Experimental evidence of self-image concerns as motivation for giving
Experimental evidence of self-image concerns as motivation for giving
In this paper we present evidence of self-image concerns in charitable giving using a laboratory experiment. Subjects make a series of three decisions of allocating an endowment of £10 between themselves and a passive recipient that is either a charity or the experimenters. When making these decision subjects are informed that one of them will be chosen randomly at the end to determine payoffs. After all decisions have been made and it has been revealed which decision will determine payoffs we offer subjects an opportunity to opt out from their initial decision and receive £10 instead. We find that almost a quarter of subjects choose to opt out, while around one third opt out from a positive donation. The fact that a subject decides to revise a decision to give and chooses instead to keep the whole amount – an option that was available when she made the first decision and was not exercised – indicates that giving in the first instance was not motivated solely by altruism toward the recipient. We argue that opting out can be explained through a combination of a reduced benefit of self-signaling due to satiation, and an increase in the costs of giving at the opt out stage, as they are realized with certainty.
dictator game, charitable giving, opting-out, self-image, self-signal
19-27
Tonin, Mirco
2929ca00-ca4e-4eb3-bf2b-a5d233b80253
Vlassopoulos, Michael
2d557227-958c-4855-92a8-b74b398f95c7
June 2013
Tonin, Mirco
2929ca00-ca4e-4eb3-bf2b-a5d233b80253
Vlassopoulos, Michael
2d557227-958c-4855-92a8-b74b398f95c7
Tonin, Mirco and Vlassopoulos, Michael
(2013)
Experimental evidence of self-image concerns as motivation for giving.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90, .
(doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.011).
Abstract
In this paper we present evidence of self-image concerns in charitable giving using a laboratory experiment. Subjects make a series of three decisions of allocating an endowment of £10 between themselves and a passive recipient that is either a charity or the experimenters. When making these decision subjects are informed that one of them will be chosen randomly at the end to determine payoffs. After all decisions have been made and it has been revealed which decision will determine payoffs we offer subjects an opportunity to opt out from their initial decision and receive £10 instead. We find that almost a quarter of subjects choose to opt out, while around one third opt out from a positive donation. The fact that a subject decides to revise a decision to give and chooses instead to keep the whole amount – an option that was available when she made the first decision and was not exercised – indicates that giving in the first instance was not motivated solely by altruism toward the recipient. We argue that opting out can be explained through a combination of a reduced benefit of self-signaling due to satiation, and an increase in the costs of giving at the opt out stage, as they are realized with certainty.
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Published date: June 2013
Keywords:
dictator game, charitable giving, opting-out, self-image, self-signal
Organisations:
Economics
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Local EPrints ID: 345387
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/345387
ISSN: 0167-2681
PURE UUID: 43e681e1-a3c9-4b44-8ebc-a9c0cdb945ad
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Date deposited: 20 Nov 2012 15:14
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:28
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Author:
Mirco Tonin
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