Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision

Bardsley, Nicholas and Sausgrueber, Rupert (2005) Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision Journal of Economic Psychology, 26, (5), pp. 664-681. (doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001).


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People contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001
ISSNs: 0167-4870 (print)
Keywords: conformity, reciprocity, ublic good experiment

ePrint ID: 35305
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 15 May 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 22:10
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