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Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.
1932-6203
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7

Brede, Markus (2013) Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS ONE, 8 (2).

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

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Published date: 2013
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 346849
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/346849
ISSN: 1932-6203
PURE UUID: 547c3fb4-3991-4ee4-ac17-f1d37b4f9157

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Date deposited: 09 Jan 2013 16:20
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 05:01

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Author: Markus Brede

University divisions

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