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Costly advertising and the evolution of cooperation

Costly advertising and the evolution of cooperation
Costly advertising and the evolution of cooperation
In this paper I investigate the co-evolution of fast and slow strategy spread and game strategies in populations of spatially distributed agents engaged in a one off evolutionary dilemma game. Agents are characterized by a pair of traits, a game strategy (cooperate or defect) and a binary 'advertising' strategy (advertise or don't advertise). Advertising, which comes at a cost, a, allows investment into faster propagation of the agents traits to adjacent individuals. Importantly, game strategy and advertising strategy are subject to the same evolutionary mechanism. Via analytical reasoning and numerical simulations I demonstrate that a range of advertising costs exists, such that the prevalence of cooperation is significantly enhanced through co-evolution. Linking costly replication to the success of cooperators exposes a novel co-evolutionary mechanism that might contribute towards a better understanding of the origins of cooperation-supporting heterogeneity in agent populations.
1932-6203
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7

Brede, Markus (2013) Costly advertising and the evolution of cooperation. PLoS ONE. (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this paper I investigate the co-evolution of fast and slow strategy spread and game strategies in populations of spatially distributed agents engaged in a one off evolutionary dilemma game. Agents are characterized by a pair of traits, a game strategy (cooperate or defect) and a binary 'advertising' strategy (advertise or don't advertise). Advertising, which comes at a cost, a, allows investment into faster propagation of the agents traits to adjacent individuals. Importantly, game strategy and advertising strategy are subject to the same evolutionary mechanism. Via analytical reasoning and numerical simulations I demonstrate that a range of advertising costs exists, such that the prevalence of cooperation is significantly enhanced through co-evolution. Linking costly replication to the success of cooperators exposes a novel co-evolutionary mechanism that might contribute towards a better understanding of the origins of cooperation-supporting heterogeneity in agent populations.

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Accepted/In Press date: 2013
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 352824
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/352824
ISSN: 1932-6203
PURE UUID: 8b3e7a11-77a8-4408-adec-2c5a168bbede

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Date deposited: 18 May 2013 12:45
Last modified: 07 Apr 2020 16:34

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Contributors

Author: Markus Brede

University divisions

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