Rewarding idleness
Rewarding idleness
Market wages reflect expected productivity by using signals of past performance and past experience. These signals are generated at least partially on the job and create incentives for agents to choose high-profile and highly visible tasks. If agents have private information about the profitability of different tasks, firms may wish to prevent over- investment in visible tasks by increasing their opportunity costs. Firms can do so, for instance, by using employee perks. Heterogeneity in employee types induces substantial diversity in organizational and contractual choices, particularly regarding the extent to which conspicuous activities are tolerated or encouraged, the use of employee perks, and contingent wages
Department of Economics, Central European University
Canidio, Andrea
a4e8d96b-a879-4fb4-a661-d7fb9e3754ff
Gall, Thomas
8df67f3d-fe3c-4a3f-8ce7-e2090557fcd4
2012
Canidio, Andrea
a4e8d96b-a879-4fb4-a661-d7fb9e3754ff
Gall, Thomas
8df67f3d-fe3c-4a3f-8ce7-e2090557fcd4
Canidio, Andrea and Gall, Thomas
(2012)
Rewarding idleness
(Central European University Department of Economics Working Papers, 2012/14)
Budapest, HU.
Department of Economics, Central European University
39pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Abstract
Market wages reflect expected productivity by using signals of past performance and past experience. These signals are generated at least partially on the job and create incentives for agents to choose high-profile and highly visible tasks. If agents have private information about the profitability of different tasks, firms may wish to prevent over- investment in visible tasks by increasing their opportunity costs. Firms can do so, for instance, by using employee perks. Heterogeneity in employee types induces substantial diversity in organizational and contractual choices, particularly regarding the extent to which conspicuous activities are tolerated or encouraged, the use of employee perks, and contingent wages
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Published date: 2012
Organisations:
Economics
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Local EPrints ID: 348656
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/348656
PURE UUID: 120517fa-a615-4c54-a119-53652f6ad67e
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Date deposited: 21 Feb 2013 11:29
Last modified: 11 Dec 2021 04:42
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Author:
Andrea Canidio
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