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The guise of reasons

The guise of reasons
The guise of reasons
In this article it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways in which we believe we have normative reason to act. This change—from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons— is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view.
2152-1123
63-72
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
Gregory, Alex
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f

Gregory, Alex (2013) The guise of reasons American Philosophical Quarterly, 50, (1), pp. 63-72.

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this article it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways in which we believe we have normative reason to act. This change—from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons— is significant because the revised view avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view.

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Published date: January 2013
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 352951
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/352951
ISSN: 2152-1123
PURE UUID: 210e84f9-efe0-4864-ba4d-416a1817b5cd

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Date deposited: 28 May 2013 10:50
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 04:09

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Contributors

Author: Alex Gregory

University divisions

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