The MTCR and the future of ballistic missile non-proliferation

Smith, Mark (2001) The MTCR and the future of ballistic missile non-proliferation Disarmament Diplomacy, (54)


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At the Russian-US summit in June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed "that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies" and stressed "their desire to reverse that process, including through existing and possible new international legal mechanisms". By equating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles as key concerns, the two leaders acknowledged one of the most significant developments in international military security over the last five years or so, and seemed newly interested in using arms control as a means of addressing it.
Efforts to find new ways to tackle the problem have been driven by a threefold crisis in strategies for coping with ballistic missile proliferation. First, the proliferation of such missiles was perceived to increase. Second, the existing international regime to promote the non-proliferation of ballid urgency to the search for durable diplomatic solutions. Over the course of the last year, these three factors combined to compel the MTCR to formulate a Draft Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation, a CBM-based initiative designed to establish the basis for a non-proliferation regime on missile activities.

Item Type: Article
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ePrint ID: 34388
Date :
Date Event
February 2001Published
Date Deposited: 18 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:13
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