The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise "or flight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together.
1309
University of Southampton
Chen, Ying
338aa31f-c129-49c9-b5b7-b583836a8cc1
Eraslan, Hülya
7ffc8aa5-cbc8-4deb-93c4-3ae2c86ea444
Chen, Ying
338aa31f-c129-49c9-b5b7-b583836a8cc1
Eraslan, Hülya
7ffc8aa5-cbc8-4deb-93c4-3ae2c86ea444

Chen, Ying and Eraslan, Hülya (2013) Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1309) Southampton, GB. University of Southampton 30pp.

Record type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)

Abstract

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise "or flight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together.

PDF
combined 1309.pdf - Version of Record
Download (473kB)

More information

Published date: 2013
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 353794
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/353794
PURE UUID: d4848c2d-a29c-4654-a1c2-28e2181d2242

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 18 Jun 2013 09:56
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 04:01

Export record

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×