Equality, democracy and self-respect: Nietzsche's agonic perfectionism
Equality, democracy and self-respect: Nietzsche's agonic perfectionism
'One who makes himself a worm cannot complain if people step on him.'
—Immanuel Kant
Kant's remark may sound harsh to our modern sensibility but it raises an issue that is central to an understanding of Nietzsche's critique of "the democratic movement of our times" (BGE 203) and, thus, to an understanding of Nietzsche's salience for contemporary democratic theory. This issue is self-respect—and, more generally, the topic of duties to oneself. The relationship between this issue and democratic theory may not appear a wholly obvious one but, on Nietzsche's account, it is crucial to the kind of equality that is expressed by democratic practices. Nietzsche's concern, I'll argue, is that "the democratic movement of our times" expresses a levelling mode of equality that undermines the conditions of self-respect in the relevant sense. Consequently, the aim of this article will be to elucidate Nietzsche's understanding of self-respect, to clarify the grounds on which he attacks "the democratic movement of our times" and to consider the relationship between these arguments and his advocacy of the agon as a model of cultural and political relations. It concludes by drawing out the implications of this interpretation of Nietzsche for democratic theory.
113-131
Owen, David
9fc71bca-07d1-44af-9248-1b9545265a58
2002
Owen, David
9fc71bca-07d1-44af-9248-1b9545265a58
Owen, David
(2002)
Equality, democracy and self-respect: Nietzsche's agonic perfectionism.
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 24, .
Abstract
'One who makes himself a worm cannot complain if people step on him.'
—Immanuel Kant
Kant's remark may sound harsh to our modern sensibility but it raises an issue that is central to an understanding of Nietzsche's critique of "the democratic movement of our times" (BGE 203) and, thus, to an understanding of Nietzsche's salience for contemporary democratic theory. This issue is self-respect—and, more generally, the topic of duties to oneself. The relationship between this issue and democratic theory may not appear a wholly obvious one but, on Nietzsche's account, it is crucial to the kind of equality that is expressed by democratic practices. Nietzsche's concern, I'll argue, is that "the democratic movement of our times" expresses a levelling mode of equality that undermines the conditions of self-respect in the relevant sense. Consequently, the aim of this article will be to elucidate Nietzsche's understanding of self-respect, to clarify the grounds on which he attacks "the democratic movement of our times" and to consider the relationship between these arguments and his advocacy of the agon as a model of cultural and political relations. It concludes by drawing out the implications of this interpretation of Nietzsche for democratic theory.
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Published date: 2002
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Local EPrints ID: 34845
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/34845
ISSN: 0968-8005
PURE UUID: 9f639b9c-afee-4ca1-8233-cb11088efc3e
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Date deposited: 15 May 2006
Last modified: 12 Dec 2021 02:53
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