The guise of reasons
The guise of reasons
In this article it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways in which we believe we have normative reason to act. This change—from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons— is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view.
63-72
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
January 2013
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
Gregory, Alex
(2013)
The guise of reasons.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (1), .
Abstract
In this article it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways in which we believe we have normative reason to act. This change—from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons— is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view.
Text
The Guise of Reasons for website.pdf
- Author's Original
More information
Published date: January 2013
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 352951
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/352951
ISSN: 2152-1123
PURE UUID: 210e84f9-efe0-4864-ba4d-416a1817b5cd
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 28 May 2013 10:50
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:48
Export record
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics
