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Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas

Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas
Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas
The implausibility of the extreme rationality assumptions of Nash equilibrium has been attested by numerous experimental studies with human players. In particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler’s dilemma, the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high rates of deviation from the unique Nash equilibrium, dependent on the game parameters or the environment in which the game is played. These results inspired several attempts to develop suitable solution concepts to more accurately explain human behaviour. In this line, the recently proposed notion of cooperative equilibrium, [5], [6], based on the idea that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has shown promising results for single-shot games. In this paper, we extend this approach to iterated settings. Specifically, we define the Iterated Cooperative Equilibrium (ICE) and show it makes statistically precise predictions of population average behaviour in the aforementioned domains. Importantly, the definition of ICE does not involve any free parameters, and so it is fully predictive.
978-3-642-41391-9
146-158
Capraro, Valerio
6a418d6c-4a80-498e-8946-9eb38601f527
Venanzi, Matteo
ba24a77f-31a6-4c05-a647-babf8f660440
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Capraro, Valerio
6a418d6c-4a80-498e-8946-9eb38601f527
Venanzi, Matteo
ba24a77f-31a6-4c05-a647-babf8f660440
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Capraro, Valerio, Venanzi, Matteo, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2013) Cooperative Equilibria in Iterated Social Dilemmas. 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). pp. 146-158 . (doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_13).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

The implausibility of the extreme rationality assumptions of Nash equilibrium has been attested by numerous experimental studies with human players. In particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler’s dilemma, the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high rates of deviation from the unique Nash equilibrium, dependent on the game parameters or the environment in which the game is played. These results inspired several attempts to develop suitable solution concepts to more accurately explain human behaviour. In this line, the recently proposed notion of cooperative equilibrium, [5], [6], based on the idea that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has shown promising results for single-shot games. In this paper, we extend this approach to iterated settings. Specifically, we define the Iterated Cooperative Equilibrium (ICE) and show it makes statistically precise predictions of population average behaviour in the aforementioned domains. Importantly, the definition of ICE does not involve any free parameters, and so it is fully predictive.

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Published date: 2013
Venue - Dates: 6th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2013-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 355139
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/355139
ISBN: 978-3-642-41391-9
PURE UUID: a1d6d02d-2dc7-4cdf-8c8a-f9c956993cc7

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Date deposited: 30 Jul 2013 15:29
Last modified: 14 Aug 2019 18:46

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Contributors

Author: Valerio Capraro
Author: Matteo Venanzi
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

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