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Manipulated into giving: when parasitism drives apparent or incidental altruism

Manipulated into giving: when parasitism drives apparent or incidental altruism
Manipulated into giving: when parasitism drives apparent or incidental altruism
Altruistic acts involve the actor donating fitness to beneficiaries at net cost to itself. In contrast, parasitic acts involve the actor extracting benefit from others at net cost to the donors. Both behaviours may have the same direct net-cost transferral of fitness from donor to beneficiary; the key difference between parasitism and altruism is thus who drives the interaction. Identifying the evolutionary driver is not always straightforward in practice, yet it is crucial in determining the conditions necessary to sustain such fitness exchange. Here, we put classical ecological competition into a novel game-theoretic framework in order to distinguish altruism from parasitism. The distinction depends on the type of interaction that beneficiaries have among themselves. When this is not costly, net-cost transferrals of fitness from the donor are strongly altruistic, and sustained only by indirect benefits to the donor from assortative mixing. When the interaction among beneficiaries is costly, however, net-cost transferrals of fitness from the donor are sustainable without assortative mixing. The donor is then forced into apparent or incidental altruism driven by parasitism from the beneficiary. We consider various scenarios in which direct and indirect fitness consequences of strong altruism may have different evolutionary drivers.
biofilms, cooperative trading, density dependence, hawk–dove game, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game
0962-8452
20130108-[10pp]
Doncaster, C. Patrick
0eff2f42-fa0a-4e35-b6ac-475ad3482047
Jackson, Adam
6d9fd09d-2a01-4ed2-9406-08eecc801b30
Watson, Richard A.
ce199dfc-d5d4-4edf-bd7b-f9e224c96c75
Doncaster, C. Patrick
0eff2f42-fa0a-4e35-b6ac-475ad3482047
Jackson, Adam
6d9fd09d-2a01-4ed2-9406-08eecc801b30
Watson, Richard A.
ce199dfc-d5d4-4edf-bd7b-f9e224c96c75

Doncaster, C. Patrick, Jackson, Adam and Watson, Richard A. (2013) Manipulated into giving: when parasitism drives apparent or incidental altruism Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 280, (1758), 20130108-[10pp]. (PMID:23486440).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Altruistic acts involve the actor donating fitness to beneficiaries at net cost to itself. In contrast, parasitic acts involve the actor extracting benefit from others at net cost to the donors. Both behaviours may have the same direct net-cost transferral of fitness from donor to beneficiary; the key difference between parasitism and altruism is thus who drives the interaction. Identifying the evolutionary driver is not always straightforward in practice, yet it is crucial in determining the conditions necessary to sustain such fitness exchange. Here, we put classical ecological competition into a novel game-theoretic framework in order to distinguish altruism from parasitism. The distinction depends on the type of interaction that beneficiaries have among themselves. When this is not costly, net-cost transferrals of fitness from the donor are strongly altruistic, and sustained only by indirect benefits to the donor from assortative mixing. When the interaction among beneficiaries is costly, however, net-cost transferrals of fitness from the donor are sustainable without assortative mixing. The donor is then forced into apparent or incidental altruism driven by parasitism from the beneficiary. We consider various scenarios in which direct and indirect fitness consequences of strong altruism may have different evolutionary drivers.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 13 March 2013
Published date: 7 May 2013
Keywords: biofilms, cooperative trading, density dependence, hawk–dove game, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game
Organisations: Electronics & Computer Science, Environmental

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 350902
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/350902
ISSN: 0962-8452
PURE UUID: 473e0a04-de5b-4409-997b-f70d6999996b
ORCID for C. Patrick Doncaster: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9406-0693

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 10 Apr 2013 13:11
Last modified: 29 Sep 2017 08:48

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Contributors

Author: Adam Jackson

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