Director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa
Director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa
This paper investigates the relationship between director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. Our results suggest a statistically significant and positive association between director shareownership and corporate performance. By contrast, we find no evidence of a non-linear effect of director shareownership on corporate performance. Our findings are robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity problems and corporate performance proxies. Overall, our results provide support for agency theory, which suggests that director shareownership can reduce agency problems by aligning more closely the interests of shareholders and corporate executives, and thereby improving corporate performance.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate performance, director shareownership, South Africa, endogeneity
corporate governance, corporate performance, director shareownership, South Africa, endogeneity
359-373
Ntim, Collins G.
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
29 December 2012
Ntim, Collins G.
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
Ntim, Collins G.
(2012)
Director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa.
African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1 (4), .
(doi:10.1504/AJAAF.2012.052137).
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. Our results suggest a statistically significant and positive association between director shareownership and corporate performance. By contrast, we find no evidence of a non-linear effect of director shareownership on corporate performance. Our findings are robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity problems and corporate performance proxies. Overall, our results provide support for agency theory, which suggests that director shareownership can reduce agency problems by aligning more closely the interests of shareholders and corporate executives, and thereby improving corporate performance.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate performance, director shareownership, South Africa, endogeneity
Text
Collins Ntim JMAA African Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance 2012
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Published date: 29 December 2012
Keywords:
corporate governance, corporate performance, director shareownership, South Africa, endogeneity
Organisations:
Centre of Excellence for International Banking, Finance & Accounting, Accounting
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 343117
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/343117
ISSN: 2046-8083
PURE UUID: 647418a1-6a4c-4338-a29f-83964e52ef01
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Date deposited: 24 Sep 2012 14:24
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 02:27
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