Managerial capital and firm types: findings from private bond contracts

Bouvier, Laurent and Nisar, T.M. (2012) Managerial capital and firm types: findings from private bond contracts Applied Economics Letters, 20, (6), pp. 592-595. (doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.720009).


Full text not available from this repository.


Field experiments have variously discovered that modern management practices enhance productivity, but not all firms adopt such practices. In this study, we examine private bond contracts used by the public house operators to explore if such variations are due to the differences in the types of the firms. Bond covenants make management actions in areas such as acquisitions and disposals contingent on meeting specified performance targets. We find that managed firms that provide greater flexibility in managing their operations are more responsive to these constraints than tenanted firms. The significant variations in the propensity of the firms to respond to covenant restrictions suggest that firms vary in their capacity to take different management actions.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.720009
ISSNs: 1350-4851 (print)
Keywords: firm types, managerial capital, bond covenants, acquisitions, disposals
Organisations: Faculty of Business, Law and Art
ePrint ID: 343129
Date :
Date Event
13 September 2012Published
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2012 15:41
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 16:35
Further Information:Google Scholar

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item