Verification in referral-based crowdsourcing

Naroditskiy, Victor, Rahwan, Iyad, Cebrian, Manuel and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2012) Verification in referral-based crowdsourcing PLoS ONE, 7, (10), e45924. (doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924).


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Online social networks offer unprecedented potential for rallying a large number of people to accomplish a given task. Here we focus on information gathering tasks where rare information is sought through "referral-based crowdsourcing": the information request is propagated recursively through invitations among members of a social network. Whereas previous work analyzed incentives for the referral process in a setting with only correct reports, misreporting is known to be both pervasive in crowdsourcing applications, and difficult/costly to filter out. A motivating example for our work is the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge where the level of misreporting was very high. In order to undertake a formal study of verification, we introduce a model where agents can exert costly effort to perform verification and false reports can be penalized. This is the first model of verification and it provides many directions for future research, which we point out. Our main theoretical result is the compensation scheme that minimizes the cost of retrieving the correct answer. Notably, this optimal compensation scheme coincides with the winning strategy of the Red Balloon Challenge.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924
ISSNs: 1932-6203 (print)
Related URLs:
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 342826
Date :
Date Event
10 October 2012Published
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2012 10:03
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 16:38
Further Information:Google Scholar

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