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Tightropes and tripwires: New Labour's proposals and means-testing in old age

Tightropes and tripwires: New Labour's proposals and means-testing in old age
Tightropes and tripwires: New Labour's proposals and means-testing in old age
This paper analyses the Government's proposals contained in A New Contract for Welfare: Partnership in Pensions. It examines the position of low paid workers and the potential of the proposals to protect individuals from means-tested old age. The paper identifies that the Green Paper's proposals add up to reinventing a new two-stage basic pension but at proposed levels that could extend means-testing to low paid workers. The paper then models the Green Paper's proposals on lifetime incomes of a hypothetical, low-income individual and their partner. Two key features of the proposed basic pension package are argued as problematic. First, the level of payment, and second, lifetime participation rules that prevent comprehensive coverage or tightropes and tripwires, respectively. The paper identifies potential incentive problems, and problems of sustainability. The authors make several suggestions about changes to the proposals that could meet their concerns.
23
London School of Economics
Evans, Martin
d76e5b1e-014d-49c9-8dbb-7e810e8afd94
Rake, Katherine
07c2f2f5-86e8-4982-85e0-82acb20a93c7
Falkingham, Jane
8df36615-1547-4a6d-ad55-aa9496e85519
Evans, Martin
d76e5b1e-014d-49c9-8dbb-7e810e8afd94
Rake, Katherine
07c2f2f5-86e8-4982-85e0-82acb20a93c7
Falkingham, Jane
8df36615-1547-4a6d-ad55-aa9496e85519

(1999) Tightropes and tripwires: New Labour's proposals and means-testing in old age (CASE Papers, 23) London, UK. London School of Economics 25pp.

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

Abstract

This paper analyses the Government's proposals contained in A New Contract for Welfare: Partnership in Pensions. It examines the position of low paid workers and the potential of the proposals to protect individuals from means-tested old age. The paper identifies that the Green Paper's proposals add up to reinventing a new two-stage basic pension but at proposed levels that could extend means-testing to low paid workers. The paper then models the Green Paper's proposals on lifetime incomes of a hypothetical, low-income individual and their partner. Two key features of the proposed basic pension package are argued as problematic. First, the level of payment, and second, lifetime participation rules that prevent comprehensive coverage or tightropes and tripwires, respectively. The paper identifies potential incentive problems, and problems of sustainability. The authors make several suggestions about changes to the proposals that could meet their concerns.

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More information

Published date: April 1999

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 34648
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/34648
PURE UUID: 78198de8-842f-4c0a-8712-b14f23e9dffe
ORCID for Jane Falkingham: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-7135-5875

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 08 Feb 2008
Last modified: 16 Oct 2018 00:34

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