Chen, Ying (2012) Value of public information in sender–receiver games. Economics Letters, 114 (3), 343-345. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.007).
Record type:
Article
Abstract
I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.
More information
e-pub ahead of print date: 23 October 2011
Published date: March 2012
Keywords:
value of information, sender–receiver games, cheap talk
Organisations:
Economics
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 353792
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/353792
ISSN: 0165-1765
PURE UUID: a78cabaf-6937-4d33-9faa-1252c08aa7ef
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 18 Jun 2013 09:28
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 14:10
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Ying Chen
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.