Testing the Finch Hypothesis on Green OA Mandate Ineffectiveness

Gargouri, Y, Lariviere, V, Gingras, Y, Brody, T, Carr, L and Harnad, S (2012) Testing the Finch Hypothesis on Green OA Mandate Ineffectiveness At Open Access Week 2012.


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We have now tested the Finch Committee's Hypothesis that Green Open Access Mandates are ineffective in generating deposits in institutional repositories. With data from ROARMAP on institutional Green OA mandates and data from ROAR on institutional repositories, we show that deposit number and rate is significantly correlated with mandate strength (classified as 1-12): The stronger the mandate, the more the deposits. The strongest mandates generate deposit rates of 70%+ within 2 years of adoption, compared to the un-mandated deposit rate of 20%. The effect is already detectable at the national level, where the UK, which has the largest proportion of Green OA mandates, has a national OA rate of 35%, compared to the global baseline of 25%. The conclusion is that, contrary to the Finch Hypothesis, Green Open Access Mandates do have a major effect, and the stronger the mandate, the stronger the effect (the Liege ID/OA mandate, linked to research performance evaluation, being the strongest mandate model). RCUK (as well as all universities, research institutions and research funders worldwide) would be well advised to adopt the strongest Green OA mandates and to integrate institutional and funder mandates.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Venue - Dates: Open Access Week 2012, 2012-10-26
Keywords: open access, open access mandates, Finch Report, RCUK Open Access Policy, ROAR, ROARMAP, Open Access Policy, research assessment, institutional repositories, sprints
Organisations: Web & Internet Science
ePrint ID: 344687
Date :
Date Event
26 October 2012e-pub ahead of print
Date Deposited: 26 Oct 2012 16:24
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 16:26
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/344687

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