Harmful rights-doing? The perceived problem of liberal paradigms and public health
Harmful rights-doing? The perceived problem of liberal paradigms and public health
The focus of this paper is public health law and ethics, and the analytic framework advanced in the report Public health: ethical issues by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The author criticises the perceived problems found with liberal models associated with Millian political philosophy and questions the Report’s attempt to add to such theoretical frameworks. The author suggests a stronger theoretical account that the Council could have adopted—that advanced in the works of Joseph Raz—which would have been more appropriate. Instead of seeking to justify overruling the legitimate interests of individuals in favour of society, this account holds that the interests are necessarily interwoven and thus such a conflict does not exist. It is based on an objective moral account and does not require an excessive commitment to individuals’ entitlements
798-801
Coggon, John
192d1511-cd81-45f4-8748-c398b74949b9
November 2008
Coggon, John
192d1511-cd81-45f4-8748-c398b74949b9
Coggon, John
(2008)
Harmful rights-doing? The perceived problem of liberal paradigms and public health.
Journal of Medical Ethics, 34 (11), .
(doi:10.1136/jme.2007.024067).
Abstract
The focus of this paper is public health law and ethics, and the analytic framework advanced in the report Public health: ethical issues by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The author criticises the perceived problems found with liberal models associated with Millian political philosophy and questions the Report’s attempt to add to such theoretical frameworks. The author suggests a stronger theoretical account that the Council could have adopted—that advanced in the works of Joseph Raz—which would have been more appropriate. Instead of seeking to justify overruling the legitimate interests of individuals in favour of society, this account holds that the interests are necessarily interwoven and thus such a conflict does not exist. It is based on an objective moral account and does not require an excessive commitment to individuals’ entitlements
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Published date: November 2008
Organisations:
Southampton Law School
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Local EPrints ID: 342900
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/342900
ISSN: 1473-4257
PURE UUID: aab601f1-bb64-4fc5-877f-c18d3047b9ce
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Date deposited: 19 Sep 2012 11:22
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 11:56
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John Coggon
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