The guise of reasons

Gregory, Alex (2013) The guise of reasons American Philosophical Quarterly, 50, (1), pp. 63-72.


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In this article it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways in which we believe we have normative reason to act. This change—from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons— is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 2152-1123 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Organisations: Philosophy
ePrint ID: 352951
Date :
Date Event
January 2013Published
Date Deposited: 28 May 2013 10:50
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2017 15:28
Further Information:Google Scholar

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