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Police enforcement of tax arrears: The last resort for transition states

Police enforcement of tax arrears: The last resort for transition states
Police enforcement of tax arrears: The last resort for transition states
This article has concluded that revenue collection based upon the development of well-embedded civil society norms can be quite effectively carried out by civil (non-police) tax administration bodies, even in countries where economic and political transition are not yet fully complete.
The CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) are helped, in this respect, by the accession partnership with the EU and its Member States. By contrast, the Russian Federation's development of quite a large, but less effective, tax police reflects the very different political and economic circumstances in that country. In Russia, a much weaker civil society base plus higher levels of corruption and deprivation produces a more politicised tax enforcement system.
1360-4724
77-83
Gregory, Frank
bcd32335-ee70-4be3-8ca5-e9ad84bdd0fb
Gregory, Frank
bcd32335-ee70-4be3-8ca5-e9ad84bdd0fb

Gregory, Frank (2002) Police enforcement of tax arrears: The last resort for transition states. Bulletin of the Institute of Development Studies, 33 (3), 77-83.

Record type: Article

Abstract

This article has concluded that revenue collection based upon the development of well-embedded civil society norms can be quite effectively carried out by civil (non-police) tax administration bodies, even in countries where economic and political transition are not yet fully complete.
The CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) are helped, in this respect, by the accession partnership with the EU and its Member States. By contrast, the Russian Federation's development of quite a large, but less effective, tax police reflects the very different political and economic circumstances in that country. In Russia, a much weaker civil society base plus higher levels of corruption and deprivation produces a more politicised tax enforcement system.

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Published date: 2002

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 35286
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/35286
ISSN: 1360-4724
PURE UUID: 4b3a7c25-22af-4dee-a488-3888db53a65e

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Date deposited: 17 May 2006
Last modified: 11 Dec 2021 15:27

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Contributors

Author: Frank Gregory

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