The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

A global game with strategic substitutes and complements

A global game with strategic substitutes and complements
A global game with strategic substitutes and complements
We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.
global games, congestion, coordination
Mimeo
Karp, Larry
c0e2efad-f4e6-4fb9-9630-aaa8cf37b72e
Lee, In Ho
f9fa5dda-198f-4857-8fe5-82023a389d3c
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
Karp, Larry
c0e2efad-f4e6-4fb9-9630-aaa8cf37b72e
Lee, In Ho
f9fa5dda-198f-4857-8fe5-82023a389d3c
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61

Karp, Larry, Lee, In Ho and Mason, Robin (2005) A global game with strategic substitutes and complements USA. Mimeo

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)

Abstract

We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.

Full text not available from this repository.

More information

Published date: 2005
Keywords: global games, congestion, coordination
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 35024
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/35024
PURE UUID: 28de5f6c-b8c6-4064-8d03-e32e07292ae2

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:48

Export record

Contributors

Author: Larry Karp
Author: In Ho Lee
Author: Robin Mason

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×