On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy
On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy
Abstract Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Econo mists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by "coordination games" seem to point to a form of rational action, "team thinking," which is not individualistic. Philosophers' analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective character istic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others' actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other mi
141-159
Bardsley, N.
4642d3b9-d339-42aa-8bc3-935875cf72ae
1 July 2007
Bardsley, N.
4642d3b9-d339-42aa-8bc3-935875cf72ae
Bardsley, N.
(2007)
On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy.
Synthese, 157 (2), .
Abstract
Abstract Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Econo mists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by "coordination games" seem to point to a form of rational action, "team thinking," which is not individualistic. Philosophers' analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective character istic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others' actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other mi
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Published date: 1 July 2007
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Local EPrints ID: 35309
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/35309
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: da7068f3-59da-469d-baef-ef6e4e8dc933
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Date deposited: 13 Jul 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:51
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N. Bardsley
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