and the ‘civil society’ agenda (e.g. providing economic security for all, reducing in-country inequality and environmental protection as a criterion of investment choices). This tension is acknowledged by staff at the Bank, with the finance agenda often dominating (Fort, 2005). Critics of the Bank agree, and argue that despite the Bank taking on new social commitments, market driven economic growth is still its raison d’être.

The idea of selectively including (and excluding) states on the basis of their adherence to liberal economic and political norms is also a source of disagreement between development agencies. The material dimension of selective inclusion is the subject of the first half of chapter six, however, it is appropriate to discuss this discursive disagreement here to give a comprehensive picture of the key tensions within the global development policy discourse. Whilst there is some agreement amongst the agencies analysed that development depends to a large extent on domestic factors, USAID, Danida and the World Bank strongly argue that the effectiveness of aid is largely dependent upon domestic political and economic factors and in consequence substantially more aid should be given to countries with ‘sound’ political and economic policy records. Aid, they argue, only helps to increase economic growth and foster development in countries with sound economic management and good governance, whilst dispensing aid selectively to reward reforms that a country has already begun to implement, mitigates the potential lack of ownership (Collier, 2002; Danida, 2003; USAID, 2002b; World Bank, 1998a). This is further connected to the belief that the sources of peace and development are to be located within the developing state (USAID, 2002a:107). In a good policy environment, argues the World Bank, financial

14 Lucia Fort, Senior Gender Specialist, Gender and Development Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (World Bank), interview with author, February 2005
assistance is a catalyst for faster growth, more rapid gains in social indicators, and higher private investment (World Bank, 1998a:4). The Bank concludes that "clearly, poor countries with good policies should receive more financing than equally poor countries with weak economic management" (World Bank, 1998a:4). Similarly, Danida’s policy discourse stresses that “[t]he [Danish] Government will strengthen cooperation with programme countries that have shown a willingness to take responsibility for their own development” (Danida, 2003:10). The belief that aid can only be affective in states committed to democracy and economic openness is given further coherence by the idea that aid given to countries with poor economic and governance policies is wasteful and can have negative consequences (ibid). In agreement, USAID maintain that in ‘good’ policy environments, a dollar of aid attracts two dollars in private capital, but in poor environments, aid drives out private capital, perpetuates failed policies and can further undermine governance (Knack, 2001; USAID, 2002a:30).

Other agencies are not so convinced by this selective approach and prefer a softer method to ensure that states are committed to liberal democracy. Whilst, the UK agrees that “[g]ood policy matters for development”, rather than targeting aid towards countries that have demonstrated a prior commitment to democratic governance and open economies, DIFD argues that the best way to ensure ‘good’ policy is a partnership that ensures both donor and recipient have a shared understanding of how aid will contribute to reducing poverty (DFID et al., 2005:1). Similarly, the EC does not advocate selectively targeting aid, but its development policy discourse sets out fundamental values which it expects ‘partner’ countries to share, including democracy, freedom, human rights and participation. Regular political dialogue to prevent situations in breach of these elements is sought, rather than the withdrawal of aid (Commission of the European Communities, 2005:10).

SIDA is unambiguously critical of the selective approach to aid allocation for two reasons: firstly ‘good performers’ do not always continue to be so and in such circumstances the withdrawal of aid is not conducive to long-term sustainable development; secondly, people are still in need in ‘badly performing’ states, and should be supported (Soder, 2005). The UNDP criticises the accuracy and data supporting selective approaches, and points out that the dimensions measured by this approach cannot be quantified or assessed objectively; “the idea that there is some form of discontinuity between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ policies is inappropriate. All policy frameworks form a continuum” (Vandoormoortele, 2004). As such SIDA and the UNDP advocate seeking ways in which development resources can be channelled into

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1 Annika Soder, Swedish State Secretary for Development, interview with author, December, 2005.
countries which are perceived as lacking the pre-conditions needed for development (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003b:7).

Whilst global development policy discourse demonstrates agreement that economic integration and growth are essential to development, differences regarding the pace of integration and importance of equity to economic growth are apparent. The stringent neo-liberal principles advocated by the Washington consensus continue to be upheld by some, but are criticised by others. There is further divergence over the proposal to reward states which have demonstrated a commitment to principles of good governance and market economics. The theory that global development policy discourse plays a central role in unifying global governance networks may imply greater discursive coherence than these tensions suggest (Duffield, 2001a; Soederberg, 2006:36; Wilkin, 2002).

5.3 Policy Coordination around a Liberal Discourse

Despite these differences, global governance actors endeavour to coordinate their global development policy. Coordination beyond the Bretton Woods institutions was not systematically sought until the early 2000s, which saw two major drives towards development policy coordination: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Aid Harmonization process. Each is reviewed in turn to assess the extent to which the global governance complex seeks to coordinate development policy in order to facilitate the realisation of shared objectives that reflect a liberal discourse (Duffield, 2001a:72; Keohane, 1984:51).

The PRSP is the centrepiece of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative formulated by the World Bank and IMF. It was driven by the reform at the World Bank, which sought to prioritise poverty reduction. PRSPs are composed by governments in receipt of aid and detail the national policies for poverty reduction, including the causes of poverty, detailed steps to reduce poverty, and how the success of these steps is to be measured. It is on the basis of the PRSP, and its acceptance by the IMF/World Bank boards, that a country will or will not receive credit. Thus, whilst written by the recipient government, the PRSP must be approved by the World Bank and IMF. The PRSP is intended to be the cornerstone of all donor/creditor relationships.

As a joint project, PRSPs have generated new mechanisms of institutional coordination between the World Bank and the IMF. For example, the PRSP is the basis for lending and debt relief under the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (the IMF’s low-
interest lending facility for low-income countries) and the World Bank bases its Country Assistance Strategy, which sets out the programme of support for a particular country, upon each country’s PRSP.

The PRSP has also been influential beyond Washington. The EU, and the governments of the UK, Sweden and Denmark, are attempting to coordinate their lending around the PRSP (European Commission, 2001:3; Government of Sierra Leone and European Commission, 2003; IDA and IMF, 2002; Jesinghaus, 2004; Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004:4, 2003a:4). Danida, for example, states that PRSPs are the starting point for Danish development assistance (Danida, 2004:23). And according to the DFID the PRSP “has to become and remain the most important document: donors need to subordinate their own documentation to the PRSP” (DFID, 2001:2).

The mechanisms of ownership and participation, as well as good governance, are strongly articulated in the PRSP ethos (Pender, 2001; Thomas, 2004a, Wilks and Lefrancios, 2002; World Bank and IMF, 2005:3). Justification for the PRSP held that it would ensure that government and civil society groups in developing countries took the lead in designing the poverty reduction policies that the Bank and the Fund supported (Anon, 2004). After its launch the IMF and World Bank noted that “armed with poverty reduction strategies, countries become masters of their own development” (World Bank and IMF, 2000). The basic principle of the PRSP approach, argues DFID, is national ownership: “A government will only implement policies that it believes in. So the PRSP has to be written in-country, by the government” (DFID, 2001:2).

As well as greater national ownership, the PRSP is expected to foster deeper donor coordination. A central aim of the PRSP was to move away from the previous situation in which donor countries funded individual projects within developing countries, without any relationship to national development strategy. Individually sponsored infrastructure projects, which typified donor activity in the 1980s, are being replaced with co-ordinated funding for multilaterally approved poverty reduction strategies. The two objectives of national ownership and donor coordination go hand-in-hand. As the PRSP is written by the recipient government (embedding ownership), when donors align their development policies to that of the recipient government, donor coordination is

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16 Jesinghaus, Jochen. Administrator: Relations with the United Nations System, Member States and other OECD donors, DG Development, Interview with author, November 2004

enhanced (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003a:4). The Zambian PRSP process, for example, can “help promote stronger Zambian ownership of the overall development process” and “serve as a platform for improved donor coordination under strengthened Zambian leadership” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003a:4). As such “Sweden intends to use the PRSP as a point of departure for development intervention … and as a basis for future dialogue” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003a:4).

The EC also uses the PRSP as the starting point for their own Country Strategy Papers (CSP) (European Commission, 2001:3). The 2003 CSP for Sierra Leone, for example is “based on the country’s development priorities as expressed in its Interim PRSP” and “will be adapted as necessary as the PRSP process moves forward and the national strategy is refined (Government on Sierra Leone and European Commission, 2003). The Interim PRSP provides the content for the National Policy Agenda section of Sierra Leone’s CSP, and the sector priorities of the paper are fully in-line with the priorities set out in the PRSP. This is also the approach taken by DFID, whose country strategy paper for Vietnam is “closely based around support for the implementation for the PRSP” (Minutes of the Development Committee Meeting, 29th November 2001).

Furthermore, it has been suggested that the EC’s CSPs are written to complement other donors’ support of PRSPs. In the case of Sierra Leone, revival of the economy, as a priority of the PRSP, is already served well by other donors. Therefore the CSP focuses on parts of the PRSP which do not receive high levels of resources, in this case transport infrastructure (Government of Sierra Leone and European Commission, 2003). In addition, interviews confirmed widespread agreement among staff at the EC that, due in large part to the introduction of PRSPs, coordination with the Bank and Fund has increased over recent years (Anon., 2004).18 There are, therefore, clear examples of the mutual adjustment of policies to facilitate the realisation of shared objectives, demonstrating the principle of comparative advantage in delivering global development.

Whilst the UNDP is critical of the macro-economic focus of the PRSPs, as discussed above, it too has become increasingly engaged in supporting the PRSP process in response to requests from developing states. In 2002, 40 UNDP country officers were involved in the PRSP process, up from 11 in 1999. The role of these officers is to ensure that the PRSP process lives up to the commitment to be participatory and

18 Anon, Economic Cooperation and the PRSP Process, DG Development, European Commission, interview with author, November 2004
nationally owned (McKinley, 2004; United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2003). Discursive consensus regarding the concepts of ownership and participation within the global development policy discourse have enabled the World Bank and UNDP to coordinate their activities, such as HIV and gender mainstreaming, around the PRSP, despite the UNDP’s reservations regarding the neo-liberal bias of many PRSPs (UNDP et al., 2009).

USAID has not given the PRSP the centrality it has been awarded by other agencies, and appears more cautious about its capacity to solve the problems related to underdevelopment. It is conceived as a World Bank/IMF project, rather than one that can or should be more widely adopted. Whilst the PRSP has increased policy coordination for a number of development agencies, USAID is less enthusiastic about its ability to deal with underdevelopment and poverty (Bromley, 2009:6; Fox, 2003:2).

The second key mechanism for development policy coordination is the Aid Harmonization process. The UNDP, World Bank, OECD, EC, UK, US, Sweden and Denmark are all key participants of the process, which aims to align the development policy procedures of multilateral and bilateral donors with country owned development frameworks such as the PRSP (Aid Harmonization, 2008a; 2005a). The rationale for harmonisation is to reduce the cost of aid, both in terms of reducing the demand on recipient capacity, and reducing transaction costs for donors and recipients, allowing aid to be more efficient. In turn, it is hoped that this will contribute to meeting the MDGs, as well as increasing the capacity of development agencies to tackle terrorism and insecurity (Aid Harmonization, 2005b; Anon, 2005, Izmestiev, 2005; Jones, 2005, Paniagua, 2004).

This process began in 2003 when the heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions met in Rome for the first High-Level Forum on Aid Harmonization. Participants committed to eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth, and promoting sustainable development, whilst advancing an inclusive and equitable global economic system. In the spirit of ownership, the Rome Declaration also made commitments to ensure that harmonisation efforts are adapted to the country context, donor assistance is aligned with the recipient's development priorities, and conditions attached to aid are streamlined (Aid Harmonization, 2003).

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The *Rome Declaration* was primarily concerned with the administrative actions that donors could take to streamline and harmonise their procedures with other donors, and align their assistance to the recipients’ own national development strategy. The follow-up meeting to Rome took place in Paris in February 2005 (Aid Harmonization, 2005a:2). The Paris High Level Forum reaffirmed the commitments made in Rome and added a more explicit political element, including a commitment to “enhance donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies” (ibid:1). In line with the 2002 *Monterrey Consensus* (United Nations, 2002), the Paris Declaration also sets out a much greater role for Southern states, who committed to exercise leadership in their national development strategies and encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector, as well as establish ‘good’ governance structures (Aid Harmonization, 2005a:3-7). Donors meanwhile committed to “[r]espect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it”, and to “base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures” (ibid:3-4). All parties to the *Paris Declaration* were able to agree on the importance of good governance, including government accountability and democratic institutions, and the centrality of civil society participation in, and national ownership of, the initiation and execution of development programmes, demonstrating the liberal discourse discussed earlier. A third High Level Forum took place in Accra in 2008. The aim of this was to assess the extent to which donors and developing countries were fulfilling the commitments made in Paris. The results of this assessment where mixed and delegates further committed to improve the predictability and transparency of aid. In addition the role of civil society organisation in enhancing aid effectiveness and aid effectiveness in fragile states were discussed (www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness).

**Conclusions**

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the proposition that global governance is united through a liberal consensus, fostering increased coordination between its networks (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2001a:2; Thomas, 2004b; Overbeek, 2005). Through an investigation of global development policy discourse it has sought to shed light on the following research question: to what extent does global development policy discourse reflect a liberal consensus, and coordination around this consensus?

This chapter demonstrates that contemporary global development discourse, rather than being politically neutral or pluralist, gives supremacy to liberal democratic forms of societal organisation. This fits with the idea of global governance as a liberal project
and supports the idea that “the dominance of the liberal paradigm means that ... we should talk more accurately of global liberal governance” (Duffield, 2001a:44; see also Dillon and Reid, 2001; Selby, 2003; Young, 1995).

The Millennium Declaration (United Nations General Assembly, 2000), Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002) and Rome and Paris Declarations (Aid Harmonization, 2005a; 2003) demonstrate that the consensus building activities of intergovernmental organisations have constructed a broadly convergent and coherent policy position centred around the primacy of good or democratic governance, including human rights, the rule of law and accountability (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2001a:74). According to this discourse, establishing liberal democracies in the South provides the key to reducing poverty and sustaining peace, both of which are linked through the security-development nexus, as discussed in chapter four. There is a strong shared vision and logic regarding the outcome of global development that prioritises liberalism as a coherent political position, with individualist and universalist tendencies. The lack of alternatives to this political consensus supports the assertion that “policy now plays the role of politics within global governance” (Duffield, 2001a:73). The logic of this liberal discourse which links democracy, poverty reduction and human rights gives some credence to the view that only one way of life is considered to be valid by the networks of global governance – that which is directed on a liberal path towards self-improvement (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2004a).

This chapter also demonstrated agreement over the governance processes of ownership and participation, required to achieve this. Harrison (2004) terms this second generation reform; rather than development policy being concerned solely with neo-liberal economic reform, how policy is formulated has become as important as the policy itself. The processes of ownership and participation reproduce key liberal ideas such as the sanctity, autonomy and rationality of the individual, as described by Waldron;

> liberals are committed to a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women ... Liberalism is bound up in large part with respect for rationality, with the discipline of self-knowledge and clear-sightedness, and with the celebration of the human capacity to grasp and understand the world (Waldron, 1987:128-133).

Prioritising the processes of ownership and participation implies that the inherent rationality of individuals within developing countries will enable them to come to their own understanding of (liberal) development. This emphasis supports Duffield's
observation that “[p]eople in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves” (Duffield, 2001a:34). Dillon and Reid term this ‘self-orchestration’ and argue that liberal global governance seeks to “govern without government or at least with diminished reliance on ‘rule’... (2001:47). Southern states are expected to commit themselves to a development agenda that includes good governance and poverty reduction because these are perceived to be universally valid, rational objectives. In this sense there is a ‘liberal consensus’, in which moral ideas are transformed into universal justification for development policy (Overbeek, 2005).

In his critique of the relationship between the World Bank and Africa, Harrison (2004) refers to states which have ‘internalised’ the good governance agenda as ‘post-conditionality’ states. Post-conditionality politics, he argues, is both more interventionist and less starkly coercive. As we can see from the policy discourse presented in this chapter terms such as partnership and participation, rather than conditionality or threats, are utilised.

Duffield relates this post-conditionality politics to the “liberal problematic of how much to govern” (Duffield, 2007:6). Following Foucault, Duffield argues that

Too much government ... and the dynamism and creative potential of the life processes on which freedom depends are destroyed. Governing too little ... risks failing to establish the conditions of civility, order and productivity and national well-being which make limited government possibly (ibid:6).

Governing through ‘ownership’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ seeks to establish development whilst avoiding the harsh conditionalities of the Washington consensus period. In addition, Foucault’s discussion of liberalism and freedom is instructive. Liberalism, according to Foucault, is an art of government that can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist. It needs freedom, reasons Foucault, and therefore it must produce it. However, “this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats” (Foucault, 2010:64). This has resonance when discussing the freedoms of ownership, participation and empowerment in the context of global development which is underpinned by an unequal power relationship between North and South including, the debt regime, ODA and preconceived Northern development models (Brohman, 1995).

Whilst there is broad discursive agreement on the political element of this liberal discourse, there are tensions regarding the place of neo-liberal economic prescriptions. This may be indicative of the wider tension between the theoretical underpinning of
neo-liberalism and liberal democratisation, or as Falk puts it, “between the dynamics of economic globalisation ... and the humanist, democratic political orientation of liberal internationalism” (Falk, 1995:563). The UNDP and SIDA prioritise the former, whilst the World Bank and USAID prioritise the latter. As such the claim that neo-liberalism is a common ideological framework needs to be qualified through assessing the different discourses of economic global development policy that these diverging positions produce (Overbeek, 2005). Similarly, Soederberg’s argument that neo-liberal ideology has reached the status of common sense and unites and motivates global governance, may suggest a greater coherence between institutions than is apparent (Soederberg, 2006:36). Furthermore, the US and the World Bank continually justify and produce evidence to support their neo-liberal position, suggesting that neo-liberalism is no longer widely accepted without question in the field of development (USAID, 2002). Whilst acknowledging that they are not as influential as the World Bank or US government, the discourses of the UNDP and Sweden dilute the extent to which neo-liberal economic ideology can be described as a ‘common sense’ position (Duffield, 2001a:30; Overbeek, 2005; Soederberg, 2006).

Larner (2006:205) recognises neo-liberalism as a complex political imaginary, rather than a coherent philosophy. She argues that constructing neo-liberalism as a monolithic apparatus that is completely knowable inadvertently reconstructs its hegemony (ibid:209). This criticism could be levelled at a number of contributors to the securitization of development debate whose conception, not just of neo-liberal philosophy, but of liberal global governance, emphasises coherence (Dillon and Reid, 2002; 2000: Duffield, 2001a: Selby, 2003. In doing so the internally contradictory and contested aspects of global governance are not theorised or engaged with. Assessing the alternative discourse of the UNDP and Sweden using this approach recognises that the discourse of liberal global governance is the outcome of contestation and acknowledges these institutions as “active agents in the process of political-economic change”. As Larner concludes, in acknowledging such complexity we stand a better chance of identifying possibilities to advance social justice (ibid:214).

The tensions regarding neo-liberal policy prescriptions and selective inclusion again set USAID, the World Bank and Denmark on one side and Sweden and the UNDP (and in the case of economic integration, the UK) on the other. The argument for slower and more measured integration into the global economy and universal rather than selective inclusion chimes with the ‘human security’ narrative favoured by the UNDP and SIDA in relation to the security-development nexus (Hettne, 2010) (discussed in chapter four). Human security is best served by slower integration, as rapid economic liberalisation has been shown to increase inequality and decrease security (UNDP, 1999). On the
other hand, prioritising economic growth through integration and the selective inclusion of liberal states is in part underpinned by the notion that insecurity and underdevelopment in the South are a serious threat to international security (the preemptive intervention discourse, discussed in chapter four) (Hettne, 2010). I.e. economic integration is perceived to be fundamental to the creation of stable, peaceful states, as is a commitment to liberal democracy (USAID, 2002a:7).

The human security discourse of the UNDP and Sweden may reject stringent neo-liberal policy, but it does not represent a radical departure from market-orientated economics or a rejection of economic globalisation. Aside from one senior UNDP employee, the assumption that it is domestic economic policy that needs adjustment is broadly accepted throughout the discourse. As Duffield argues, “the notion that underdevelopment may be a function of the structural relationship between rich and poor countries, has more or less been erased from the policy discourse” (Duffield, 2001a:30). Furthermore, the ‘human security’ discourse still seeks to develop, or seeks the self-improvement, of people and societies along liberal lines (Dillon and Reid, 2001). This rationale is invoked in the discourse by terms such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘capacity building’.

Whilst in practice their objectives may be limited, PRSPs and the Aid Harmonization process demonstrate a growing coordination of development governance and policy, validating the claim that, utilising a liberal discourse, the networks and institutions of global governance seeks to coordinate development policy. Shared policy assumptions, such as the idea that democratisation must be a bottom-up process, enable different actors to seek to coordinate their various activities. The rationale of global governance, it is argued, is in part that of “information sharing, comparative advantage and coordination” (Duffield, 2001a:45). Information sharing is a fundamental part of the Aid Harmonization process which also illustrates the perception that global development policy is largely un-contentious, with the possibility that the policies of both donors and recipients are convergent enough to enable the harmonisation of procedures and practices. The principle of comparative advantage in the delivery of global development policy is demonstrated by the PRSP process, through which donors focus on those areas not sufficiently funded by other donors, where their development assistance will have the maximum impact. Global development policy discourse

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During an interview the structural economic constraints on development were fully acknowledged by the Senior Advisor for Employment for Poverty Reduction (Anon, Employment for Poverty Reduction Advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP interview with author, New York 14th February 2005)
therefore has a coordinative function in providing a common language, framework and vision for the construction of policy (Schmidt, 2002:210).

Considering the evidence presented here, to what extent does the idea of liberal consensus enabling policy coordination aid our understanding of contemporary global governance? Firstly, the policy discourse of global development is confined within liberal political and economic parameters, validating the term *liberal* global governance; no alternatives to liberal development are seriously considered.

Secondly, Dillon and Reid (2001; 2000) and Duffield (2010; 2007) develop an understanding of global development as a liberal mechanism of governance. Harrison’s work on post-conditionality politics is instructive here, as is Foucault’s analysis of liberalism and freedom, as discussed (Foucault, 2010; Harrison, 2004). There are limitations to Foucault’s approach however. It tends to sideline the relations of power that the techniques of liberal government imply (Dean, 1999). Chapter seven returns to this discussion.

Thirdly, the securitization of development debate correctly identifies the increasing coordination of global development governance underpinned by a liberal discourse and the security-development nexus.

However, divergence over neo-liberalism – broadly following the divisions regarding the security-development nexus discussed in chapter four - qualifies the idea that neo-liberalism is accepted as common sense amongst the networks of global governance. It also highlights that the liberal discourse of global governance institutions is contested rather than coherent.

The following chapter builds on this analysis and asks weather this liberal discourse has translated into global development practice.
Chapter Six

Selective Inclusion and Liberal Societal Transformation

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which global governance is selectively inclusive and seeks the liberal transformation of Southern societies. This closely follows the investigation of global development policy discourse in the previous chapter, which established a strong liberal discourse amongst global governance actors. This chapter examines whether this discourse has translated into practice, as the securitization of development debate maintains. Global governance, it is argued, is selectively inclusive on the basis of liberal norms and values. This logic is a system of carrots and sticks where cooperation paves the way for development assistance, while non-cooperation risks varying degrees of conditionality and isolation (Duffield, 2001a:34-37): "Through the inclusion (or exclusion) of populations and countries in relation to the flows and networks controlled by donor governments and aid agencies, the aim is to encourage positive behaviour while discouraging the bad" (Duffield, 2002a:1064). International aid agencies, argue Dillon and Reid, “are increasingly making the delivery of aid conditional on the recipient meeting the good governance criteria that global liberal politics specifies for them” (2000:120),

Furthermore, as an ideological response to the security-development nexus, liberal societal transformation is understood as a way of managing non-liberal areas of the South to ensure that they do not pose a threat to the liberal capitalist system. Reflecting the liberal discourse of global governance, this process of transformation is portrayed as one of transition to a liberal democratic state, a liberal civil society and a market economy, involving non-state as well as state actors (Ayers, 2006; Duffield, 2004a; Williams and Young, 1994).

Through a statistical analysis of the relationship between the geographical distribution of development aid and acquiescence of aid recipients to liberal norms, sections 6.1 and 6.2 provide a means to assess the extent to which states that adhere to a liberal framework are likely to receive more ODA than those that do not. In doing so it delivers a test of the claim that global governance is selectively including or excluding on the basis of adherence to certain liberal norms. Section 6.1 is concerned with multilateral ODA and 6.2 with bilateral. In order to evaluate the second part of this claim, section 6.3 comprises a case study analysis of two types of development programmes: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and local level development programmes.
The purpose being to assess the extent to which they are directed towards the liberal transformation of societies in the South.

Whilst the evidence presented offers isolated examples of selective inclusion through aid flows (i.e. Denmark) it does not offer strong or consistent evidence to validate the idea of global governance as a selectively inclusive system, rewarding cooperation through the distribution of aid, although current global development policy discourse indicates some donors may be moving towards this (as discussed in chapter five) (Collier, 2002; Danida, 2003; World Bank, 1998a). This investigation does, however, provide strong evidence to indicate that development programming seeks the liberal transformation of societies in the South, as a response to the security-development nexus. This fundamental process is accurately described within the securitization of development debate, which identifies liberal transformation as a central rationale of global governance in the South (Dillon and Reid, 2000:20; Duffield, 2004a; Williams and Young, 1994). This chapter concludes, therefore, that whilst inducing institutional change through ODA distribution is not strongly in evidence, at the programme level, change in the subjectivities of populations in the South is clearly sought.

6.1 Selective Inclusion: The Relationship between Multilateral Official Development Assistance and Liberal Norms

In order to examine the extent to which global development practice in selectively inclusive, this analysis brings together a wide range of studies that explore the geographical distribution of ODA, supplemented by an original statistical analysis that models the relationship between aid disbursements and the recipient state’s adherence to liberal norms. It asks whether as a state’s commitment to liberal values increases, it is likely to receive more aid. ODA allocation over a 12 year period (1991-2002) from the same global governance institutions used in chapter four is examined. Again, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, as the organisation that allocates the World Bank’s ODA, is used.

As discussed in the thesis introduction, acquiescence to liberal norms is represented by the widely used political rights and civil liberties index, published yearly in the Freedom in the World Survey (http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.htm) (see appendix 3 for list of indicators). All data on ODA is taken from OECD Datasets (available from www.esds.ac.uk). The results of the project are illustrated in the tables throughout this section. Importantly, bold type in a column indicates a statistically significant result,
meaning that the result was unlikely to have occurred by chance. See appendix two for the full research design of this statistical project.

_Sum of multilateral ODA_

With regards to the total aid given by the UNDP, EC, and IDA, figure 19 shows that the results for 1996-2001 are statistically significant, that is, not likely to have occurred by chance. The year 2002 falls just below the 95% threshold.

_Figure 19. Relationship between Sum of Multilateral ODA and Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Recipient_

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<td>Coefficient B</td>
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<td>-.047</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.106</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>-.199</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>-.286</td>
<td>-.243</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>-.180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.029</td>
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This suggests that for total multilateral aid allocation, political rights and civil liberties became more important in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The coefficient generally increases during this time, indicating that this trend became increasingly important from 1996 onward. This supports the view that adherence to liberal norms and values is a prerequisite to acquiring substantial development aid, whereas those countries which do not adhere to these norms may be excluded, and experience decreasing ODA disbursements. The UNDP and EC give very little aid in comparison to the IDA (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm). One would therefore expect the IDA to dominate these results. However, there are no clear patterns linking the results of the sum of multilateral aid and IDA aid (Figure 21).

In 2003, Neumayer examined whether total bilateral and multilateral aid flows take account of human rights covering the period from 1984 to 1995 (Neumayer, 2003c). Human rights are measured firstly, by political and civil liberties and secondly, by personal integrity rights, using the Purdue Political Terror Scales. Only a change in political and civil rights was found to affect total multilateral aid. Countries which improve their index of political and civil rights by one point receive on average a 7% higher share of aid. However, a static higher level of respect for political and civil or personal integrity rights did not correspond to a higher share of multilateral aid. Neither did an improvement in respect for personal integrity rights result in a higher share of aid. This is in line with the finding shown in Figure 19; before 1996, political and civil rights scores did not appear have a bearing on aid allocation. However, Trumbull and Wall (1994) examined total bilateral and multilateral aid flows combined over the 1984-89 period. They conclude that there exists a positive relationship
between political and civil rights, and the receipt of aid, indicating that respect for political and civil rights was rewarded during the 1980s. This suggests some level of selectivity based upon a recipient countries willingness to follow liberal democratic norms.

The International Development Agency

As discussed in chapter five, the World Bank has embraced the idea that resources will be more effective at lifting people out of poverty, if selectively targeted towards those states with ‘sound’ policies (World Bank, 1998a). States which are not experiencing conflict or are in a post-conflict phase and eligible for aid through the Bank’s IDA are allocated aid on the basis of GDP per capita, need for concessional lending, and good performance (World Bank, 2007c). Good performance is measured through the CPIA. Figure 20 shows the CPIA criteria for 2004. The Bank has been using country assessments since the 1970s to help allocate lending resources, but the criteria has evolved over time, and in 1998 was substantially revised to include governance and social policies, reflecting the post-Washington consensus (Operations Policy and Country Services, 2006). In 2003, the Bank and IMF used the concept of ‘good policies’, based on the CPIA index, to identify 18 priority countries for additional aid allocations – ranging from 20 to 100 per cent increases in current ODA levels.

Figure 20. CPIA 2004 Criteria

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<th>A. Economic Management</th>
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<td>1. Macroeconomic Management</td>
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<td>2. Fiscal Policy</td>
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<td>3. Debt Policy</td>
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<td>B. Structural Policies</td>
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<td>4. Trade</td>
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<td>5. Financial Sector</td>
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<td>6. Business Regulatory Environment</td>
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<td>C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity</td>
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<td>7. Gender Equality</td>
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<td>8. Equity of Public Resource Use</td>
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<td>9. Building Human Resources</td>
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<td>10. Social Protection and Labour</td>
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<td>11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability</td>
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<td>D. Public Sector Management and Institutions</td>
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<td>12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance</td>
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<td>13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management</td>
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<td>14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization</td>
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<td>15. Quality of Public Administration</td>
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<td>16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector</td>
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(Operations Policy and Country Services, 2006:3)
Although the IDA does not specifically look at political rights and civil liberties, some of the performance indicators of the CPIA, such as transparency, accountability and the eradication of corruption, are similar (Operations Policy and Country Services, 2006).

However, in the statistical analysis of ODA distribution, political rights and civil liberties do not appear to consistently affect aid disbursement decisions; only two years give significant results. Both suggest that the greater respect a state has for political rights and civil liberties the more aid it will receive from the IDA.

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<td>B</td>
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<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.224</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>-.131</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.508</td>
<td>.368</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.993</td>
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This analysis provides little evidence to suggest that selectivity on the basis of liberal norms is driving Bank decisions about the allocation of ODA. Frey and Schneider (1986) found that aid is allocated largely on the basis of economic policies. Critics of the PRSPs also argue that economic management must be in line with Bank ideals in order to secure funding (Wilks and Lefrancios, 2002). This suggests that the Bank selectively allocates aid on the basis of neo-liberal economics, rather than democratic governance. However, Neumayer (2003d:69-70) has found that the IDA appears to consider both the regulatory burden on the private economy and human rights, when deciding which countries are eligible for receipt of aid. Those with a low regulatory burden and those with greater respect for human rights are considered eligible for aid with greater probability. At the recipient stage (which considers only those states that receive ODA), more aid goes to countries with a greater respect for human rights and personal integrity, but respect for political and civil rights, rule of law, and perceived existence of corruption, do not appear to matter.

The European Commission

The EC does not have a systematic policy discourse justifying the selective inclusion of states which adhere to a liberal framework, though it may be moving towards this (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). Figure 22 shows that political rights and civil liberties are significant at the 95% level for the EC in 1997 and 1999. In both years, the less respect a country has for political rights and civil liberties, the less ODA it is likely to receive. Overall, though, these rights do not appear to have an effect on the allocation of aid from the EC.
This is backed up by other research. Neumayer’s study of aid allocation by multilateral donors from 1991-2000 found no significant relationship between the amount of ODA a state receives from the EC, and respect for political rights and civil liberties (Neumayer, 2003d). This study also failed to find evidence that other good governance indicators are taken into account by the EC, when allocating aid. These indicators included respect for basic human and personal integrity rights, respect for rule of law, regulatory burden imposed on the private economy and perceived existence of corruption.

The United Nations Development Programme

Eric Neumayer attempted to discover the determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and UN agencies, including the UNDP (Neumayer, 2003a). He found that respect for political freedom does not test significantly positive for the UNDP, indicating that this variable is not taken into consideration when allocating aid. Both respect for personal integrity rights and low corruption were also found to be insignificant. As figure 23 illustrates, my findings are in line with Neumayer’s. In each year from 1991 to 2002, political rights and civil liberties are not significant at the 95% level. This indicates that this variable is not taken into consideration by the UNDP when making allocation decisions. In a later study, Neumayer actually found that “if anything, more democratic countries receive less aid from UN agencies” (Neumayer, 2003d:67).

These findings are broadly in line with the UNDP’s policy discourse, which stresses the need for continuing levels of support regardless of a state’s record in these areas. As discussed in chapter five, the UNDP does not profess to select or reward countries on the basis of their adherence to liberal norms, but aims to offer support on the basis of recipient need (Vandemoortele, 2004).
We might expect that the UNDP is more likely to be influenced by recipient need based upon the Human Development Index (HDI). As we can see from figure 24, this is the case in 1994, 1995, and 2002. These years give statistically significant results, indicating that the UNDP was more likely to give more ODA as the HDI decreases. These increases are quite substantial. As the UNDP produces the HDI we may have expected more years to give significant negative coefficients. Neumayer found that the Physical Quality of Life Index, which is similar to the Human Development Index, but does not include GDP, plays a statistically significant role in determining how much aid a country will receive from the UNDP (Neumayer, 2003d).

Figure 24. Relationship between UNDP ODA and Recipient's HDI

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<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
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<td>-1.113</td>
<td>-2.613</td>
<td>-4.959</td>
<td>-3.413</td>
<td>.593</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>-1.404</td>
<td>-1.541</td>
<td>-2.159</td>
<td>.159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.678</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.016</td>
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</table>

In summary, total multilateral ODA provides some evidence to suggest that political rights and civil liberties are increasingly important in ODA allocation decisions. On the other hand, when looked at separately, the World Bank, the EC and the UNDP tend not to allocate more aid on this basis.

6.2 Selective Inclusion: The relationship between Bilateral Official Development Assistance and Liberal Norms

Sum of Bilateral ODA

As figure 25 shows, democracy does not seem to be a consistent determinant of combined bilateral aid, except for a short period during the late 1990s. 1991, 1997 and 1998 give significant negative coefficients. 1999 just misses the 95% significance level.

Figure 25. Relationship between Sum of Bilateral ODA and Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Recipient

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>-.389</td>
<td>-1.116</td>
<td>-1.059</td>
<td>-1.070</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>-1.178</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>-1.231</td>
<td>-1.236</td>
<td>-1.169</td>
<td>-1.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.482</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>.685</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his 2003 study, covering the period 1984 to 1995, Neumayer finds that respect for political and civil rights is rewarded by total bilateral aid, although improvements in respect for political and civil rights is not. The opposite is found to be true in the case of personal integrity rights. Personal integrity rights are statistically insignificant for
total bilateral aid, whilst countries that improve their respect for these rights over time are rewarded by a 4% higher share of aid for every one unit improvement (Neumayer, 2003c).

The United States

Neumayer analysed the total aid given by the US from 1991-2000 and found that at the eligibility and recipient stages, the US favoured those states with a greater respect for political and civil liberties. States with a low regulatory burden on the private economy were also more likely to be eligible for aid. Countries with a greater respect for the rule of law were less likely to be eligible (Neumayer, 2003d). This offers some evidence for the argument that states which adhere to liberal political and economic principles are selectively included into aid networks by the US.

Svensson, in a study that covered the period from 1970 to 1994, found that political and civil rights impacted upon US ODA allocation at the aid eligibility stage (the decision as to which states are eligible for aid), but not at the recipient stage (the decision regarding the amount of aid states will receive) (Svensson, 1999). He concluded that the US pursued “political and strategic goals which have little to do with rewarding democratic regimes … resulting in an insignificant relationship between aid and democracy” (ibid:291).

Whilst Neumayer analysed total US aid, the statistical project conducted for this research looked at each year separately, and indicates that respect for political and civil rights does not have an influence in the years 1991-2002 (Figure 26). None of these years render significant results.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>-.157</td>
<td>-.257</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.199</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>-.149</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td>-.118</td>
<td>-.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.753</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.408</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>.328</td>
<td>.473</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This does not tally with the policy discourse, which was discussed in chapter five (USAID, 2002a:10-11). Since 2002, however, the US government has launched the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) which aims to link aid to ‘sound policies’. The MCA is based on the understanding that development aid can only be successful in developing counties which have demonstrated a strong commitment towards good governance, the health and education of their people and sound economic policies.
(USAID, 2002b). States qualify for aid under the MCA only if they demonstrate commitment in all three policy areas. Based on these principles, the Bush administration has devised 16 eligibility criteria that each country must adhere to before receiving aid (Figure 27). As a result of the MCA, one may find that since 2002 there is a stronger relationship between political and civil rights, and the allocation of US aid.

Figure 27. MCA Performance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governing Justly:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Liberties (Freedom House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political Rights (Freedom House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Voice and Accountability (World Bank Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government Effectiveness (World Bank Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule of Law (World Bank Institute)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investing in People:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Public Primary Education Spending as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Primary Education Completion Rate (World Bank/national sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Expenditures on Health as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Immunization Rates: DPT and Measles (World Bank/UN/national sources)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promoting Economic Freedom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor Magazine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inflation (IMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 3-Year Budget Deficit (IMF/national sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trade Policy (Heritage Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Days to Start a Business (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2006:295; Soederberg, 2004)

Two points can be made here, however. Firstly, Duffield’s original claim pertains to the distribution of development resources in the pre-2002 period, as do the arguments regarding the politicisation of aid made by Dillon (2003:24). Secondly, Woods has found that the MCA has not affected aid flows. She argues that “two years after its creation, no disbursements have been made ... the promised US$2.5 billion is unlikely to survive its 2004 appropriations process since the MCA is unlikely to come close to spending its 2004 appropriation” (Woods, 2005:398).

The United Kingdom

According to Svensson (1999), respect for political rights and civil liberties led to the receipt of higher total aid flows from the UK in the period 1970 to 1994. Alesina and Dollar (2000) confirm Svensson’s findings that the UK rewards democratic governance.
Examining UK aid allocation from 1991 to 2003, Neumayer found that countries with low corruption and a low regulatory burden on the private economy were more likely to be eligible for aid from the UK. No other ‘good governance variable’, including respect for basic human and personal integrity rights, respect for political and civil liberties, respect for the rule of law, or the amount spent by the government for military purposes, had a bearing on eligibility. At the recipient stage, no good governance variable proved statistically significant in relation to UK aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003d). However, in an earlier study which examined aid from 1985 to 1997, Neumayer concluded that during this period the UK did provide more aid to states which respect civil and political rights (Neumayer, 2003b).

The results for the UK from my own research (Figure 28) suggest that respect for political and civil rights is not rewarded by the UK. Only 2001 gave a significant result. In this year it appears that respect for political and civil rights is related to an increased level of ODA. These results may reflect the UK’s policy of engaging with all developing countries on the basis of need, rather than selectively including some on the basis of adherence to liberal norms (DFID et al., 2005).

**Sweden**

As figure 29 illustrates, the results of the study carried out for this research, indicate that respect for political rights and civil liberties has no bearing upon the amount of aid a country receives from Sweden.

This is confirmed by Neumayer, who found that civil and political rights, along with a range of good governance variables, were statistically insignificant at both the aid eligibility and recipient stage in the 1991 to 2000 period (Neumayer, 2003d). This is in
line with Sweden’s policy discourse, which does not advocate rewarding states which adhere to a liberal normative framework (Rabe, 2005). Svensson, however, found that political and civil rights led to the receipt of higher aid flows from Sweden during the 1970-1994 period, but did not impact upon whether a country is deemed eligible to receive aid (Svensson, 1999).

Denmark

According to Svensson, Denmark considers political and civil rights in its aid allocation decisions, such that in the 1970-1994 period, Denmark allocated higher total aid flows to states that respected these rights. For the years 1997-2001, the statistical analysis conducted for this thesis indicates that respect for political rights and civil liberties is negatively correlated with aid flows (Figure 30). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, therefore, it appears that democracy was taken into account and rewarded in Denmark’s ODA allocation decisions. These results also indicate a change of policy between 1996 and 1997. The coefficient becomes much stronger in 1997 and is highly significant. It appears that, from 1997, countries which have little respect for political right and civil liberties could expect less ODA from Denmark.

Figure 30. Relationship between Danish ODA and Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Recipient

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient B</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.340</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>-.183</td>
<td>-.514</td>
<td>-.473</td>
<td>-.416</td>
<td>-.497</td>
<td>-.465</td>
<td>-.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is in line with Danish policy discourse. As noted in chapter five, Denmark has moved towards a policy of re-prioritising development assistance to take account of what it calls ‘sensible policies’, including those which establish fundamental rights of freedom, democracy and good governance (Danida, 2003).

Since 2002, Denmark has further restructured its development assistance in order to take account of the research suggesting that aid effectiveness is reliant upon domestic policies (Danida, 2003:7). As a result, 15 selected programme countries received 68.2% of Denmark’s bilateral development assistance in 2003, as follows.

21 Patrick Rabe, Deputy Director, Head EU-Coordinator, Division for Global Development, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with author, October 2005
Figure 31. Denmark’s Programme Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Country</th>
<th>Share of bilateral development assistance</th>
<th>Programme Country</th>
<th>Share of bilateral development assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Danida, 2004:26)

We may therefore expect that the pattern of aid giving found in this study to continue.

Neumayer actually found that levels of democracy do not appear to have a bearing on the amount of aid a country received from Denmark, although he took total ODA for the years 1991-2000 as the dependent variable (Neumayer, 2003d). He also found that, at the eligibility stage, Denmark appeared to select countries with a high respect for human and personal integrity rights, and a low military expenditure, with greater probability. Countries with a low regulatory burden were also more likely to be eligible for aid. In his conclusion Neumayer remarks that “[o]ne striking result of this study is that a difference between the like-minded countries, which have a reputation of putting emphasis of good governance, and other donors, is not found” (Neumayer, 2003d:98). This is confirmed in a second study which also found no difference between the like-minded countries and others donors, concerning the impact of respect for personal integrity rights on aid allocation. Of these results Neumayer notes that “[t]his stands in striking contrast to the self-proclaimed commitment of the like-minded countries with respect to the importance of human rights in their development assistance” (Neumayer, 2003a). However, Neumayer does not consider that the like-minded countries actually have very different policies regarding selectivity allocating aid on the basis of good governance, as discussed earlier (Danida, 2003; Soder, 2005).

In summary, Danish ODA provides some evidence to suggest that political rights and civil liberties are increasingly important in deciding how much ODA to allocate to recipients. Neumayer has found the same for the US, although this analysis does not confirm his findings. On the other hand, Sweden and the UK tend not to allocate more aid to states with a greater respect for political rights and civil liberties in the 1991-2002 period.

__________________________

22Aniker Soder, Swedish State Secretary for Development, interview with author, October 2005
6.3 Liberal Societal Transformation at the Programme Level

Liberal societal transformation is understood as a way of managing non-liberal areas of the South to ensure that they do not pose a threat to the liberal capitalist system: in order to avoid future instability and conflict, societies must be transformed in line with liberal modernity (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001a:22). Rather than proposing that liberal change has or is actually taking place, the literature holds that it is a central objective of global governance. In order to evaluate this claim, this section comprises a case study analysis of two types of development programmes. This allows a deeper understanding of the characteristics, patterns and nuances of these programmes, in order to examine the extent to which they are directed towards liberal societal transformation, as constructed within the securitization of development debate. As discussed in the thesis introduction, the two types of development programmes examined are Security Sector Reform (SSR) and local level development programmes.

Evidence on these cases was gained through an examination of primary and secondary evidence. The former includes documents published by the funding/implementing agency describing the aims and methods of particular projects and programmes, or reviewing the success and limitations of, and lessons learned from, them. Information regarding the case studies was also elucidated in interviews with members of staff in key global governance agencies. Secondary evidence consists of reports produced by academic institutions and through journals evaluating SSR and local level development programmes.

SSR and local level development programmes are examined using three questions which correspond to the claims made within the debate regarding societal transformation: to what extent are SSR and local level development programmes directed towards transforming behaviour, attitudes and beliefs in accordance with a liberal discourse? What is the role of non-state actors in relation to these programmes? And to what extent are they directed towards the pursuit of peace and stability in developing societies? Each programme is examined in line with these three questions; first SSR, followed by local level development programmes.

Security Sector Reform

SSR is currently on the agenda of a number of major development institutions, including the OECD, the UNDP, the World Bank and DFID. It is related to the idea of good governance, and is concerned with increasing the ability of states in the South to
“meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with
democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and rule of law”
(OECD, 2004:1). According to the OECD, the security system includes defence,
intelligence, policing, and judicial and penal institutions, as well as elected authorities
responsible for the control and oversight of security, such as parliament, the executive
and the defence ministry (ibid:11). The UNDP calls this justice and security sector
reform (JSSR), and uses the OECD’s definition of SSR, whilst adding that armed
opposition groups, traditional militias, private security firms, civil society, and the
media are all part of the justice and security community (Bureau for Crisis Prevention
and Recovery UNDP, 2002). The objective of JSSR is to “strengthen the ability of the
sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to provide an accountable, equitable
and rights respecting public service” (ibid:5). As such, the DFID aims to help countries
“manage their security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective
way by initiating and supporting reform and providing appropriate education and
training” (Bell, 2003:30). The discourse of SSR therefore links strongly to the idea of
liberal development and also incorporates the principles of ownership and
participation from the post-Washington consensus. The UNDP, for example, maintains
that JSSR programmes must be locally designed, locally implemented, and locally
evaluated (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery UNDP, 2002:15). Whilst for the
OECD, the SSR processes must build a nationally-owned and led vision of how the
security sector should be constructed and function (OECD, 2004).

SSR is conducted through discrete projects, larger programmes containing multiple
projects, or through more general development programmes not solely concerned with
SSR. SSR programmes and projects are often jointly funded and sometimes jointly
managed. Figure 32 shows the examples used in this case study. These examples
reflect the projects and programmes on which information is available. At least one
project funded and/or administrated by each of the global governance institutions
used in this research (excluding the OECD and Denmark)\textsuperscript{23} is examined. As the most
vocal and public champion of SSR in the international arena, DFID provides a number
of examples (Williams, 2005). These projects and programmes are wide ranging in
terms of aims, donors/administrators and beneficiaries and therefore should give a
strong indication of SSR as a whole.

\textsuperscript{23} The OECD does not fund global development programmes. Denmark does use development
resources for a small number of SSR programmes. However, the information on these
programmes was provided by the Danish government under instruction that it was confidential
and could not be used for publication.
To what extent are Security Sector Reform Programmes directed towards Transforming Behaviour, Attitudes and Beliefs in accordance with a Liberal Discourse?

To establish democratic accountability and transparency in the security sector is one of the key aims of SSR (Ginifer, 2004). The terms ‘professional’, ‘accountable’ and ‘transparent’ are fundamental in describing the type of security sectors these projects and programmes aim to create (Ball et al., 2007; Ginifer, 2004). The UK’s SSR project in Sierra Leone, for example, aimed to “establish effective and disciplined armed forces, controlled and accountable to the democratic government of Sierra Leone” (Ball et al., 2007:84). The project sought to “develop appropriate legal and institutional frameworks for national security and defence, including civil leadership, transparency and accountability in the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence” (ibid:1). SSR projects administering police training also reflect this liberal discourse. The UN devised Peace Building and Recovery Strategy in Sierra Leone includes strengthening the capacity, accountability and loyalty of the Sierra Leone Police, and strengthening the rule of law.
Similarly, the purpose of DFID’s Jamaican Constabulary Reform and Modernization Project (JCRMP) was to transform the organisational culture of the police force through improved transparency, integrity and public confidence (Department for International Development Caribbean, 2000:8). As such this project explicitly sought a change in the behaviour and attitude of police officers (ibid:26), as did the UK’s SSR approach in Nepal which committed to “[s]trengthen security and access to justice at the community level, by helping the Nepal police become more accountable” (DFID, 2004:16).

An integral part of creating accountable and transparent security sectors in the South is to reduce corruption. In this respect the Azerbaijani judiciary is targeted by the World Bank’s Judicial Modernisation Project which aims to address efficiency, integrity and corruption (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia, 2006:4). To contribute to the Azerbaijani government’s anti-corruption programme, this project is directed towards ‘cultural’ and ‘mindset’ change within the judiciary, through education and training (ibid:5).

A number of SSR programmes, including DFID’s project in Sierra Leone and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), aim to ensure democratic control and civilian oversight of the security sector (Ball et al., 2007:84). As part of the latter, the UN has assisted the government in restructuring the police force in line with democratic policing and developing a civilian police training programme (UNMIL, 2004-2006). Such programmes strive to ensure adherence to the principles of civil supremacy, accountability and transparency (Williams, 2005:8).

Embedding respect for human rights into the security sector is a major aspect of SSR, particularly with regard to the police and armed forces. In order to address the poor human rights record of the army in Sierra Leone, for example, the UK government has made international law a compulsory part of armed forces training; through this training programme international law is presented in a way that is sympathetic to the human rights approach (Ginifer, 2004:18). Furthermore, as part of the UNMIL SSR programme, the Liberian national police force are educated in aspects of human rights law, issues of gender and the protection of vulnerable groups such as women and children (Aboagye and Bah, 2004). This training programme aims to affect the attitudes and norms of those individuals subject to it. In addition, in order for serving police officers to be retained in the Liberian National Police, they are subjected to a screening process to ensure that they do not have a tainted human rights record (Aboagye and Bah, 2004:11). The UK’s police reform programme in Jamaica
also involves the creation of a transparent and accountable “human rights-
respecting public service” and aims to build and sustain trust and confidence
between the public and the police (Department for International Development
Nigeria aims to support “action-focused research on women’s rights under
sharia law” (DFID, 2007:4).

It can be inferred from the programmes discussed thus far, that SSR is directed
towards liberal state building through, for instance, creating democratically
accountable police and armed forces (Ball et al., 2007). SSR reform in Afghanistan
provides further evidence of this. Sedra reports that carrying guns has become an
inalienable part of Afghan culture; they are fired into the air at celebrations, and are
the principle guarantor of property and physical security, as well a source of income
through militia activity (Sedra, 2002:37-38). The coalition forces have attempted to
transform this aspect of Afghan culture through the National Disarmament
Commission. This transformation is in line with liberal theories of the state in which
civilians relinquish the right to distribute justice, to a liberal democratic state (Waldron,

There is also evidence to suggest, however, that the creation of democratically
accountable security sectors may not always be the unconditional priority of donors. In
Afghanistan, the United States trains not only the centrally controlled Afghan National
Army as an integrated part of the coalitions SSR approach, but also trains and funds
‘anti-Al Qaeda units’, which are drawn from the militias of local warlords (Sedra, 2002).
This, it is argued, has undermined the Afghan National Army, and fostered resentment
amongst its ranks, whose rate of pay is less than that of the anti-Al Qaeda units.
Furthermore, the provision of training and equipment to rural militias, loyal to
recalcitrant warlords, has strengthened these warlords at the expense of the Afghan
National Armies centralising drive (ibid). In this case, one US security interests – the
destruction of Al Qaeda – is given precedence over another - the creation of a stable,
liberal democratic nation state of Afghanistan.

Whilst liberal transformation is evident, some SSR programmes do take into account
what might be referred to as traditional justice and decision-making systems and,
rather than replacing them with Western models, actually enhance them. The DFID’s
Access to Justice Program in Nigeria reportedly “encompasses informal as well as
formal policing structures … [and] emphasises work with traditional justice, alternative
dispute resolution, and lower courts, on all of which poor people depend” (Stone et al.,
2005:4). Furthermore, as part of their SSR approach in Nepal, DFID committed to
“[s]trengthen security and access to justice at the community level ... by supporting community mediation” (DFID, 2004:16). DFID also supports and trains Village Development Committees to act as courts of first instance for the settlement of civil disputes through arbitration and mediation (Stone et al., 2005:15). These practices may be liberal, but may not be Western. Donors are not willing to support non-liberal practices, but they may be willing to support non-Western ones. However, it must be noted that in some cases, what donors might consider to be traditional justice systems can be used as political tools by central government, and as a façade for eliciting donor funding for ‘participatory’ projects (Oomen, 2005).

Stone reports that when a holistic approach and domestic commitment for change is lacking, the success of SSR is severely limited (Stone et al., 2005:20-21). The DFID’s police development project in Nepal made only minimal progress partly because there was no “champion for change in the government”, who was in a position to exercise authority across multiple institutions in the security and justice sector (Stone et al., 2005:21). Similarly, central government politicians and civil servants are often reluctant to cede power to local governments and communities. Reforms that curtail their authority may, for example, threaten their capacity to extract rents (Manor, 2004).

On the other hand, the desire for liberal transformation is often endogenous. Rather than being introduced by development agencies, change within the security sector is often driven from within the domestic society. The Jamaica Constabulary Reform and Modernisation Project (JCRMP), for example, was funded at the request of the Jamaican government and designed by the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) (Department for International Development Caribbean, 2000:17). Similarly, in 1999, the president of Sierra Leone requested that a UK senior police officer be appointed Inspector General of Police, in the hope that she/he would “create space in which to develop a new generation of un-corrupt, untainted Sierra Leone police leaders” (Stone et al., 2005:18). In these cases, those domestic actors driving the change are already committed to principles of human rights, accountability and legitimacy.

In summary, SSR programmes aim to establish accountability and transparency through changing the behaviour and attitudes of those working within the security sector. In this way, such programmes contribute to efforts towards liberal state building in the South. However, such efforts are often endogenous and at the same time, SSR programmes do sometimes support traditional justice and decision-making systems. However, donor priorities may clash with SSR priorities. For this, and other reasons, (such as the lack of domestic will) the success of SSR is limited.
What is the Role of Non-State Actors in relation to Security Sector Reform programmes?

In some cases non-governmental actors are involved in SSR through public consultation on the construction, implementation and evaluation of a project. For example, the World Bank’s Judicial Modernisation Project in Azerbaijan “benefited from preliminary consultations with community associations … and with NGOs working in the sector (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia, 2006:79). In other cases, private-sector actors are employed to facilitate SSR programmes. The DFID engaged UK Management Consultants (UKMC) to ensure the successful delivery of the JCRMP. They were employed to

... provide strategic support and planning to allow a structured programme of reform and modernisation to occur within the JCF. To this end, the UKMC will develop contacts with key stakeholders within the JCF, the community and the Government of Jamaica … The UKMC will undertake work on behalf of the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) under contract with DFID” (Department for International Development Caribbean, 2000:39-40).

Local non-state actors may be asked to participate in discussions regarding the implementation and evaluation of programmes, whilst Northern private actors may be employed to facilitate programmes. These examples illustrate the type of role non-state actors can play in SSR programmes. However, Stone reports that in Nigeria, there is a reluctance on the part of the security sector to engage with Nigerian civil society, of whom they are very suspicious (Stone et al., 2005:9). And in Sierra Leone, civil society is very distrustful of the army, which committed many human rights abuses during the recent conflict. Therefore, whilst non-state actors from both the North and South are engaged with SSR, the relationship between state and non-state actors can be antagonistic.

To what extent are Security Sector Reform programmes directed towards the pursuit of Peace and Stability in Developing Societies?

Aside from contributing to the creation of liberal democratic state structures which, as discussed in chapter four, are connected to sustaining peace and stability, there are specific mechanisms through which SSR programmes pursue peace and stability in states which have recently experienced, or are experiencing, conflict. A key mechanism for this is the imposition of ethnic or geographic quotas in the recruitment of armies and police forces (Sedra, 2002). Aboagye and Bah report that in an attempt to reduce
the number of Liberian police officers who entered the service under Charles Taylor’s patronage, individuals who entered the service after his 1997 election were not eligible for the UNMIL’s police training programme (Aboagye and Bah, 2004). The aim was to create a police force which is not based on loyalty to class, tribe or family, but on meritocracy. Furthermore, the recruitment process factors in ethno-geographic balance, aiming to minimise suspicion of domination of the police force by members of one ethnic group or geographical area of the country (ibid:11).

A second key mechanism of SSR’s contribution to peace and stability are Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. In Afghanistan, this process began in 2003 and engaged in the cultural transformation of Afghan militia groups and soldiers by providing vocational training and opportunities for demobilised personnel (Sedra, 2002). They could, for example, get a loan to start a small business or receive vocational training in construction, tailoring or carpentry or join the Afghan National Police or Afghan National Army (UNAMA, 2004a). The aim of this programme was to reintegrate armed groups back into society and ensure that individuals have the opportunity to pursue peaceful employment, removing the economic incentive to re-take up arms (Sedra, 2002).

A stable, democratically controlled security sector is conceived as paramount in the creation of peaceful states and SSR programmes are expected to contribute to this through creating non-partisan police and armed forces, which do not reflect the pre-peace power structures, through disarmament and through the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

SSR largely involves transformation at the level of the state (e.g. of police and armed forces) and this discussion will now move on to examine liberal societal transformation within local level development programmes, which entails transformation at the community level.

Local Level Development

Local level development programmes usually involve improving local services or infrastructure through locally designed and implemented projects, funded by donors. The World Bank appears to be the leader in the local level development approach with its Community-Driven Development (CDD), and Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programmes (World Bank, 2008a). The UNDP employs a similar approach termed ‘community empowerment’ (UNDP, 2008). World Bank and UNDP programmes are the
subject of the majority of the literature on local level development and as such these
two institutions provide the cases discussed in this analysis. Examples from a range of
Southern states are included, but the choice of programmes is to some extent dictated
by the availability of literature on local level development programmes.

CDD and CDR involve empowering communities, including local governments and
NGOs, to make decisions regarding their own development and giving them
responsibility for development resources. For example, communities are provided with
untied funds, allowing them to finance their own priorities. According to the World
Bank local populations and local institutions are the key players in project planning,
execution and development. And whilst CDD typically tries to improve low level service
provision and community infrastructure, CDR generally has to “rebuild from zero, in a
situation of great flux in the economy and institutional services” (Cliffe et al., 2003:2).
Both CDD and CDR seek to empower “communities to identify their needs, decide on
projects to address these needs, manage resources and contracts, monitor
implementation, and evaluate outcomes” (ibid:2). CDD programmes, it is argued,
operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance and greater
downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity (World Bank, 2008a).

In line with the World Bank’s CDD programmes, the UNDP’s community empowerment
programmes promote community chosen priorities, the involvement of traditional
leaders, civil society and the individual, and community contribution and participation
in the projects’ implementation (Schuften, (n.d):1; UNDP, 2008).
Figure 33 introduces the programmes discussed in this section.

**Figure 33. Local Level Development Projects and Programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Project Beneficiary</th>
<th>Project donor/administrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KALAHI Programme</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Filipino Communities, Philippines</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kecamatan Development Project</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Rural Communities, Indonesia</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Reintegration and Development Project, Rwanda</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Rwandan Communities, Rwanda</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Partnership for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Urban Poor Communities, Bangladesh</td>
<td>UNDP and Bangladesh Ministry of Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Social Action Project, Burundi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Vulnerable Poor Groups, Burundi</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirajgani Local Government Development Fund Project</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Local government and communities, Bangladesh</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Empowerment Project</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>World Bank and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Decentralisation and Community Development Project</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Rwandan Communities, Rwanda</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Community Driven Development Project, Benin</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Poorest Communities, Benin</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To what extent are Local Level Development Programmes directed towards Transforming Behaviour, Attitudes and Beliefs in accordance with a Liberal Discourse?

Local level development programmes, to a large extent, reflect a liberal discourse. The objective of local level development programmes is to ensure legitimacy and transparency in community decision making, embedding the processes of ownership and participation. The principles of the KALAHI programme in the Philippines (Figure 34), a showcase CDD programme for the World Bank, demonstrate this. Ownership, participation, legitimacy and transparency are key aspirations of the KALAHI programmes, and reflect the values of liberal democracy, as discussed in chapter five.
Participation and empowerment are also features of the Decentralization and Community Development Project in Rwanda. This project aims to embed participation through formalised channels, ensuring that women and youth are represented in the decision making processes of development projects, thus empowering vulnerable groups (World Bank, 2004d). The objective of this project is to make communities the driving force of development, illustrating the desire to make development a bottom-up process and reflecting the liberal discourse discussed in chapter five. In order to fulfil this aim, the project sought to strengthen economic and financial planning and management capacity at the local levels (ibid:1).

Similarly, the Bank’s Kecamatan Development Project in Indonesia aims to mobilise and develop the capacity of rural communities to take a more active role in building small scale infrastructure and improving social services (McNeil and Woolcock, 2005). This project involved “fundamental changes in people’s attitudes, perceptions, values and behaviour” and sought to transform societies through embedding the values of ownership and legitimacy (ibid:3). These liberal principles are also apparent in the UNDP’s local level development programmes. The UNDP’s Sirajganj Local Government Development Fund (SLGDF) project in Bangladesh aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of allocating funds directly to local government and of allowing the local community to participate in identifying development priorities. In doing so it is hoped

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Figure 34. Principles of the KALAHI Programme

| **Localized Decision-Making.** | All decisions about community projects are taken in public forums and meetings. |
| **Empowerment.** | Communities take ownership of all aspects of projects, from planning and decision-making, to implementation. |
| **Transparency.** | The community knows every aspect of project decision-making. Financial management of project funds is open and shared with the entire community. |
| **Competition.** | Villages in a municipality submit proposals to inter-village forums for funding. Representatives of the local people prioritize the proposals in the forums based on collectively agreed criteria. |
| **Institutional Capacity-Building.** | Formal and informal institutions working in the villages and municipalities will be encouraged to participate in project planning, implementation and maintenance. |
| **Demand-Driven.** | Options for community projects are based on open menus. Communities can ask for funding for any development activity they want, except environmentally and socially harmful activities. |
| **Socially Inclusive.** | Whole communities—not just a few families—have the opportunity to be involved in decision-making. Special efforts are taken to ensure the active participation of women and the poor. |
| **Simplicity.** | All decision-making, financial procedures, and rules of the project, are simple so that local people can easily understand them and become fully involved. |
| **Sustainability.** | Operational and maintenance plans are prepared prior to project implementation. At the municipal level, local governments are encouraged to adopt community-driven approaches. |

(World Bank, 2005)
that resource allocation and development initiatives will directly reflect the needs of the local population. In addition, local governments can receive a 15% increase in funds if they institute mechanisms that ensure accountability and transparency in the management of projects (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2005). Through such initiatives, the SLGDF seeks to embed participation, transparency and accountability in local government and communities.

The World Bank’s National CDD Project in Benin provides another example of the pursuit of societal change within a liberal framework. Its objective is to improve the access of the poorest communities to basic social and financial services (World Bank, 2004c). Under this project, local communities will initiate, develop and implement their own sub-projects and on completion will have the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating them. The World Bank provides funds to strengthen the capacity of communities to enable them to manage these sub-projects. In this context, building capacity includes the introduction of democratic practices such as community ownership and having active community organisations that are representative and transparent (World Bank, 2004c).

These local level development programmes reflect the consensus on the pursuit of liberal democracy, specifically the principles of transparency and legitimacy, and the mechanisms of ownership and participation, linked to development as a bottom-up process.

What is the Role of Non-State Actors in relation to Local Level Development Programmes?

Non-state actors play a key role in many local level development programmes. In the KALAKI programme in the Philippines, for example, NGOs were a source of project staff and resources, monitoring the project using their own funds and assisting communities in the process of implementation (World Bank, 2005:38). NGOs also had a function within the Decentralisation and Community Development Project in Rwanda as part of the committee charged with addressing the devolution of ministerial functions to the local level (World Bank, 2004d:3). And in Burundi, a local NGO, Twitezimbere, co-manages World Bank funds for the Community Rehabilitation Project, with the UNHCR (Cliffe et al., 2003).

As well as having administrative and delivery functions, NGOs can also be the target of local level development programmes. For example, an objective of the UNDPs Local
Partnership for Urban Poverty in Bangladesh is to build the capacity of “people’s representatives and NGOs to respond to the needs of the urban poor” (UNDP/UN Habitat, 1998:1).

These examples demonstrate that NGOs are supportive of donor’s local level development programmes, and that donors recognise and want NGOs as key partners in local level development (Cliffe et al., 2003; UNDP/UN Habitat, 1998:1; World Bank, 2005:38).

**To what extent are Local Level Development Programmes directed towards the pursuit of Peace and Stability in Developing Societies?**

At the World Bank, CDD and CDR programmes are strongly linked to post-conflict reconstruction and are conceived as two of the best mechanism for ensuring conflict does not re-occur (Cliffe et al., 2003). It is argued that within post-conflict societies there is an opportunity to “re-define the social and institutional relationships that led to the conflict in the first place” (ibid:1). The World Bank is concerned with establishing community level governance that breaks away from the discrimination which may have occurred pre-conflict. One example of this is the Timor-Leste Community Empowerment Project, funded by the World Bank, which stipulated that village heads linked to the pre-conflict resistance movement were not allowed to serve on local development councils unless they relinquished their roles within the resistance organisations (ibid:9). Furthermore, to avoid domination of the councils by one leader or their identification with one political force, traditional leaders, ex-Indonesian village heads and the heads of resistance structures cannot be candidates in community council elections (ibid:8).

The Community Reintegration and Development project in Rwanda is another example of local level development linked to peace and stability. This project sought to assist returnees and other vulnerable groups, post-conflict, through a process of community-based reintegration and development. It aimed to strengthen the capacity of local communities to implement development projects (World Bank, 1998b:1). As such, Community Development Committees were elected as the central decision making body within the project, each with a women’s and youth representative (Cliffe et al., 2003:8).
These programmes therefore aim to tackle representation and legitimacy at the local level and, in an attempt to establish peace and stability, are concerned with ensuring that new structures of local representation differ from those of the pre-conflict era.

**Conclusions**

In order to assess in what ways the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance, the purpose of this chapter was to investigate the extent to which global governance is selectively inclusive and seeks the liberal transformation of Southern societies. Through an investigation of the distribution of development aid, this chapter has shed light on the validity of the claim that, for Southern states, cooperation with a liberal development agenda paves the way for development assistance, while non-cooperation risks isolation (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001a:37). An examination of two types of development programmes in section two assessed the claim that as a response to the security-development nexus, “development policy engages the broad process of social and political change within recipient countries” (Duffield, 2001a:39).

To what extent, then, does the distribution of aid validate the claim that global governance is selectively inclusive on the basis of liberal norms? When multilateral ODA disbursements are regressed as a sum, political rights and civil liberties appear to be a determining factor, with democratic countries likely to receive more aid than non-democratic ones. And, in contrast to the research for this study, Neumayer found that US total aid favoured states with a greater respect for political and civil rights in the period 1991-2000. Danish ODA offers the clearest evidence that, in order to access substantial development assistance, states are expected to govern within a liberal normative framework. Danish ODA distribution appears to demonstrate a change of policy in the late 1990s, corresponding with the observation that aid had been politicised (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; Woods, 2005). The geographical allocation of multilateral, Danish and American ODA therefore offers some evidence to substantiate the idea of global governance as a selectively inclusive system, suggesting that for these donors “[s]outhern governments and project partners now have to show themselves fit for consideration” in order to receive development aid (Duffield, 2001a:7).

However, aid allocated by the EC, UNDP, IDA, Sweden and the UK (and the US in the research carried out for the purpose of this study) does not appear to be based upon the adherence to a liberal framework; countries with a greater respect for political
rights and civil liberties are not likely to receive any more aid than those which are less
democratic. ODA allocation from individual multilateral donors, the UK and Sweden
cannot be fully explained by the logic of selective inclusion.

Conversely, there is strong evidence that current development programming is
directed towards the liberal transformation of populations in the South. Section three
examined the extent to which SSR and local level development programmes are
orientated towards this goal through addressing three questions: to what extent are
SSR and local level development programmes directed towards transforming
behaviour, attitudes and beliefs in accordance with a liberal discourse? What is the role
of non-state actors in relation to these programmes? And to what extent are they
directed towards the pursuit of peace and stability in developing societies?

In respect to question one, both SSR and local level development programmes reflect
the global development policy discourse that gives primacy to liberal democratic
governance, ownership and participation. They seek to change behaviour, attitudes
and beliefs, through embedding principles of empowerment, accountability, legitimacy,
transparency and respect for human rights (Ball et al., 2007; Ginifer, 2004; Williams,
2005). SSR involves transforming the composition of security institutions with the aim
being to create a security sector that is not based on loyalty to class, tribe or family,
but on meritocracy; a fundamental principle of liberalism (Ayers, 2006). And local level
development projects seek to ensure the representation of vulnerable groups in
community decision making and enable communities to drive democratic change
(McNeil and Woolcock, 2005; World Bank, 2004d).

Such programmes imply that with the correct information and resources, communities
have the capacity to make the right (liberal) choices about their lives. Furthermore,
these programmes support the argument that development is no longer concerned
with promoting economic growth in the hope that development will follow, but is
better described as “an attempt, preferably through cooperative partnership
arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of the people
within them” (Duffield, 2001a:42). Effecting social transformation appears to be a
direct and explicit policy aim (Duffield, 2001a:39). These programmes also strongly
demonstrate the assumption, evident within the global development policy discourse
(chapters four & five), that development problems are endogenous rather than
exogenous to a particular society. The KALAHI programme in the Philippines, for
example, pursues a bottom-up approach that focuses on enabling communities to
identify and rectify problems of underdevelopment (World Bank, 2005).
However, while that idea of liberal societal transformation gives the impression that transformation is something that external actors are doing to southern states and societies, in reality, of course, there are domestic actors pushing for liberal transformation from within these societies. Whilst Duffield does note that “[p]eople in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves” (ibid:34), the context in which this is written implies that coercion is employed through the threat of exclusion. This in turn obscures the idea that there are actors pushing for liberal transformation from within Southern societies without the need for external motivation. The idea that domestic actors do not willingly initiate transformative liberal agendas cannot be sustained (Stone et al., 2005:18). If communities were to propose a local level development project antithetical to the liberal political consensus of global development policy, it may not be supported by Western donors. However, it does not necessarily follow that local level development programmes are solely part of a global governance project. The KALAHI project, for example, has wide media and local NGO support and whilst it may be in line with the desire of global governance to create liberal societies, it also appears to be in line with the desires of poor communities in the Philippines (Kaligbak, 2002; Sun Star, 2005a; 2005b; 2006; The Philippine Star, 2002). It is difficult to sustain the argument that local level development projects (with untied funds) which are initiated, managed and used by local communities are exclusively part of a global governance project of transformation. As Cooper writes “humanitarian discourses, however arrogant in intent, only transformed social relations if they resonated with something on the ground” (Cooper, 2001:35). Duffield is able to envisage home-grown transformative non-liberal networks of authority and legitimacy in the South, as discussed in chapter three, but this obscures the possibility of home-grown liberal transformation, or at least the desire for it (Duffield, 2001a).

Alternatively, theorising liberal societal transformations through the lens of Foucault’s concept of liberalism as a form of governance, highlights the agency of local actors in self-regulating their conduct (Foucault, 2010). From this perspective, domestic actors have internalised the conceptions of a ‘free’ liberal self, demonstrating the possibility of limited government (Dean, 1999; Harrison, 2004). And, as discussed in chapter two and above, Duffield (2007) and Dillon and Reid (2001; 2000) utilise this understanding of liberalism.

However, liberal societal transformation as a response to the security-development nexus (a line of argument strongly pursued by Duffield) is not the same as liberal transformation for its own sake i.e. as a response to the liberal problematic of how much to govern. Duffield in part resolves this by pointing to development as a moral
trusteeship, safely teaching non-liberal societies the powers of freedom, as this could legitimately be seen as part of the security-development nexus: embedding liberal forms of governance to ensure peace and stability. Duffield does not explicitly make this link, however.

Furthermore, Ayres (2006) argues that whilst liberal societal transformation may be partially attributable to liberalism’s universal pretensions, it also endeavours to consolidate neo-liberal economic reform and is linked to the expansion of capitalist modernity. Harrison (2004) makes a similar argument. Neither specifically identifies the securitization of development as a driver of liberal societal transformation. This is an omission given the strong security-development nexus demonstrated in chapter four and the development programmes directed towards the pursuit of peace and stability in the South highlighted in this chapter. At the same time, however, neither Dillon and Reid nor Duffield offer a convincing account of the link between the liberal transformation of Southern populations and capitalism. Liberal democracy, argues Ayers (2006), maintains an organic relationship with capitalism. The struggle for individual rights and liberties arose from the interests of the emerging capitalist class in England. Furthermore, a separate economic sphere, intrinsic to capitalism, emerged, the power relations of which were not dependent on juridical or political privilege. Liberal democracy, she concludes “leaves untouched this whole new sphere of domination and coercion created by capitalism” (ibid:334). It is this which is being emulated in the project of liberal societal transformation.

The complex links between what might be the multiple drivers of liberal societal transformation in the South need further investigation. Harrison (2004) and Ayers (2006) draw attention to the consolidation of neo-liberalism, linked to the expansion of capitalism, whilst Bradbury (2003) and Duffield (2001) identify the security-development nexus. Liberalism as a form of governance that governs life through its freedom and self-regulation is also invoked (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2007; Harrison, 2004).

A final point to be made regarding the extent to which development programmes are directed towards transformation in accordance with a liberal discourse, is that whilst it is unlikely that non-liberal practices would be endorsed, indigenous, non-Western justice and decision-making systems can be enhanced, rather than replaced, through SSR programmes (DFID, 2004; Stone et al., 2005). This suggests that development programmes are not necessarily concerned with the imposition of Western practices.
Moving on to question two, in fulfilling the participatory requirement of global development policy, civil society groups are consulted on the construction, implementation and evaluation of SSR, and take a lead in managing and implementing local level development programmes (Department for International Development Caribbean, 2000; Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia, 2006). This implies that non-state actors and donors share similar objectives and perceptions of development. Such programmes endorse the view of Young, who maintains that the civil society aspect of liberal development has been colonised by NGOs (1995:537). NGOs, argues William and Young, “provide a conduit of micro-interference that complements the macro-interference at the state level” (1994:99). And Dillon and Reid argue that “global liberal governance quite literally threatens nongovernmental and humanitarian agencies with recruitment into the very structure of power against which they previously defined themselves” (2000:119).

Duffield describes this as a division of labour between state and private-agencies – a civil-political complex that has seen state and non-state actors working together to initiate liberal transformation in the South (2004a:7). The case studies in this chapter to a large extent endorse this. They also demonstrate, however, a lack of coordination and trust between donors, Southern governments and NGOs, suggesting that the picture of non-state actors as partners in the liberal societal transformation process, needs some qualification through the recognition of the antagonistic relations that can exist between state and non-state actors (Ginifer, 2004; Stone et al., 2005:9).

In response to question three, this chapter demonstrated that many SSR and local level development initiatives take place in post-conflict states and are part of wider peace-building programmes (e.g. the Sierra Leone SSR Project). In attempting to mitigate further conflict, they seek to circumscribe the power of previously dominant groups, demonstrating, as Dillon and Reid point out, that development resources are now used to shift the balance of power between groups in order to secure political settlements (2001:120). This ties in with Duffield's observation that re-establishing development post-conflict appears to be conceived by donors as a “non-linear exercise that will often require the creation of new institutions and forms of social organisation” (Duffield, 2001a:38). Furthermore DDR programmes link to the idea that there are economic incentives to continue armed conflicts, such that providing ex-combatants with employment removes this incentive. This is facilitated by the belief that liberal democracy and market economics are the basis for a peaceful society.
Whilst it is clear that liberal societal transformation is a key aim of current development programming, this investigation also indicated that there are limitations to the success of programmes that seek transformation. Firstly, Brzoska observes that SSR is very difficult to implement, despite wide acceptance of its principles, for a number of reasons (Brzoska, 2003). Despite the rhetoric detailed in chapter five, commitment to donor coordination on the ground is apparently hard to find. In Afghanistan, for example, different countries took the lead for different institutions within the security and justice sector and with no overall national strategy for transformation this approach encountered immediate setbacks (Stone et al., 2005:21). Even when a single state takes the lead on one aspect of security, a holistic approach to that one area can be lacking; as demonstrated by the United States’ SSR approach in Afghanistan that undermined the Afghan national army by funding and training ‘anti-Al Qaeda units’ (Sedra, 2002). Whilst SSR is largely perceived to contribute to the creation or strengthening of a liberal state, the interests of donors can obstruct this aim. This has implications for the conceptualisation of the security-development nexus. Chapter four demonstrated that US global development policy discourse emphasises that the creation of liberal democratic states in the South is paramount to its long-term security. However, US activities in Afghanistan demonstrate that the US has multiple and sometimes conflicting security objectives.

Secondly, although there are examples of domestic actors initiating liberal change, there can also be problems with finding and fostering local ownership for SSR. Without a desire for change coming from within, programmes tend not to succeed (Brzoska, 2003:39). Other specific limitations to the success of liberal societal transformation through SSR include: a lack of capacity and experience among project managers, consultants, trainers and ‘experts’ (Stone et al., 2005:23), and in the case of small arms collection in Afghanistan, a lack of information regarding the procedure, and uncertainty about what compensation would be given (Sedra, 2002).

The limitations to enacting liberal change are not criticisms of the argument that this is a central objective of global governance, but raise the question why, if efforts to transform Southern societies are ineffective, is it important to understand the rationale of global governance as liberal transformation? It may be that, as with SAPs and the resulting increase in parallel economic and political networks, the programmes directed towards liberal societal transformation have unforeseen consequences (Bhattacharyya, 2005; Nordstrom, 2001). In which case further research must be conducted to examine the effect such programmes have on Southern societies.
Considering the evidence and arguments presented in this chapter, how does the conceptualisation of global governance as a selectively inclusive system pursuing liberal societal transformation, aid our understanding of contemporary global governance? Whilst selective inclusion may be a strong discursive concept for a few donors, its effect upon development practice is ambiguous. This weak empirical base limits the extent to which the idea aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. The discourse upholding the supremacy of liberal democratic governance does, however, have material consequences within development programming, as both SSR and local level development programmes seek liberal change in the South. Duffield has therefore accurately described this rationale:

Development assistance is no longer concerned with helping support an often conservative pro-Western alliance of Southern elites; it is now in the business of transforming whole societies ... The need to change behaviour and attitudes, especially in relation to violent conflict, has been clearly stated and widely accepted in this context (Duffield, 2001a:39).

This enables an understanding of development policy and practice within the context of a liberal transformative project. There are some complexities obscured by the conceptualisation of liberal societal transformation, however, including: the endogenous desire for liberal change in the South; the support given to traditional justice and decision making systems by donors; antagonism between state and non-state actors; and more importantly, the rationale for liberal societal transformation.
Chapter Seven

Conclusions: In what ways, if any, does the Securitization of Development Debate Aid our Understanding of Contemporary Global Governance?

Introduction

This concluding chapter seeks to evaluate how the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of contemporary global governance. It identifies the limitations of the current debate and offers alternatives or modifications which take into account the qualifications and inconsistencies identified in the previous chapters.

Section 7.1 provides an overview of the thesis that presents a summary of each chapter, outlining their objectives, methodology and contribution to the research. The subsequent three sections correspond with the structure of the thesis thus far. That is, section 7.2 is concerned with global governance and the global economy, 7.3 with global governance and (in)security, and 7.4 with power. Each section begins with a brief summary of the deficiencies of orthodox global governance theory in relation to these themes. Following this summary and drawing upon the thesis as a whole (rather than only from the corresponding chapter), the extent to which the securitization of development debate overcomes these deficiencies and the limitations within this debate, are then examined. With these in mind, this chapter argues for modifications to the current securitization of development accounts, and in some instances proposes that alternative theoretical propositions provide more robust explanations. Section 7.5 offers an overview of the concluding arguments, draws out the key limitations of the existing literature and suggests how these can be overcome. It sets out the significance and wider relevance of this work and provides an outlook that may be useful for future research.

In section 7.2 this concluding chapter argues that whilst implicitly recognising the importance of global economic structures for the study of global governance, the accounts of global capitalism given within the current securitization of development literature are underdeveloped and, to an extent based upon questionable data. Whilst the pursuit of liberal peace does appear to be a central rationale of global governance, the ‘capitalist logic’ is sidelined and the relationship between these two dynamics is not sufficiently explored. Furthermore, whilst recognising that capital accumulation often works against development in its current form, contributors to the debate tend to suggest alternatives to development, rather than changes to the processes of global capital accumulation.
Section 7.3 argues that the securitization of development literature contributes to our understanding of global governance through its analysis of the security-development nexus, which is a strong discursive concept justifying current global development policy. There are however at least two significantly different security-development narratives, which are not sufficiently accounted for by the key protagonists of this model, and the effect of the nexus upon development practice is ambiguous.

This chapter subsequently argues in section 7.4 that the debate sheds light upon the use of productive power within global governance. Dillon and Reid (2001) and Duffield (2007) identify a global governance system coordinated around a specifically liberal vision of development and progress, which is formulated and disbursed by global governance institutions and networks. Tensions within this discourse are, however, overlooked, and the potential for resistance through alternatives to the dominant discourse are not probed.

This section goes on to propose that Duffield (2002a; 2001a), along with Dillon and Reid (2001) and Young (1995), has identified an important rationale of global governance in the pursuit of liberal societal transformation in the South, but also highlights a number of qualifications and limitations to this concept. Finally, in privileging productive over structural forms of power, these accounts have less to say about how the structures of the global economy are a source of power and constraint for global governance networks and, in part, underpin the securitization of development.

7.1 The Structure of the Thesis

In order to review current understandings of global governance within the mainstream, rather than critical, literature, chapter one outlined the ontological base of global governance as understood within orthodox global governance theory. It went on to review how the relationship between global governance and the global economy, global governance and (in)security, and the nature of power within global governance are theorised, and identified the limitations of orthodox global governance theory in these three key areas. In light of the subsequent research conducted in this thesis, this concluding chapter can now ask how the securitization of development debate overcomes the limitations of these mainstream theories.
Mirroring chapter one, chapter two set out the key propositions of the securitization of development debate, through examining its understandings of the relationship between global governance and the global economy, global governance and (in)security and the nature of power within global governance. A range of authors contribute to each of these themes within what I have called the securitization of development debate. Duffield makes a key contribution to each of these themes, whilst others, to some extent reflecting their theoretical persuasion, priorities one theme over the others. Each subsequent chapter took one of these areas in turn and critically examined the theoretical and empirical base of the claims made in relation to them.

Chapter three, therefore, in assessing how the relationship between global governance and the global economy is understood, asked whether the idea of capitalism as a structurally exclusive system is conceptually sound, consistent with the wider securitization of development arguments, and empirically persuasive. It initially discussed the theoretical limitations of the ideas of structural exclusion. This included assessing the usefulness of binary categories (North/South, exclusion/inclusion, parallel economy/formal economy) to develop an account of the global economy and identified a number of limitations and alternatives to this approach. This chapter subsequently identified two tensions within these accounts. The first concerns the source of structural exclusion from the global economy. The second tension regards the contention that whilst the South is perceived as ‘un-bankable’, its economic integration is sought through development policy. This chapter concludes that Harvey’s (2003) analysis is instructive in overcoming these tensions.

The second section of chapter three investigated the empirical evidence for structural exclusion. There were two parts to this. The first part assessed whether the exclusion of the South was a new phenomenon. This was assessed through mapping long-term global economic trends and, in light of these, suggested that whilst the South may be less integrated into the formal networks of the global economy than it was in the 1970s, structural exclusion appears to be an historical trend. The second part identified the limitations of the contemporary data used by Hoogvelt to demonstrate the increasing exclusion of the South (Hoogvelt, 2001). It argued that by using different measurements of economic integration and more recent data, we build a more ambiguous picture of exclusion than suggested by Hoogvelt, and therefore can conclude that the idea of exclusion needs some modification.

In assessing the accounts put forward within the securitization of development debate of the relationship between global governance and (in)security, chapter four investigated the extent to which global development policy and practice reflected the
logic of a security-development nexus. It initially analysed the degree to which the
development policy discourse of the OECD, EU, World Bank, UNDP, US, UK, Sweden and
Denmark was guided by this logic. This analysis largely substantiated the picture of a
security-development nexus drawn within the literature, but concluded that there are a
number of security-development narratives used to justify policy, pointing towards
complexity rather than consensus and highlighting multiple motivations for global
development intervention. The second part of this chapter assessed the security-
development nexus in practice. It examined the statistical relationship between the
amount of ODA a state received and the conflict intensity level of the recipient and
concluded that, with the exception of the US, the distribution of ODA cannot be
explained within a security-development framework.

Chapters five and six were concerned with assessing how the securitization of
development debate conceptualises power within the contemporary global governance
system. The purpose of chapter five was to investigate the extent to which the
structures and politics of global governance are permeated by a liberal consensus
fostering policy coordination. Specifically, it asked to what degree global development
policy discourse reflected a liberal consensus and coordination around this consensus
(Duffield, 2004b; 2001a). The subsequent investigation examined policy discourse and
initiatives from the institutions listed above and demonstrated that global development
policy is not politically neutral or pluralist, but confined within a liberal discourse. On
the other hand, tensions were identified within this discourse, which question the idea
of a liberal 'consensus'. Despite these tensions, the growing coordination of
development governance and policy was also substantiated.

The purpose of chapter six was to investigate the extent to which global governance is
selectively inclusive of the bases of compliance with liberal norms, and seeks the
transformation of what are considered non-liberal populations through development
programmes. The former was assessed through a statistical analysis of the
relationship between the geographical distribution of development aid and
acquiescence of aid recipients to liberal norms. This provided a means to assess the
degree to which states that adhere to a liberal framework are likely to receive more aid
than those that do not. It did not offer strong or consistent evidence to validate the
idea of global governance rewarding cooperation through aid disbursements.

The second part of this chapter comprised a case study analysis of two types of
development programme: SSR and local level development programmes. The purpose
being to assess to what degree they are directed towards the liberal transformation of
societies in the South. These programs provide strong evidence to indicate that
development programming seeks the liberal transformation of societies in the South as a response to the security-development nexus, implying that Duffield (2002a) and Bradbury (2003) accurately describe this fundamental rationale of global governance. However, this investigation also highlighted some complexities obscured by this current conceptualisation of liberal societal transformation, and identified a number of limitations inherent within it, which need to be resolved.

The following sections ask whether and how the authors contributing to the securitization of development debate within the critical global governance literature overcome the deficiencies of orthodox global governance theory. It assess the limitations of these accounts and suggests how these might be rectified. As outlined in the chapter introduction, these sections correspond with the structure of the previous chapters. Thus 7.2 is concerned with global governance and the global economy.

7.2 Global Governance and the Global Economy

Deficiencies within Orthodox Global Governance Theory

In relation to the global economy, chapter one identified the key deficiencies of orthodox global governance theory as follows. The role of ideas and discourse in enabling and sustaining contemporary global economic structures is curtailed. Rather, the globalized economy is understood as natural, inevitable and if managed correctly, beneficial to human development (Rosenau, 2000:194). The current institutions of global governance are deemed to be politically neutral and effective in this regard, although there is room for them to become more accountable and efficient (Keohane, 1989; Rosenau, 2006:139). Furthermore, there is little recognition of the structural power of the global economy in producing and reproducing internally related positions of subordination or domination, such as capital and labour (Bartnett and Duvall, 2005:3); the unequal or exclusionary tendencies of global capitalism are sidelined. Finally, much of the orthodox global governance theory omits an account of the historical development of global capitalism. In relation to global governance and the global economy, the following discussion tackles whether these deficiencies are overcome within the current securitization of development debate, how this debate may aid our understanding of global governance, its limitations and alternatives.
Chapter Seven

*The Structure of Global Capitalism*

Analysis by Castells (1998), Duffield (2001) and Hoogvelt (2001) implies the structural power of global capitalism. Excluded/included and North/South are identified as internally related positions produced by the contemporary global economy. Duffield and Hoogvelt argue that the core regions of the liberal world system (the North) are consolidating and strengthening their ties at the expense of outlying areas (the South) (Duffield, 2001a:3-4; Hoogvelt, 2001). At the same time, however, the South is re-integrating itself into the networks of the global economy through parallel economic activity (Castells, 1998:75; Duffield, 2001a:136-160). The tendency of global capitalism to produce inequality is brought to the fore within these accounts. This contrasts with Rosenau’s statement that global markets "are not systematic in any harm they cause" (Rosenau, 2000:194).

However, aspects of these accounts of global capitalism are underdeveloped and their limitations can be distilled through exploring the concepts and categories used. Furthermore, the opposing positions of North/South or excluded/included are understood in the context of global capitalism as a contracting system (Duffield, 2002a; 2001a; Hoogvelt, 2001). In this regard Duffield relies, in part, on Hoogvelt’s analysis (2001), which, as demonstrated in chapter three, needs substantial modification.

Chapter three argued that the three related binary categories of formal economy/parallel economy, exclusion/inclusion and North/South are questionable. Nordstrom (2001) challenges the viability of collapsing all informal and criminal activity into one parallel economy category, and argues that even if the binary categories of formal/informal economy did exist they do not translate into geographical areas. Moreover, Meagher (2003) refutes the assertion that populations can overcome exclusion through parallel economic networks. However, the inclusion of the parallel economy as a fundamental part of the global economy offers a more holistic and dialectical framework than orthodox global governance theory, within which the persistence and increase of shadow economic activity can be investigated.

Linkages between the ‘excluded’ and the core regions of the global economy include parallel economic networks, as Duffield acknowledges, but also include official financial interactions including currency speculation and hedge funds. Harvey (2003) calls these forms of wealth creation ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Chapter three maintained that as well as parallel economic networks, the process of accumulation by dispossession should be central to the ideas of an excluded South. This refers to the
continuing displacement or deferral of capitalist contradictions. It implies an unequal power relationship between the core areas of the capitalist economy and the South (Soederberg, 2006). The structural power of global capitalism is more fully acknowledged if we take account of forms of accumulation by dispossession, which brings to the fore the ways in which the South still exists in an exploitative relationship with the North, even though populations throughout the South can be described as excluded.

The terms North and South are also problematic, relying as they do on the concepts of exclusion and the parallel economy. Furthermore, both Duffield and Hoogvelt argue that these are social as well as geographical categories, but it is the geographical categories which are reinforced throughout their work. Castells addresses this through his analysis of excluded populations in the geographical North, but fails to incorporate the process of accumulation by dispossession which is taking place within these marginalised areas (Castells, 1998). Furthermore, if the South is now a social rather than geographical category, it would be salient to analyse how global governance may seek to transform non-liberal populations in the North. For example, in 2006, the then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, set out a government plan to target ‘at risk’ children for ‘early intervention’, and before they had demonstrated ‘anti-social’ tendencies (Blair, 2006). Such examples may be indicative of a project of management, containment and liberal transformation of the excluded in the core industrialised countries of the West.

The Rationale of Global Governance

There is some ambiguity regarding the relationship between global governance and the global economy, as demonstrated by the tension regarding the source of structural exclusion, which is identified as structural adjustment policies and structural changes within the nature of global capitalism. An explanation of the links between these two phenomena is lacking. Harvey’s analysis overcomes this ambiguity by systematically linking capitalist crisis with the introduction, by the agents of global governance, of structural adjustment policies (Harvey, 2003). These policies, he maintains, were in part an attempt to overcome a crisis of overaccumulation in the core through orchestrating limited devaluations in the South which allowed accumulation by dispossession without devaluations spreading to the developed economies. Surplus capital was then invested and profits made from these seized assets. In addition, loans

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24 This resonates with bio-politics as a technology of governance that requires detailed knowledge of life in order to optimise the life of each individual within the population (Dean, 1999).
to the South, for which they are then liable, make them ‘sinks’ for surplus capital (Harvey, 2003:118-119). The way in which the assets and resources of ‘excluded’ areas are utilised to mitigate capitalist crisis in the short term needs greater exploration, and in this regard, accumulation by dispossession can provide a fuller understanding of global capitalism and its relationship to global governance.

Chapter three also identified a tension between exclusion and the process of liberal societal transformation, which Duffield argues is a central purpose of global governance. Market reform, leading to greater global economic integration as an aspect of liberal transformation, is at odds with what Duffield perceives as the reality of structural exclusion. This tension can be more fully understood if we think of global governance as motivated by two logics of power. Harvey, following Arrighi, constructs a model in which capitalist logic and territorial logic are both employed (Arrighi, 2002: 33-36; Harvey, 2003). As argued below, the logic of liberal peace may be a more accurate concept to use when trying to understand the political, as opposed to economic processes which characterise global governance. However, sticking to the Harvey model for now - the territorial logic requires economic integration for security reasons, and the capitalist logic requires areas of exclusion where accumulation by dispossession can mitigate capitalist crisis. Both logics may appear discordant, but are also working in balance when we consider Duffield’s idea of ‘surplus life’, which is created by capitalism (capitalist logic) and managed by global governance (in part, territorial logic).

Whilst for Dillon and Reid (2000) and Duffield (2001a), liberal peace is the key motivator of the contemporary global governance complex, the logic of capitalism in guiding global governance is also implied. For example, neo-liberalism is understood by Duffield as the dominant economic model (2001:30). Despite acknowledging these dynamics of contemporary global capitalism, this capitalist logic is under-theorised. As discussed in chapter three and above, Harvey gives a more comprehensive account of the logic of capitalism as a rationale of global governance (Harvey, 2003).

However, whilst Harvey argues that the political dimension of power can be understood as ‘territorial logic’, Duffield maintains that global governance is politically motivated by liberal peace. According to this position, the new complexes of state and non-state actors that make up contemporary global governance are strategic and coordinated in their pursuit of liberal peace, rather than politically neutral or pluralist. And through
consensus building activities have constructed a broadly convergent and coherent liberal policy position, as explored in chapter five (Duffield, 2001:44-74).\textsuperscript{25}

Corroborating Duffield’s position, chapters five and six point to global governance networks, guided by the logic of liberal peace, pursuing the transformation of non-liberal populations. In recognising global governance as working within a fundamentally liberal framework, Duffield includes an analysis of the role of ideas and discourse in the production and justification of policies directed towards the maintenance of liberal capitalism. This model aids our understanding of global governance by highlighting that it has a purpose beyond the technical matters of cooperation discussed within neo-liberal institutionalist accounts of global governance (Keohane and Nye, 1987).

Both territorial logic and the logic of liberal peace are concerned with Western security. The rationale of liberal peace is to transform non-liberal populations in the South into liberal, cooperative and stable entities to enhance Western security (Duffield, 2000a:11). The rationale of the territorial logic of power in Harvey’s work (2003) is less prescriptive but directed towards the accumulation of political power, again to secure Western liberal capitalism. The logic of liberal peace could be a part of this, i.e. through securing non-liberal populations in the South, Western security is enhanced (the security-development nexus).

Whilst the rationale may be similar, the type of power utilised by liberal peace and territorial logic differ. Liberal peace employs compulsory power through the ‘carrot and stick approach’ of, for example, aid disbursements, as well as productive power through its coordinating and unifying impact upon global governance networks, and the production, diffusion and consolidation of a liberal discourse through global governance networks (Dillon and Reid, 2000:120; Duffield, 2001a:34-37). For Harvey, as well as Callinicos, the territorial logic is concerned with how a state can increase its relative power through the use of compulsory power (Callinicos, 2009:74; Harvey, 2003:27).

Territorial logic is concerned with geo-politics, whereas liberal peace is concerned with bio-politics – the support, management and optimisation of populations, rather than territories (Dean, 1999:46; Dillon, 2003:25; Duffield, 2007:5; Foucault, 2010). In line with Dillon (2003) then, Duffield’s later work is informed by Foucault’s concept of bio-

\textsuperscript{25} Whilst Dillon and Reid (2000) and Dillon (2003) also maintain that the rationale of global governance is liberal peace, their understanding of liberal peace emphasises the Foucaudian concept of governmentality, rather than a coherent ideology or set of principles. This is discussed below.
politics, which seeks to optimize the life of each and all within the governed population. The governance of development as a form of bio-politics is understood to seek to establish self-regulating individuals within non-liberal areas (Dillon, 2003:25). This resonates with the operation of SSR and local level development programmes, which foster self-realisation and the capacity of the individual to effect change (at the individual, community and state level) through ‘empowerment’ and ‘capacity building’.

Furthermore, territorial power is too wedded to the idea of political power residing within a system of states and excludes the multiplicity of actors within global governance networks (Callinicos; 2009:74). Liberal peace not only involves those actors “whose power is based in command of territory” (Harvey, 2003:26) but also civil society groups and NGOs as well as the private sector. Territorial logic does not account for the role of these actors in the governance of development, and does not necessarily contain within it the logic of the security-development nexus. Liberal peace, on the other hand, points specifically towards this current axiom. Furthermore, liberal peace certainly imbues the political logic with, what Callinicos calls an ‘element of autonomy’ from the capitalist logic and cannot be reduced to it.

This does not mean that geo-politics is not a factor within global governance. States still make decisions driven by the logic of geo-politics. The territorial logic of the Project for the New American Century, which sought the invasion of Iraq, seems clear (Arrighi, 2005). As Duffield acknowledges, the US invasion of Iraq dispensed with a liberal imperialist framework (Duffield, 2007:192). This territorial logic may have most relevance when studying the neo-conservative agenda of the Bush administration, although geo-political concerns are also apparent in the search for liberal peace; as demonstrated in chapter four, the pursuit of liberal peace is key to the national security of the US, Denmark and the UK. The logic of liberal peace, however, is of greater relevance when the diverse actors of global governance are considered. And biopolitics, rather than geopolitics has greater explanatory power with regards to understanding liberal societal transformation.

According to Harvey, whilst they are distinct from each other, territorial and capital power intertwine in complex and sometimes contradictory ways (Harvey, 2003:29). And this is also true of capital and liberal power. The logic of liberal peace is, in part, about the protection of the global capitalist system. As already discussed in chapter three and above, whilst the ‘surplus population’ created by capitalism and existing as a threat to it, is managed through liberal societal transformation, seeking security in this way may not actually enhance global capital accumulation. Liberal transformation is aimed at mitigating exclusion through making populations self-reliant, which may
reduce the long-term opportunities for capital accumulation through accumulation by dispossession in excluded/surplus areas. However, opportunities for accumulation do exist even here, and in theorising a civil-political complex, Duffield is pointing to where these two logics overlap. Private military companies working within the South, for example, are in large part motivated by capitalist logic, but, according to Duffield, are also agents of liberal peace “providing army or police training, for example, as part of a formal assistance programme such as security sector reform” (Duffield, 2001a:65).

The idea of liberal peace aids our understanding of the rationale of global governance, but this model also implies the logic of capitalism and at present this is under-theorised (Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001a: 261): the discursive is prioritised over the material (Jessop and Sum, 2006). Harvey’s concept of capitalist logic is more fully developed, although the accompanying notion of territorial logic does not account for the rationale of the diverse actors or biopolitical techniques of liberal global governance.

The Empirical Evidence for Southern Exclusion

Chapter three demonstrated that the empirical picture of Southern exclusion is less clear cut than is implied by Castells (1998), Hoogvelt (2001) or Duffield (2002a; 2001a). The contention that we are witnessing a new phase of capitalist contraction in which formal global economic links to the South as a whole are decreasing, is difficult to sustain. This is especially the case given the other economic interactions such as currency speculation, which are not represented by trade and investment figures. Therefore, a number of processes need to be balanced when constructing a model of contemporary global capitalism. There are areas which are not fully included in the networks of global capitalism as the trade and investment figures demonstrate, but the evidence presented by Williamson (2002), Maddison (2001), Baldwin and Martin (1999) and O’Brien (1982) suggests that this appears to be an historical trend. Contemporary data does not point clearly towards increasing exclusion either. Using different measurements of economic integration from those used by Hoogvelt, as well as more recent estimates of the same measurements, and taking into account regional and country variations, gives a more ambiguous picture than suggested by Hoogvelt’s thesis of involution, which is subsequently utilised by Duffield (2002a; 2001a). Whilst the data indicates that Africa, the Americas and parts of Asia are not integrated into the global economy to the same degree or in the same way as the core regions, it does not clearly point towards an increasing exclusion of these areas either.
As well as calling into question the idea of exclusion in the South, this analysis has implications for Castells’ (1998:75) and Duffield’s (2002a) supposition that in the face of increasing exclusion, new methods of wealth creation through shadow economies have emerged to reintegrate the South into global economic networks. This is envisaged as a parallel process to capitalist retraction, being in large part driven by the resulting exclusion (ibid:1056). Qualifications regarding the historical trend and current strength of exclusion suggest that this reintegration argument needs further investigation to assess, for example, what is driving increased parallel economic activity in the South, if not the increasing withdrawal of formal economic links to the global economy.

7.3 Global Governance and (In)security

Deficiencies within Orthodox Global Governance Theory

Both liberals and realists give a limited account of the relationship between security, insecurity and global governance. For liberal theorists, the rationale of global governance is understood as the creation of order through cooperation (Keohane, 1984), and steering, coordination and control mechanisms (Rosenau, 2006). The contemporary form of global governance is conceived as the most appropriate mechanism for dealing with financial and ecological security threats; insecurities are overcome through an extension or reform of existing global governance mechanisms (Keohane, 2005; Rosenau, 2002). Global governance is also linked to the diffusion of liberal democracy and the related pursuit of peace. These theories do not consider productive power in establishing accepted definitions of security or the extent to which global governance networks may create or perpetuate economic or environmental insecurity. Rather, such insecurities may be attributed to inevitable global economic processes, the excesses of which global governance is tasked with mitigating. The contested nature of and links between insecurity, global governance and the global economy are not, therefore, fully explored.

The Security-Development Nexus

The relationship between global governance, security and development is central to the securitization of development debate. Whilst Duffield agrees that the rationale of global governance is in part to create order, this is problematised, in that the pursuit of order is racked with conflict and contestation, and is largely unsuccessful (Duffield,
2007:133-158). Whilst liberal theories of global governance tend to link the spread of liberal democracy to an expanding zone of peace, this critical literature argues that the diffusion of liberal democracy is a violent and disputed process in the global South, the consequences of which are often unexpected and counterproductive.

Furthermore, the debate recognises the importance of ideas and discourse in defining the South and the consequential relationship between the agents of global governance and Southern states (Bradbury, 2003; Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2007). Ideas regarding ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states, and the speech act of defining a state as such, determines the resources available to that state and the type of relationship with the networks and institutions of global governance that state will experience, as Duffield discusses with reference to Afghanistan (Duffield, 2007:145). Definitions of security – both international security and human security – are produced and utilised by global governance actors. What can be securitised is defined by global governance actors, and policies are justified using this accepted definition. As well as echoing the securitization literature (Buzan et al, 2004), this is in line with the idea of performativity – in naming something as a security threat, it becomes so (de Geode, 2006:10).

Furthermore, the work of Beall et al (2006) and Duffield (2007), for example, facilitates an understanding of global development policy, in part, as a response to the conceptualisation of the South as a serious threat to the liberal capitalist system of the North and the axiom that conflict and underdevelopment are mutually generating. The security-development nexus, as demonstrated in chapter four, is a very strong discursive construct justifying current development policy. Global policy makers link structural exclusion to growing resource competition and criminalisation, and underdevelopment more generally is linked to an increased risk of conflict, whereas conflict is understood to reverse development gains (DFID et al., 2001; USAID, 2002a). Development, on the other hand, is seen as having the capacity to resolve conflict (DFID, 2005a; OECD, 2007; Persson and Karlson, 2003; UNDP, 2007). It was also demonstrated that, as Duffield (2001a:28) and Thomas (2004b:4) argue, the causes of conflict and stability in the South have been internalised, such that the main burden of responsibility for solving these problems has been placed on Southern actors. Furthermore, the EC, OECD and the governments of the UK, US and Denmark perceive underdevelopment as a major threat to international security (Danida, 2005; DFID, 2005a; DG Development, 2004a; OECD, 2007; USAID, 2002).

Chapter four also argued, however, that the UNDP and SIDA have not reconceptualised underdevelopment as an international security concern, but justify development
intervention on the grounds of human security and human rights (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b; UNDP, 2007). Duffield (2007) is critical of this approach, which he argues, seeks (and fails) to create self-reliant individuals as part of an attempt to manage the South and counteract its potential to destabilise. Nevertheless, in not linking underdevelopment to international security, the narrative produced by the UNDP and SIDA is an alternative to the dominant discourse. This alternative resonates with what Hettne (2010) calls the pre-September 11th development discourse concerned with ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention, whilst the dominant discourse draws upon a post-September 11th narrative prioritising a ‘war against terror’ or ‘pre-emptive intervention’. The motivation and justification for development intervention produced by these two narratives differ from one another. This has implications for how they may change and develop. Given its concern with human dignity, personal autonomy and meaningful participation in community life (Thomas, 2000), a development discourse based on human security has greater potential for global solidarity emphasising “mutuality and reciprocity between provider and beneficiary” (Duffield, 2007:233), than the “war on terror” narrative. Identifying human security as an alternative rather than positing only one security-development nexus, has merit (see for example Wilkin, 2002).

Chapter five also suggested that US activities in Afghanistan over the last decade demonstrate the multiple and conflicting security objectives of the US. The aim of the US’ SSR approach was to contribute to the establishment of a liberal state, but this aim was undermined by the funding and training of anti-Al Qaeda units, the authority of which came directly from the US and not from the regular Afghan armed forces (Sedra, 2002). This dynamic could also be incorporated to reflect the multiple dimensions of the security-development nexus.

The Boomerang Effect and Alternative Development

The internal contradictions of liberal capitalism are also implicit in the securitization of development. Populations excluded by the structures of capitalism become potential security threats to its core regions (Soederberg, 2004). Global governance then attempts to manage these areas through the mechanisms of development. In turn, development policies fostering liberalisation and privatisation can have a destabilising effect on the South, which again has implications for wider security. Glenn refers to such phenomena as ‘insecurity boomerangs’ (Glenn, 2011).
Furthermore, Duffield maintains that capitalist accumulation works against the liberal desire to make poor populations self-reliant: “capitalist accumulation tirelessly seeks to break down and absorb areas of autonomy and self-reliance, continually creating and recreating surplus population in the process” (Duffield, 2007:218). Development in its current form can therefore never succeed.

Rather than seeing potential alternatives as rooted, in part, in the material changes to global economic structures, Duffield calls for the radical reform of the institutions and networks of global governance to enable them to address complexity and the continuous policy failure they are currently facing (2001a:261-265). Alternatives to development, where “instead of educating the poor and marginalised” we should learn from “their struggles for existence, identity and dignity and together challenge the world we live in”, are also proposed (Duffield 2007:233-234). This conclusion is similar to that drawn by some orthodox global governance theorists, who advocate reform of the current global governance system (Nuscheler, 2002: 164). Such an approach could include uncovering and challenging the material power structures that produce inequality and constrain action, but Duffield does not directly tackle how the dynamics of the global economy perpetuate and reproduce inequality and create, to use Duffield’s phrase, surplus populations. Others contributing to the securitization of development debate provide a more convincing analysis of alternatives (see for example Thomas, 2000:110-127). Thomas considers how a range of policies drawn from the areas of trade, finance and investment could lead to the long-term transformation of global markets.

The Security-Development Nexus in Practice

Whilst the foundational beliefs and assumptions of global development policy discourse provide some strong evidence to substantiate the proposition that global governance is guided by the logic of the security-development nexus, the statistical analysis in chapter five found that the affect of this logic upon development practice is ambiguous. Given the amount of ODA distributed by the US, the material consequences of the security-development nexus are significant. However, this needs to be qualified through acknowledging that the US government does not appear to be representative of other global governance agencies in respect to aid disbursements. On what basis substantial aid resources are distributed remains unclear and cannot be fully explained through the logic of the security-development framework, thereby limiting the extent to which identifying development policy as a response to the security-development nexus aids our understanding of global governance.
7.4 Global Governance and Power

**Deficiencies within Orthodox Global Governance Theory**

As discussed in chapter one, orthodox theories of global governance tend to emphasise either compulsory or institutional power in their study of global governance. The more insidious forms of productive and structural power are not fully acknowledged. Disregarding productive and structural power, global governance and the global economy are conceived by liberal theories of global governance as possessing democratic, pluralist qualities (Rosenau, 2000:193; Keohane, 2005). How knowledge or ‘expertise’ is produced and diffused within the networks of global governance is not fully investigated and the structural power of global capitalism in the production of the social relations of constitution is not acknowledged. The following section details how each of the forms of power identified by Barnett and Duval (2005) are accounted for within the securitization of development debate. It also discusses alternative literatures which may be of value in conceptualising power within global governance.

**The Compulsory Power of Aid**

In its pursuit of stability, argues Dillon and Reid, global governance aims to modulate behaviour through rewarding acceptable attitudes and penalizing unacceptable ones (2000:120). And Duffield writes that “during the 1990s, development aid became more selective, tending to concentrate on ... ‘good performers’ at the expense of ... ‘poor performers’” (2007:165-166). Compulsory power is implied if donors distribute ODA on the condition that the recipient adopts certain economic and political policies, and if ODA is channelled to states which have already shown a commitment to certain policies. This is a direct use of power; global governance institutions use their resources to coerce Southern states to do what they want them to do.

Chapter Six demonstrates that there is some evidence that Denmark and the US are seeking to reward and induce institutional change through the distribution of aid. Furthermore, when multilateral aid is taken as a sum it does appear to reward a commitment to political rights and civil liberties in the years 1997-2001. This trend does not, however, extend to the analysis of individual multilateral agencies, Sweden or, in this analysis, the UK. Whilst chapter six put forward the case that changing the subjectivities of agents is a strong aim at the level of development programming,
evidence that global governance seeks institutional change through the distribution of aid is more ambiguous than Dillon and Reid or Duffield acknowledge.

**Institutional Power**

According to Barnett and Duvall’s definition, the conceptual focus when discussing institutional power is on the “formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:15). Rather than A having a direct effect on B, power works through socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations. For example, whilst the WTO works on a one member one vote basis, poor states often do not have the skilled personnel available to ensure their interests are reflected in trade negotiations (Adler and Bernstein, 2005). Trade negotiations are highly complex and overtly legal, and developed countries use dedicated lawyers to ensure their interests are pushed onto the agenda. Poorer countries have difficulty finding qualified trade lawyers to represent them, and must sometimes rely on the WTO to provide legal services. Furthermore, they can lack the organisational capacity to even attend meetings and the time to become properly prepared to play an active role in negotiations (ibid:314). States of the G7 can employ institutional power to impose their own agenda on trade negotiations. Scholars contributing to the securitization of development debate are less inclined to look at institutional power and give greater insight into the productive power of the institutions and networks of global governance, specifically in constructing, consolidating and disseminating a liberal discourse (Duffield, 2001a).

**The Production of Liberal Discourse**

Productive power concerns discourse – “the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced and transformed” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:20). Discourses are understood here as systems of significance that “define the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a problem” (Hayward, 2000:35 quoted in Barnett and Duvall, 2005:21). Focussing on productive power gives insight into “who needs to be ‘governed’, who is authorized to ‘govern’, what counts as legitimate knowledge, and whose voices are marginalized” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:22). The securitization of development debate gives insight into this form of power which is implied in the
production of a liberal discourse guiding global governance. Through the production of this discourse, the institutions and networks of global governance define and reproduce what constitutes legitimate knowledge. In defining which states or societies are failed, undemocratic, non-liberal or developing, global governance networks determine how these states are governed, who is authorized to govern them and what development policies and practices are imaginable and appropriate (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2007; 2001a). For example, states which are either in the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA\(^{26}\) or ‘not rated’ in this assessment are defined as fragile. Once this categorisation has been made, policy mechanisms such as the World Bank’s Low Income Countries Under Stress programme, or the EU’s ‘difficult partnerships’ initiative (Olson, 2004)\(^{27}\), are deployed accordingly (World Bank, 2007e). Hence “problematisations of danger, together with their allied discourses of fear” write Dillon and Reid “are the very means by which specific programmes of life, individual welfare, social formation and political order are introduced ...” (2001:5). These authors therefore provide a fruitful account of the productive power of discourse in relation to the governance of development.

As discussed in chapter two, Overbeek shows how dominant policy discourses are produced and cultivated through epistemic communities including representatives from within international organisations and dominant states (Overbeek, 2005:52). In addition Duffield, following Harrison (2004), draws attention to the practice of identifying, encouraging and cultivating ‘post-interventionary’ elites in Southern states whose interests, objectives and beliefs overlap with those of global development institutions (Duffield, 2007:167). Overcoming the omission within the orthodox global governance literature, Duffield and Overbeek give attention to how discourse, consensus and moral leadership are produced.

Within this model, global governance is understood to work within a “liberal paradigm” (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2001a:44; Selby, 2003; Soederberg, 2006; Overbeek, 2005). The analysis of global development policy discourse in chapters four and five lends support to this conception. This analysis demonstrated a policy position centred on the primacy of liberal democratic forms of governance and the appropriateness of ownership and participation as guiding principles of global development. According to this discourse, establishing liberal democracy in the South is the key to reducing poverty and sustaining peace, both of which are linked through the security-development nexus, as discussed in chapter four. To have arrived at this common vision is celebrated by global governance agencies, which advocate the pursuit of

\(^{26}\) The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), scores states according to various criteria including economic management, structural policies and social inclusion.

coordinated development efforts and argue for greater collaboration (Commission of
the European Communities, 2005:2; Persson and Jamtin, 2004:4; United Nations,
2005; Goal 8). This lends support to the idea of a global governance complex which,
rather than being politically neutral, technical or pluralist, is highly political, operating
within and reproducing a distinctly liberal framework for action. Prioritising the
processes of ownership and participation, which Dean (1999:155) refers to as
“techniques for self-actualisation”, implies that the inherent rationality of individuals
within developing countries will enable them to come to their own understanding of
(liberal) development.

Through reference to multilateral policy declarations, chapter five also demonstrated
that international organisations have constructed a broadly convergent and coherent
political policy position centred around the primacy of good or democratic governance,
including human rights, the rule of law and accountability (Aid Harmonization, 2005a;
2003; Duffield, 2001:74; United Nations, 2002; United Nations General Assembly,
2000). Furthermore, whilst in practice their objectives may be limited, PRSPs and the
Aid Harmonization process demonstrate a growing coordination of development
governance and policy, corroborating the claim that global governance seeks to
coordinate development policy, share information and utilise comparative advantage
between development agencies (Duffield, 2001a:44-45).

Whilst there is broad discursive agreement on the political element of this liberal
discourse, tensions were identified in chapter five concerning the primacy of neo-
liberal economic policy and the idea that developing states should be selectively
included into aid networks on the basis of their adherence to a liberal framework
(Persson and Karlsson, 2003:27). Rejection by the UNDP, Sweden and, in some
instances, the UK (DFID, 2006; Vandermoortele, 2004) of some specific neo-liberal
economic prescriptions, implies that neo-liberalism is not a common ideological
framework of global governance, as Overbeek (2005) suggests, but could instead be
described as a “complex and hybrid political imaginary, rather than a coherent
ideology” (Larner, 2006:205).

Such divergence may be indicative of the wider tension between the theoretical
underpinning of neo-liberal economic globalization and liberal democratisation. The
World Bank and USAID prioritise the former, whilst the UNDP and SIDA prioritise the
latter. Whilst USAID argue that neo-liberal policies enhance liberal development and
thus contribute to global stability, the human security discourse emphasises that this
capitalist logic can undermine liberal development. Therien (2005) has found a similar
division in relation to the discourse of poverty (although he investigates the UN, rather
than the UNDP). He identifies two competing ‘paradigms’, one emanating from the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF, WTO) and the other from the UN. The former imbues globalisation with progressive tendencies, whereas the latter believes globalisation multiplies inequalities (ibid: 219). He concludes that “the UN paradigm offers the most coherent alternate narrative on global poverty” (ibid: 220).

In line with the notion of liberal global governance, the ‘human security’ discourse still seeks to develop or change people and societies - the “improved self-regulation of whatever processes it addresses” (Dillon and Reid, 2001:29). However, to envisage a ‘liberal consensus’ does not account for the conflicting dynamics between the agencies of global governance (Duffield, 2001a:73). In offering a sufficiently different narrative of poverty and security, the UNDP and SIDA may offer important arenas in which to identify, challenge or subvert dominant discourses. And, as discussed in chapter 2, in contrast to Duffield, Wilkin (2002) and Thomas (2001) are inclined to understand the human security discourse as a potentially positive alternative.

The productive power of discourse and ideas does not stay tethered to the institution/actor that initially produced a given discourse or idea. Productive power is diffuse and as such can shape outcomes in ways not intended or anticipated. This is true of all forms of power, but especially so with productive power. Discourse and ideas can be adopted to legitimate and justify policies or causes antithetical to their original use. This can be thought of as resistance to productive power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 23). In this way, Sweden and the UNDP draw from the dominant liberal discourse of human rights, democracy and equality to critique aspects of the orthodox position and offer alternatives, disrupting the dominant discursive understandings of global development policy.

In emphasising the coherence of the liberal discourse of global governance, these internally contradictory and contested aspects of the discourse are not identified or engaged with. As Jessop and Sum (2006) note, the unity and consensus generated by successful hegemonic projects is always temporary, if not illusory. Thus depicting a liberal consensus bestows a greater coherence and logic to global governance than may be evident. On the other hand, acknowledging complexity enables the identification of alternatives and potential forces for change (Larner, 2006:214).
Chapter Seven

Societal Transformation

The extent to which global governance seeks institutional change through the selective distribution of aid is questionable. However, chapter six argued that development programmes pursue the transformation of the ‘mindset’, interests and behaviour of individuals and populations. Both SSR and local level development programmes give primacy to liberal democratic governance, ownership and participation. They also attest to what Young calls the intense desire to impose the deliriums of liberalism on everyone else (Young, 1995:528-530). These programmes imply that with the right information and resources, communities have the capacity to make the right (liberal) choices about their lives. As such, development problems are understood as endogenous, rather than exogenous to a particular society. NGOs are embedded in this process of liberal transformation through the construction, implementation and evaluation of SSR and local level development programmes (Department for International Development Caribbean, 2000; Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia, 2006). This investigation therefore provides evidence of the civil-political complex, described as a division of labour between state and non-state/private agencies (Duffield, 2004a; see also Dillon and Reid, 2000; Young, 1995). Furthermore, both programmes are directed towards the pursuit of peace and stability in the South. Through changing how people think and define themselves and their interests, these programmes seek to create communities and populations in which conflict is dealt with without recourse to violence (Cliffe et al., 2003). The securitization of development debate therefore identifies, in liberal societal transformation, a central rationale of global development (Young, 1995).

The idea that liberal change through development programming is something being done to non-liberal populations, however, obscures the agency of home-grown liberal transformation and restricts the type of questions we can explore. For example, through local level development programmes, is there space for communities to identify specific constraints (which may be external, rather than internal to the community) and concrete practices which could transform or subvert them? This may be unlikely, but understanding these programmes as projects of global governance does not allow for such possibilities to be explored. Participatory development could be understood, instead, as part of an ongoing process of engagement with political struggle (Williams, 2004). Alternatively, domestic actors pushing for liberal change may attest to the internalisation of the conception of a ‘free’ liberal self by Southern populations who are self-governing their conduct (Dean, 1999; Harrison, 2004).
The investigation in chapter six also highlighted that the civil-political complex is characterised by a lack of coordination and trust between donors, southern governments and NGOs, suggesting that the picture of non-state actors as partners in the liberal societal transformation process needs some qualification through recognising the antagonistic relations that can exist between state and non-state actors (Ginifer, 2004).

Liberalism(s)

There are potentially three readings of liberalism relevant to this discussion. The first is liberalism as a coherent discourse of global governance. Duffield (2001a) initially uses this understanding, i.e. global governance utilises liberal political and economic tenets. Using this interpretation, liberal societal transformation is understood as a response to the security-development nexus (Duffield, 2001a:259): the creation of liberal democratic societies with market economies will engender peace and stability. This first reading is at the fore in the discussion of the production of liberal discourse, above, so is not rehearsed here.

For Foucault, liberalism is not a political philosophy, ideology, coherent set of ideas or institutional structure but contains within it a form of governing which seeks to limit and restrain the exercise of authority by governing bodies (Dean, 1999, Foucault, 2010). This is the second reading.

The third reading is an extension of the second, that is, neoliberalism as governmentality. This is described as liberalism’s contemporary form, or advanced liberalism (Hindess, 2004) and highlights the mentality of the market being internalised by individuals.

In later work, following Young (1995) and Dillon and Reid (2001; 2000), Duffield utilises this second interpretation. Liberalism, he argues, refers to a technology of government that supports freedom while governing people through the interconnected natural, social and economic processes that sustain life (Duffield, 2007:6). In linking development and liberalism, these authors depart from Foucault’s observations, which concerned ‘developed’ society, and engage the idea of a developmental trusteeship that allows the powers of freedom to be learned and safely applied; encouraging local level self-reliance and self-realisation both through and against the state (Duffield, 2008:145-146; 2007:7-8). “Development emerges as a moral trusteeship over life experienced as either incomplete, redundant or somehow surplus to requirements
This is underpinned by ‘politico-culturally coded racism’ which allows liberalism to accept freedom and democracy for the developed world, while tolerating illiberal or ‘good enough governance’ for the underdeveloped (Duffield, 2007: 193). This is different from liberal government in developed societies in that it involves not just governance through freedoms, but a great measure of coercion and intervention, and what would be considered by Foucault’s definition of liberalism as too much government. Such a trusteeship, which would otherwise be intolerable to liberalism, is considered acceptable if the result is the betterment of people and their early self-management (ibid). Duffield’s use of this interpretation is therefore, insightful.

This could be further explored. For example, the mechanism of ownership and participation limit the extent to which the direct control of populations is required, and rely instead upon what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’: the way in which one conducts the conduct of individuals, through the freedoms they enjoy (Foucault, 2010:186). Or, to put it another way, power over others is made operable through the freedoms of those over whom it is exercised (Dean, 1999:46). Echoing this, Young observes that the liberal project of development, in contrast to imperial power, seeks the consent of the citizens it seeks to transform, rather than their mere compliance (1995:534).

Similarly, Duffield notes that people in the South are no longer ordered what to do, but are expected to do it willingly themselves (Duffield, 2001a:34). The production of freedom by liberal government, however, entails limitations and coercion. This has resonance when discussing the freedoms of ownership, participation and empowerment that global development policy (underscored by techniques of control and coercion) seeks to produce.

Using these two interpretations of liberalism (liberalism as a political discourse and liberalism as governance through freedoms) brings to the fore a tension within the analysis of liberal societal transformation. Transforming societies into liberal democracies as a response to the security-development nexus is not the same as employing liberal techniques of governance, as a moral imperative or as solving the liberal problematic of governing to little or too much. Duffield prioritises the former (2005; 2001a) and subsequently the latter (2007). Dillon and Reid (2001; 2000) and Young (1995) prioritise the moral imperative to “impose the deliriums of liberation on everyone else” (ibid:530), but also imply the security-development nexus as a driver of transformation in some of their work (Dillon and Reid, 2000:120).
From a different critical perspective, Ayers (2009) Harrison (2006) and Porter and Craig (2004) argue that liberal societal transformation is embedding the logic of neoliberal global capitalism. Ayers (2009) argues that development agencies prioritise economic liberalisation over democratisation when the two aims clash. And, furthermore, argues that the promotion of private economic interests in part drives the pursuit of civil society transformation in the global South (ibid:15). I.e. the creation of a separate economic sphere of human activity, constituting the arena of production, distribution and exchange (ibid:14-15). In addition, Porter and Craig (2004) argue that the move towards ‘inclusive liberalism’, evident within the development’s current preoccupation with partnership and participation, seeks to re-embed and legitimate neo-liberal order.

There are, therefore, three possible dynamics of liberal societal transformation in the South: the security-development nexus (which in part has geo-political underpinnings); liberalism as a form of limited governing through freedoms (which implies biopolitics and governmentality); and the emulation of capitalist relations. How these three dynamics can be reconciled within a theory of the securitization of development needs further investigation.

Returning to the discussion of liberalism(s), Foucault’s work on neo-liberalism as governmentality (the third reading of liberalism) is not explicitly utilised by Duffield to give insight into the securitization of development, but is employed by Dillon and Reid (2001) in relation to liberal global governance. The concept of governmentality is used to explain the introduction of political economy into the art of government, which is characteristic of the contemporary form of liberal governance (Donzelot, 2008). As well as concerned with the limit and restraint of governmental authority, neo-liberalism, in this reading, involves a form of governance that encourages both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market (Larner, 2006; Larner and Walters, 2004). Foucault analyses the development of neo-liberal thought in America and Germany in the second half of the last century. He argues that, according to this school of thought, because the market works most efficiently in conditions of inequality and competition, government must ensure these conditions exist by acting upon the population (Foucault, 2010:119-120). The role of the state is to intervene in favour of the market (rather than because of the market) in such a way that the market and the principle of equal inequality is maintained (Donzelot, 2008:124). This necessity of competition makes individuals into entrepreneurs: “someone who situates himself in a game and applies himself to increasing his successful outcomes" (ibid:130). In this regard one can establish a conduct of conduct because individuals

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29 This discussion is concerned with neo-liberalism as governmentality, which Larner (2006) distinguished from neo-liberalism as policy and ideology.
enjoy autonomy as entrepreneurs of their own life and, as such, are made responsible for it (ibid:130).

This is linked to the production of freedom. People are encouraged to see themselves as individualised and active subjects, responsible for enhancing their own wellbeing. Such individuals are governable, argues Foucault, because they govern themselves according to economic laws and “one can act on the environment in such a way as to modify ... conduct” (Foucault, 2010: 186). This enables individuals to be shaped and guided whilst at the same time respecting their autonomy (Rose, 1993:290).

Relating this to development, Larner sees neo-liberalism less as a response to capitalist crisis and more a response to the problem of how to govern the world when the poorest are no longer dependents or subjects but citizens of formally independent states (Larner, 2004:9). Rose links this to “advanced liberal rule” that seeks to detach the authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, and relocate experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer demand (Rose, 1993; 285). And Hindess (2004:26) argues that market interaction is perceived as a powerful instrument of civilisation, inculcating such virtues as prudence, diligence, punctuality and self control. He notes, with regard to Southern populations, that this view suggests that

... if only suitable property can be set securely in place and non-market forms of economic activity reduced to a minimum, then market interaction itself may function as a means of improving the character of less civilised peoples

(ibid:26)

Furthermore, Hindess (2004), in a departure from Foucault, offers a detailed explanation of how non-liberal mechanisms of government are intrinsic to liberalism. This is useful when considering liberalism and development, and Duffield’s idea of a developmental trusteeship. Hindess argues that liberalism will always have to deal with individuals and areas of conduct which seem not to be governable through available techniques of government through freedom (ibid:28). Liberalism will need to distinguish between what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what must be governed in other ways (ibid:30). The decision to sometimes use illiberal methods should be seen as a central feature of liberal political reason. Hindess argues that liberalism has always made use of illiberal methods of government. In line with Foucault, he highlights the market (free-market, private property) as the arena in which excessive government can be identified. But developing Foucault’s observations, Hindess maintains that the image of the market also provides a test of who can be
governed liberally, and who cannot. Those who do not internalise market principles or the culture of the entrepreneur, cannot be governed through freedoms.

Duffield argues that development is acceptable to liberalism because of ‘politico-culturally coded racism’ and the pursuit of early self-management. It is through politico-cultural racism that liberal government is able to distinguish between who can be governed through freedom and self-regulation and who must be governed through other methods.

Both Hindess and Duffield are concerned with engaging Foucault’s ideas of liberal government with global development. The two authors differ in their theory of what makes the governance of development acceptable to liberal government. Their theoretical conjectures are not contradictory and it would be insightful to probe these arguments further to distil there compatibility: How does the identification of non-entrepreneurial society and politico-culturally coded racism diverge to de-limit a zone of liberal exception?

Furthermore, neo-liberalism as governmentality may provide a potentially fruitful way to analyse liberal societal transformation. The way in which individuals within developing societies are encouraged to be entrepreneurs of their own lives through the processes of ownership, participation and empowerment, and the drive towards competition, anti-corruption, meritocracy and autonomy may be understood as such. Furthermore, the emergence of non-liberal forms of social and economic organisation, which is at the forefront of Duffield’s analysis, can be understood as resistance to governmentality, whilst non-liberal mechanisms of governance, are understood as an intrinsic part of liberalism.

The Structural Power of Global Capitalism

De Goede (2006:1) argues that a post-structural conceptualisation of power need not disable a critique of capitalism. However, significant contributions to the securitization of development debate have less to say about the structural power of global capitalism, than the productive power of the networks of global governance (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2000; Duffield, 2007; 2001a; Young, 1995). That the structure of global capitalism generates unequal social privileges is implicit in much of this work. For example, Duffield’s starting point for analysis is the division of the world into North and South on the basis of levels of integration into the formal networks of the global economy (2001a). This does not, however, constitute a central subject of investigation,
as it does for other critical scholars contributing to the securitization of development debate and the broader global governance literature (Castells, 1998; Harvey, 2003; Hoogvelt, 2001; Soederberg, 2002), leading to the tensions and omissions detailed in section 7.2. The structural power of capitalism is important in the work of Clapham, for example, who emphasises that revenues accrued to African states are sustained by exports based on primary products, which are subject to high fluctuations in export prices and affected by a long-term decline in prices (Clapham, 2003:56). Thomas also investigates how the workings of the global economy create inequality, and argues that alternative pathways to the pursuit of human security need to be explored (Thomas, 2001:174). And Gill, in demonstrating the structural power of capital, argues that because the process of economic growth depends on the need to maintain investor confidence, governments are driven to sustain their credibility in the eyes of investors by attempting to provide an appropriate business climate (Gill, 2005:176).

In allocating differential capacities and advantages, these structures, to a degree, also determine who can be governed and who is authorised and has the capacity to govern (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:18-22). Global capitalism is therefore implied in the emergence, evolution and definition of systems of global governance. It is through the structures of global capitalism that global governance institutions, in part, derive power. Furthermore, Hoogvelt emphasises that the structure of global capitalism shapes ideology (Hoogvelt, 2001:149). At the same time, by emphasising the responsibility and commitment that must come from developing societies themselves, the liberal development discourse masks the structural imperatives which generate inequality. The division between structural and productive forms of power is not therefore clear-cut, and they overlap in important ways. Barnett and Duvall highlight that both forms of power concern how the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these processes shape actors’ understandings, and perceived interests (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:20). However, whilst they are intimately linked and simultaneously employed within global governance networks, key contributions to the securitization of development debate privilege the productive power of discourse, over the structural constraints of global capitalism (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2000; Duffield, 2007; 2001a; Young 1995).

Jessop and Sum (2006) attempt to develop an approach to International Political Economy which combines the insights of Gramsci and Foucault; the material and the discursive (also see Joseph (2011) for an account which seeks to reconcile the material and discursive within Critical Terrorism Studies). They suggest an approach which “stresses the contradictory and conflictual dynamic of capitalist social formations based on the reciprocal interweaving and interaction of the material and the discursive”
(Jessop and Sum, 2006:166). These authors recognise that the structural dynamics of capital accumulation on a world scale and the processes and mechanisms through which political, intellectual and moral leadership is secured have a conjoint impact on capacities for action and transformation.

This approach is instructive in attempting to combine structural power (privileged by neo-Gramscian accounts) and productive power (privileged by Foucauldian accounts) to construct a theory of the securitization of development. This would entail relating the disciplinary aspects of development policy, including the discourse of ownership, participation and human security, with the dynamics of accumulation of a world scale. Duffield acknowledges the way in which dominance and social power are enacted in and through discourse. But the securitization of development is not only a discursive construct. There are underlying material structural dynamics to this phenomenon. Ontologically, this clearly means, in opposition to positivism and some poststructuralisms, acknowledging that there is a reality independent of our thought about it or our experience of it (Archer, 1998).

Jessop and Sum (2006:163) argue that, for Foucault, power is immanent and relational and has no ultimate ground beyond the specific technologies of power and their articulation of knowledge. Foucault’s focus on the micro-level techniques of government tends to be at the expense of the strategic relationships of power that they may imply (Dean, 1999:47). Such an approach is instructive in understanding the micro-level techniques of governance utilised in SSR and local level development programmes, but has less to say about how global governance networks are able to implement such intrusive projects. Socio-economic relations of dominance and strategy are often apparent in development policies. These material dynamics are crucial in theorising the unequal power relations that exist in relation to global governance networks and the Global South. As Harrison (2004:4) observes, the World Bank is able to produce ‘governance states’ in large part through its ability to dispense hard currency. Structural power relations are implicit when we consider the security-development nexus, which involves global governance networks utilising development policy and aid in the interests of wider stability (Danida, 2003; USAID, 2002a).

Thus an approach rooted in Gramsci, which grounds the exercise of power in specific material apparatuses and specific social practices, and asks how order is secured, would be instructive (Jessop and Sum, 2006:164). An approach which appreciated the reciprocal relations between the political, economic and ideological fields, would highlight, as Duffield does, the way in which dominance and social power are enacted through the discourses of the security-development nexus and liberal democratic
development. It would also include an analysis of the emergent structural properties that underlie power relations. Duffield touches on this in his short analysis of surplus populations (Duffield, 2007:7). A more explicit analysis could systematically investigate the effects of accumulation by dispossession, spatio-temporal fixes and other socio-economic practices on Southern populations. These may include forms of exclusion, the creation of ‘surplus populations’, increased parallel economic activity and non-liberal development. These dynamics are not only discursively identified by global governance as threats to wider security, but are embedded within wider social, historical and material relations (see for example, Soederberg, 2004). Discourse is a crucial component in the construction of the securitization of development, but it also has a material dimension in socio-economic relations, as well as possible material effects at the level of development programmes.

7.5 Conclusion

Overview of Concluding Arguments and Implications

This research has identified four broad strengths of the securitization of development debate.

Firstly, it draws attention to the liberal political discourse of global governance and how this discourse is produced and reproduced by the varied networks of global governance.

Secondly, it highlights liberal societal transformation as a key rationale of global governance. This could be developed through establishing greater clarity regarding the drivers of transformation and deeper engagement with the wider literature concerned with liberal societal transformation (Ayers, 2006, 2009; Harrison, 2004).

Thirdly, this literature identifies the security-development nexus, and seeks to trace its genealogy, production, effects and potential (Beall et al., 2005; Duffield, 2001a; 2005; Woods, 2005). Acknowledging the different narratives linking security and development would engender a more robust understanding of this discourse.

And finally, within this debate a fruitful application of post-structural analyses of liberalism and bio-politics to the problematic of global development has developed (Dillon, 2003; Duffield, 2007). This needs further clarity and potentially wider engagement with the governmentality literature (Larner, 2006; 2004; Hindess, 2004).
There are five broad limitations within the securitization of development debate. These are divided here into three empirical, one material and one discursive. The outlook for future research flows from these.

(Empirical)

This first set of limitations concern the empirical assumptions made by key scholars contributing to the securitization of development debate, of which this research has investigated three: that the security-development nexus affects development practice; that global governance institutions are selective in their approach to development resources; and that formal economic links to the South are shrinking.

Chapter four demonstrates that development aid cannot be fully understood within the logic of the security-development nexus. Conflict prevention in the South does not appear to be a strategic priority for donors. Therefore, the effect of the axiom that there can be no development without security and vice versa, on development resources, requires further investigation.

The second empirical contention needs qualification through specifying which donors are selective on the basis of adherence to a liberal political and economic framework, which are moving towards this, and which reject this approach. This will give a more nuanced picture of how the differing actors within the global governance system seek to elicit democratic change in the South.

The final empirical contention needs to be qualified through attention to the wider economic literature that presents a more complex and varied picture of global economic expansion and demonstrates the historical tendency towards the concentration and centralization of capital in core areas (Glen, 2008; Kiely, 2007). Furthermore, a more robust explanation of structural exclusion would need to take account of the many economic interactions (including, but not restricted to, the parallel economy) which link up ‘peripheral’ areas to the global economy, not least the way in which capital contradictions are deferred or displaced to the South (Harvey, 2003).
The theoretical and empirical limitations of the literature’s engagement with the structural dynamics of global capitalism were the subject of chapter three. These led to the contention that a theory of the securitization of development needs to pay greater attention to the structural dynamics of the global economy, including how these are linked to the production of discourse. Such an approach needs to be rooted in the material structures of what Jessop and Sum (2006) call the ‘hegemony of production’, as well as the discursive dynamics of the ‘production of hegemony’.

As discussed above, the securitization of development debate aids our understanding of the productive power employed through global governance networks. However, depicting global governance as unified through a liberal consensus and the security-development nexus, endows a greater coherence to these discourses than they warrant. In doing so, internal contradiction, contestation and contingency is obscured. An approach to these related discourses which makes visible the ‘messy actualities’ (Larner, 2006) of global governance may reveal potential and spaces for specific emancipatory change.

Wider Relevance of Work

This thesis has engaged with the securitization of development debate broadly situated within the critical global governance literature. As a prominent scholar within this debate, the works of Duffield has been key. As discussed in the introduction, his work is at the forefront of this field and encompasses the central assumptions of those authors concerned with the securitization of development. This research is therefore primarily applicable to the wider securitization of development debate.

This research also has relevance for scholars, from within the neo-Marxist as well as post-structuralist field of global governance, who are concerned with the way in which aid is increasingly politicized (Soederberg, 2004). Hindess (2004:34), for example argues that international aid programmes constrain the conduct of post-colonial states through IFIs. However, chapter six suggested the evidence that access to aid is conditional upon adherence to liberal reform, was far from conclusive. The research therefore contributes to the ongoing discussion concerning the extent to which ODA is politicized or securitized.
Hindess also highlights the governmental use of empowerment and responsibility within development programmes as instruments of self-regulation (Hindess, 2004:35). Both of these dynamics are evident within SSR and local level development programmes, as demonstrated in chapter six. In debating how global governance induces change within the global South, the research is instructive.

This thesis has also questioned the coherence and strategic purpose of global governance, which some critical global governance scholars tend to emphasise (Porter and Craig, 2004; Overbeek, 2005). Chapters four and five demonstrate that such an approach may imbue global governance with a coherence and strategic vision which is unwarranted. The contention that neo-liberalism represents a ‘common sense’ understanding is challenged and resistance to its more stringent policies, from within global governance networks, is identified.

This research also engages with, and has implications for, neo-Marxist understandings of global governance and development. Cammack, for example, argues that the central logic of global development is the creation of a reserve army of labour that will “enforce the disciplines of capitalist labour-markets across the greater part of humanity” (Cammack, 2002:125). Such an approach to global governance sidelines the prominent discourse linking development to wider security concerns. Moreover, the move towards ‘second generation reform’, including the liberal societal transformation of non-liberal populations, is not immediately or solely directed towards expanding opportunities for global capital accumulation or the proletarianization of Southern populations.

Finally, in evaluating the way in which productive and structural power are theorised within the securitization of development model, this thesis adds to the critique of orthodox global governance theory which tends to ignore these more opaque and insidious forms of power.

**Outlook for Future Research**

This thesis has engaged with a topical body of literature which straddles the fields of critical global governance studies, including Critical Theory, as well as post-structural politics, and critical development studies. Inevitably, this has opened up more avenues of enquiry which could not be addressed within the confines of this thesis.
1. This thesis has identified serious limitations within the current securitization of
development debate in relation to its understanding of the relationship between
the securitization of development and the wider social and economic structures of
global capitalism. It is beyond the confines of this thesis to seriously attempt to
rectify this. However, this conclusion has suggested an approach, following Jessop
and Sum (2006) that considers both the material structures of capital accumulation
and the related discursive dynamics of global governance.

2. This research has also suggested that ‘territorial logic’ or geopolitics is an
important dynamic for key actors within global governance network. To gain
further clarity into the securitization of development (and related to the suggestion
above), therefore, a systematic investigation of the relationship between territorial
logic (or geopolitics), liberalism (as a form of bio-politics) and the structural
imperatives and constraints of global capital accumulation is required. This thesis
has pointed towards the influence of these dynamics and argued that the
relationship between them has not been sufficiently explained. Furthermore, if we
can delineate which dynamics are most important for which global governance
actors, this would substantially aid our understanding of the complexities of
contemporary global governance.

3. The security-development nexus is connected to the ‘war on terror’ narrative
(geopolitics) as well as the ‘human security’ narrative, which in part relies on a
particular liberal perspective that implies bio-politics. Furthering the work of Hettne
(2010) and Stern and Ojenda (2010) there is scope to investigate the rationale and
interests driving these positions. Such an analysis of discourse could focus on how
these narratives are linked, their internal inconsistencies and contradictions, and
how the discourses of the security-development nexus may change. This would
produce a more dynamic and complex picture of the discourses linking security
and development.

4. The rationale(s) driving liberal societal transformation in the South need further
investigation. Specifically, how are security-development discourses, liberal
technologies of government at the micro-level and capitalist interests moulding
development programming, and what are the relationships and links between these
dynamics?

5. How the endogenous pursuit of liberal transformation in the global South should
be understood merits further attention. Specifically, should this be understood
within the context of a liberal global governance project of transformation, or as
part of an ongoing process of engagement with political struggle, or as the internalisation of the conception of a ‘free’ liberal self by Southern populations who are self-governing their conduct (Dean, 1999; Harrison, 2004)?

6. Finally, there is scope for additional research into the determinants of the geographical distribution of development aid to further monitor the effect of the security-development nexus and selectivity. How much, for example, has been diverted into the UK’s conflict prevention pools and the US Millennium Challenge Account? Furthermore, this could fruitfully engage with recent studies that have attempted to understand the effect that the war on terror has had on the distribution of ODA (Aning, 2010).
Appendix 1. List of Interviewees

DG Development, European Commission, Brussels 24th – 25th November 2004
1. Anonymous. Economic Cooperation and the PRSP Process
2. De Jonghe, Karen. Coordination with the World Bank
3. Jesinghaus, Jochen. Administrator, Relations with the United Nations System, Member States and other OECD donors
4. Lenormand, Patrice. Administrator, Coordination with Member States
5. Olson, Marita. Governance/Institutional Development and Difficult Partnerships
6. Paniagua, Jose. International Desk Officer in charge of Enlargement, OECD/DAC Relations and other International organisations
7. Wilkki, Timo. Desk Officer, Coordination with UN Processes.

UNDP, New York 14th – 15th February 2005
11. Izmestiev, Artemy. Consultant, Poverty Reduction Group, Bureau for Development Policy
12. Jones, Terence. Director of Capacity Development, Bureau for Development Policy
13. Kuehn, Susanne. Poverty Specialist, MDG focal point, Bureau for Development Policy

World Bank, Washington 22nd – 25th February 2005
16. Anonymous. Coordinator, Low Income Countries under Stress
17. Anonymous. Director, Social Development Department
20. Fort, Lucia. Senior Gender Specialist, Gender and Development Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
21. Ordon, Katoline. Civil Society Team
22. Sharkey, Katrina. Senior Operations Officer, Poverty Reduction

IMF, Washington 23rd – 24th February 2005
23. Bisping, Jennifer. NGO Liaison Officer, External Affairs Department
24. Plant, Mark. Senior Advisor, Policy Development and Review Department

OECD, Paris 22\textsuperscript{nd} November 2005

25. Bell, Edward. Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation, Policy Coordination Division, Development Cooperation Directorate

26. Lehembre, Christian. Head of Aid Effectiveness Division

27. Scott, Simon. Principal Administrator, Statistics and Monitoring Division Development Co-operation Directorate

28. Williams, Lisa. DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Development Cooperation Directorate

Swedish Government October/December 2005

29. Rabe, Patrick. Deputy Director, Head EU-Coordination, Division for Global Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25\textsuperscript{th} October 2005 (Leeds, UK)

30. Soder, Annika. State Secretary for Development, 1\textsuperscript{st} December 2005 (telephone interview)
Appendix 2. Research Design of Statistical Analysis

The dependent variable is the log of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in constant US$ that a country receives in the years 1991-2002. The log of ODA is used so that the distribution of this variable is more even. The multilateral donors examined here are the European Commission (EC), the International Development Association (IDA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The International Development Association is the part of the World Bank which gives grants and low-interest loans to poor countries – in effect it is the arm of the Bank which allocates ODA. The World Bank as a whole also loans money to richer countries who can afford to pay higher interest. Such resources cannot be described as ODA. The OECD does not distribute ODA as an organisation, so is not included in this analysis.

For the multilateral donors – the UNDP, the IDA and the EC – ODA is in 2001 prices. For the bilateral donors – the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark – ODA is in 2003 prices. This is because the multilaterals were examined earlier than the bilateral donors, when ODA was given in 2001 prices. When it came to analysing bilateral aid flows, the database had been updated to 2003 prices. All data on ODA is taken from the OECD’s International Development Statistics Online Database (http://www.oecd.org. This is also available form www.esds.ac.uk). Each year is analysed to give separate results. This way any trends can be picked up.

ODA, also referred to here as aid, includes grants as well as highly concessional loans (i.e. loans with a grant element of at least 25%) that are “undertaken by the official sector” and administered with the “promotion of economic development and welfare” of the recipient countries as its main objective (Bell, 2003:294). Negative amounts of ODA are excluded from this analysis because this study is not concerned with repayments of concessional loans, but distribution of ODA.

The first independent variable is Conflict Intensity Level. The Conflict Intensity Level is taken from the Uppsala University Conflict Database (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php). This database gives each conflict location an intensity level as follows:

*Minor:* At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.

*Intermediate:* At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths but fewer than 1000 in any given year.
War: at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.

Each of these levels were allocated a corresponding score:

Minor – 1
Intermediate – 2
War – 3

Locations of no conflict are given the score of 0.

The Uppsala database splits Bosnia and Herzegovina into two: Serb and Croat. In order to make this compatible with the Freedom House data (see below), which only has one score for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest Conflict Intensity Level of the two (Serb and Croat) is taken as the Conflict Intensity Level for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second independent variable is the political rights and civil liberties index, published yearly in the Freedom in the World Survey (http://www.freedomhouse.org). The Freedom in the World Survey allocates a political rights’ rating and a civil liberty rating both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. For this database the average of the political rights and civil liberty rating is given for each country. This gives a score of 1-7, 1 being the best and 7 being the worst.

In response to the literature, the following variables will also be controlled for: Population, Gross Domestic Product, which is logged to render its distribution less skewed, and the Human Development Index score. These can be used as a proxy for recipient need, which has been found to affect the amount of aid a country receives (Neumayer, 2003d; Trumbull and Wall, 1994).

The total number of states used in this analysis was 157. However, the sample size changes from year to year, and donor to donor (the lowest sample for any one donor in any one year being 93). To be included in the sample for a particular year and for a particular donor, states must receive ODA from that donor and have data for each of the variables. In accordance with Neumayer (2003b), the independent variables enter the regression with a two-year time lag to mimic the data situation facing donors when making aid allocation decisions.
Appendix 3. The Freedom in the World Survey, Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indicators

Political Rights
A. Electoral Process
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

C. Functioning of Government
1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?

Civil Liberties
D. Freedom of Expression and Belief
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious expression?
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
4. Is there open and free private discussion?
E. Associational and Organizational Rights
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

F. Rule of Law
1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
4. Is the population treated equally under the law?

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
1. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
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