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Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders

Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders
Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders
We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts") are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.
339-345
Robu, Valentin
36b30550-208e-48d4-8f0e-8ff6976cf566
Parkes, David C.
3c873bcd-d181-4d6f-9347-ac345399f8d3
Ito, Takayuki
60235c85-14ee-4191-a711-a3f8a2a49bf6
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Robu, Valentin
36b30550-208e-48d4-8f0e-8ff6976cf566
Parkes, David C.
3c873bcd-d181-4d6f-9347-ac345399f8d3
Ito, Takayuki
60235c85-14ee-4191-a711-a3f8a2a49bf6
Jennings, N. R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Robu, Valentin, Parkes, David C., Ito, Takayuki and Jennings, N. R. (2013) Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders. At Proc. 23rd Int. Joint Conf. on AI (IJCAI 2013) Proc. 23rd Int. Joint Conf. on AI (IJCAI 2013). pp. 339-345.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts") are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: August 2013
Published date: 2013
Venue - Dates: Proc. 23rd Int. Joint Conf. on AI (IJCAI 2013), 2013-08-01
Organisations: Electronics & Computer Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 351025
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/351025
PURE UUID: 5b0c0568-e585-4e73-b363-001aa4cc4d3d

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Date deposited: 12 Apr 2013 15:52
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 04:29

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